# **BUSINESS AND POLITICS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD**

## **Global Opinion Report No. 153**

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## **Introductory Note**

This week report consists of 29 surveys. Two of these are multi-country surveys while the rest are national surveys from around the world.



# Topic of the week: INDIA-

72% of Indians see Corruption as India's Biggest Problem

This page is devoted to opinions of countries whose polling activity is gener

This page is devoted to opinions of countries whose polling activity is generally not known very widely or where a recent topical issue requires special attention.



*Commentary*: Indians See Corruption as One of the Main Ailment in the Country

Close on the heels of scams such as that involving Mumbai's Adarsh housing society, a majority of Indians identify corruption in the public sphere as India's biggest bane, a CVOTER survey finds and writes passionately about it. Indeed there is also a brighter side to India's growth. This piece should

therefore be read with that caution in mind.

According to Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), **India** is ranked 87 amongst 180 nations even below the likes of *Rawanda*, *Namibia* and *Botswana*, all relatively deprived countries but ostensibly more honest than us. But "rankings" such as these should come as no surprise to most of us:

While we may celebrate our growth rate and economic prowess, the sad truth is that economic benefits of development are being shared by just a few, privileged and powerful people in **India**. The *license raj* of the pre-Liberalisation era may have gone but that has not lessened the power of politicians and bureaucrats in the country, who along with interested corporates, are able to bend rules, grant favours, and so on—all with a view to subverting the system, making a mockery of just and fair practices and making money for private gain rather than for the good of the nation.

The Hindi heartland—UP and Bihar, because of chaotic politics and bureaucrats and politicians who have made private gain their overreaching, all encompassing "philosophy", have a notorious reputation for harbouring and promoting corruption. Yet, recent scams that have caused uproar in the country show that other states are just as corrupt, if not worse. You only

have to look at the likes of the recent Adarsh Housing scam in Maharashtra to realize how this cancer in our society is spreading and even venerable institutions such as the army possibly are affected by this deep rot.

| Do you agree that corruption is modern India's big-<br>gest bane? |   |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| Can't Say   | 9 |  |  |  |
| Definitely Yes 72   |   |  |  |  |
| Yes, may be 15  |   |  |  |  |
| No,not at all   | 4 |  |  |  |

**Base: All Respondents** 

The Adarsh controversy erupted over how a society in Colaba, Mumbai, initially meant to be just six-storey high and house Kargil war heroes and their widows got converted into a 31-storeyed tower through a collusion of bureaucrats, politicians and top defence brass. In fact, commentators watching the whole drama unravel have noted that everyone who moved the file along, giving permissions and clearances where none should have come—the environment ministry has not cleared the project—benefited.

This kind of corruption points to a deeper rot within out entire polity which can only be stemmed through serious action and a will to clean up the entire system. Rigorous investigation into all instances of corruption—whether it is the CWG mess or this one—and credible punishment to the funding should also take place.


A recent CVOTER survey conducted across 21 states found that an overwhelming **72** % of respondents agreed that corruption was the biggest bane in the country. Another **15** % added "may be" it is, while just **4%** outrightly denied that that was the problem.

We may think that **Indians** are immune to corruption by now but the survey revealed that people strongly look forward to credible action being taken against the tainted. When asked whether they felt that the wrongdoers in scams such as Adarsh housing and CWG will be brought to book, a majority of **47** % replied in the affirmative. A further **18** % said "may be" while just **19** % were pessimistic and said "never".

On the other hand, close to half (47 %) of the respondents said that Maharashtra and Karnataka were in danger of going the Bihar way. Only 20 % said that the political leadership was definitely interested in weeding out corruption from the public sphere. 26 % said that it was taking action but not as much as required. While a substantial 37 % said that the government was not serious at all about this issue. Clearly, there is a strong sense of discontent with the corrupt polity of the day. It is high time that our leaders woke up and took notice.

**SOURCE**: <u>http://teamcvoter.com/teamcvoter/newsletter12i1/newsletter\_12issue1.pdf</u>

# **INDIA**



# INDIA:

Population: 1,156,897,766 (July 2010 est.)

GDP per Capita: \$3,100 (2009 est.)

The Indus Valley civilization, one of the world's oldest, flourished during the 3rd and 2nd millennia B.C. and extended into northwestern India. Aryan tribes from the northwest infiltrated onto the Indian subcontinent about 1500 B.C.; their merger with the earlier Dravidian inhabitants created the classical Indian culture. The Maurya Empire of the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. - which reached its zenith under ASHOKA - united much of South Asia. The Golden Age ushered in by the Gupta dynasty (4th to 6th centuries A.D.) saw a towering of Indian science, art, and culture. Islam spread across the subcontinent over a period of 700 years. In the 10th and 11th centuries, Turks and Afghans invaded India and established the Delhi Sultanate. In the early 16th century, the Emperor BABUR established the Mughal Dynasty which ruled India for more than three century, the European explorers began establishing footholds in India during the 16th century. By the 19th century, Great Britain had become the dominant political power on the subcontinent. The British Indian Army played a vital role in both World Wals Nonviolent resistance to British rule, led by Mohandas GANDHI and Jawaharlal NEHRU, eventually brought about independence in 1947. Communal violence led to the subcontinent's bloody partition, which resulted in the creation of two separate states, India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought three wars since independence, the last of which in 1971 resulted in East Pakistan becoming the separate nation of Bangladesh. India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 caused Pakistan to conduct its own tests that same year. In November 2008, terrorists allegedly originating from Pakistan conducted a series of coordinated attacks in Mumbai, India's financial capital. Despite pressing problems such as significant overpopulation, environmental degradation, extensive poverty, and widespread corruption, rapid economic development is fueling India's rise on the world stage.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html

#### **MIDDLE EAST**

#### **Summary of Polls**

#### Palestinians Stuck in Worries

A recent survey of Palestinians show that they are not satisfied with both the ruling parties in the territories and demand for a fresh election. However in their crisis with Israel a two third majority is not willing start negotiations without a freeze on building new settlements. (PCPSR)

29 December 2010

#### WEST & CENTRAL ASIA

Pakistanis Believe That Taxes Are Unjust and Too Many

Over the decades majority of Pakistanis continue to believe that taxes are unjust and too many. Acceptability of taxes rose from 34% in 1991 to 45% in 2002 and then declined to 34% again by 2010. (Gallup Pakistan)

January 4, 2011

Two Third of Pakistanis Repent For Their Sins Everyday

According to a Gilani Research Foundation survey carried out by Gallup Pakistan, almost two third of all Pakistanis (64%) state that they seek forgiveness for their sins from the Creator everyday, 28% sometimes and 7% never. (Gallup Pakistan) January 6, 2011

### SOUTH ASIA

Indian Muslims Doing Well in Hindu Majority Country

A recent survey of Indian Muslims show that despite fears and comparative backwardness Indian Muslims are on the way to integration. They do not want separate representations and reject the idea to migrate to Pakistan or Bangladesh if given the chance. (CVoter)

December 2010

Indians See Corruption As One of Main Ailment in The Country

A recent CVOTER survey conducted across 21 states found that an overwhelming 72 per cent of respondents agreed that corruption was the biggest bane in the country. Another 15 per cent added "may be" it is while just 4 per cent outrightly denied that that was the problem. (CVoter)

December 2010

#### NORTHEAST ASIA

Japanese Not Satisfied With Their Government

A recent survey shows that people in Japan are not satisfied with the Kan government. However they are also against midterm elections. (Asahi Shimbun)

December 14, 2010

#### WEST EUROPE

Expected 'Slow Burn' Turned Into A 'Deep Freeze' As Retail Footfall Suffers In December Final figures for December released by Synovate Retail Performance confirm that the month was significantly quieter on the high street than last year. The Retail Traffic Index (RTI), the UK metric of non-food store footfall was down 7.0% for the month compared to December 2009. (Synovate)

January 07, 2011

EU Residents Downbeat About Local Job Market in 2010 (Multi-country survey)

Europeans' evaluations of their local job markets were universally grim last year and even more dismal than Americans' assessments; neither are positive signs heading into 2011. A median of 13% across the 25 EU countries Gallup surveyed in 2010 said it was a good time to find a job in their communities, compared with 24% of Americans. (Gallup USA) January 4, 2011

Labour Still Leads in Britain, Even if Coalition Partners Run Together

The opposition Labour Party remains ahead of the Conservatives in Britain, while the Liberal Democrats have recovered from their poor showing in December, a new Vision Critical / Angus Reid poll has found. Only a third of people who voted for the Liberal

Democrats in 2010 would support the party if it runs in tandem with the Tories. (Angus Reid)

January 07, 2011

#### NORTH AMERICA

Obama & Congress Job Approval Improves

President Barack Obama's job approval rating has bounced back to 43% after tying an all-time low of 39% in early December. Also increasing over that time are the number of voters who approve of the performance of Congress and the number that believe the nation is headed in the right direction. These changes were caused primarily by positive movement among Democratic voters. (Zogby International) January 05, 2011

Christie Trumps Field Of Potential Presidential Candidates; Only One Who Beats Obama

New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie leads a hypothetical field of contenders for the Presidential nomination among Republican voters, and is the only Republican tested who leads President Barack Obama among all voters, while Obama and former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney are tied, a new Zogby Interactive poll finds. (Zogby International) January 03, 2011

Americans Happier, Less Stressed in 2010

Americans were, on average, happier and less stressed in 2010 than they were in 2009. The percentage of Americans experiencing a lot of happiness and enjoyment without a lot of stress and worry increased by one percentage point in 2010, while stress decreased by about the same amount. (Gallup USA)

January 4, 2011

Majority of Americans Say 2011 Will Be Better Than 2010

Americans enter the new year with considerably more optimism than pessimism about what it may bring: 58% say 2011 will be better than 2010, 20% say 2011 will be worse, and 21% say it will be the same.

January 3, 2011

Looking at 2011 Economy, Optimists Double Pessimists

Twice as many Americans think the U.S. economy will be better rather than worse in 2011. Americans living in the East and Midwest are a little more optimistic about the economic outlook for 2011 than those living in the South and West. Americans making \$75,000 or more in annual income are slightly more optimistic than other Americans, and Democrats are considerably more optimistic than their independent and Republican counterparts. (Gallup USA)

January 3, 2011

Obama Job Approval Reaches 50% for First Time Since Spring

Barack Obama's job approval rating reached the symbolic 50% mark in the latest threeday average from Gallup Daily tracking. Obama's approval rating has been in the mid-40% range for much of the latter half of 2010. He last hit 50% approval in a three-day average near the end of May/beginning of June. (Gallup USA) January 3, 2011

111th Congress Averaged 25% Approval, Among Recent Lowest

The 111th Congress received an average 25% approval rating from Americans over the course of 2009 and 2010. While this is similar to the 23% average approval rating for the

110th Congress spanning 2007 and 2008, it is among the lowest average approval ratings for a Congress that Gallup has recorded in the past two decades. (Gallup USA) January 5, 2011

Democratic Party ID Drops in 2010, Tying 22-Year Low

In 2010, 31% of Americans identified as Democrats, down five percentage points from just two years ago and tied for the lowest annual average Gallup has measured in the last 22 years. While Democrats still outnumber Republicans by two points, the percentage identifying as independents increased to 38%, on the high end of what Gallup has measured in the last two decades. (Gallup USA) January 5, 2011

American Views on Immigration Temper Slightly Since the Summer

While more than half of Americans continue to have negative views on immigration, the attitudes of respondents have softened since the heated public debates of summer regarding the Arizona immigration law, a new survey conducted by Vision Critical has found. Two-in-five Americans would deport all illegal immigrants currently working in the U.S., while three-in-ten endorse the "path to citizenship." (Angus Reid) December 30, 2010

Standard-of-Living Perceptions in U.S. Are Slightly Upbeat

Americans' perceptions of whether their standard of living is getting better or getting worse were fairly steady throughout 2010. Gallup Daily tracking in December found 45% saying their standard of living was getting better, while 35% said it was getting worse, for a + 10 "net improving" score. (Gallup USA)

January 7, 2011

In U.S., 46% Favor, 40% Oppose Repealing Healthcare Law

Americans do not strongly endorse the new Republican House majority's efforts to repeal the landmark healthcare legislation passed last year. A new Gallup poll finds that 46% of Americans want their representative in Congress to vote to repeal the healthcare law, 40% want their representative to vote to let the law stand, and 14% have no opinion. (Gallup USA)

January 7, 2011

Gallup Finds Unemployment at 9.6% in December

Unemployment, as measured by Gallup without seasonal adjustment, increased to 9.6% at the end of December -- up from 9.3% in mid-December and 8.8% at the end of November. (Gallup USA)

January 6, 2011

Faith on the Hill

Many analysts described the November 2010 midterm elections as a sea change, with Republicans taking control of the U.S. House of Representatives and narrowing the Democratic majority in the Senate. But this political overhaul appears to have had little effect on the religious composition of Congress, which is similar to the religious makeup of the previous Congress and of the nation, according to an analysis by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life. (Pew Research Center)

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January 5, 2011
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The 2010 Congressional Reapportionment and Latinos

Hispanic voters are nearly three times more prevalent in states that gained congressional seats and Electoral College votes in the 2010 reapportionment than they are in states that lost seats, according to an analysis of Census data by the Pew Hispanic Center. (Pew Research Center)

January 5, 2011

Optimism About 2011

Americans are more optimistic than not about the year ahead --- both when it comes to themselves and their families and when it comes to the world. But they don't feel any more positive about 2011 in this Economist/YouGov Poll (conducted the first week of this year) than they felt one year ago about the prospects for 2010. (Yovgov) January 7, 2011

Very Religious Have Higher Wellbeing Across All Faiths

Very religious Americans of all major faiths -- and even those who do not have a formal religious identity -- have higher overall wellbeing than do their respective counterparts who are moderately religious or nonreligious. This relationship, based on an analysis of more than 372,000 interviews, is statistically significant after major demographic and regional variables are controlled for. (Gallup USA)

January 6, 2011

# AUSTRALASIA

Australian Perceive Economic Problem to Be The Most Important Problem of the World & Themselves

Australians still consider Economic issues 32% (down 1% since September 2010) the most important problem facing the World today, ahead of Environmental issues (26%, down 3%) and Terrorism/ Wars/ Security/ Safety (15%, up 3%). (Roy Morgan) January 6, 2011

#### **MULTI-COUNTRY STUDIES**

Hong Kong and China optimistic about the year ahead

As the economy continues to stabilise, at least to some extent in much of the world, are consumers' feelings following suit? According to Synovate's first release of results on consumers' perception on the economy from the "Synovate Global Trends study," consumers in China and Hong Kong are the top groups in Asia feeling the most optimistic about their market's economy and what's ahead. (Synovate)

7 January 2011

#### **CYBERWORLD**

Internet Gains on Television as Public's Main News Source

The internet is slowly closing in on television as Americans' main source of national and international news. Currently, 41% say they get most of their news about national and international news from the internet, which is little changed over the past two years but up 17 points since 2007. (Pew Research Center)

January 4, 2011

Mobile Phones Shaping New Social Lives

From texting to video to social networking, mobile phones are taking an ever-expanding role in our daily lives. And young people around the world are more immersed in mobile technology than any previous generation. (Nielson) December 2010

#### MIDDLE EAST

#### Palestinians Stuck in Worries

29 December 2010 Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (38) *In the fourth quarter of 2010:* 

While demand for holding local elections increases, and while pessimism regarding the chances for reconciliation increases, and while criticism of the PA for suppression of freedoms increases, credibility of the authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip diminishes, support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative decreases, and two thirds oppose return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction despite the fact that a majority believes Israel would be the first to benefit from no negotiations<sup>1</sup>

#### 16-18 December 2010

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Stripbetween 16-18 December 2010. Before the conduct of the poll, authorities in the West Bank arrested a Hamas cell and accused it of plotting to assassinate the governor of Nablus and Hamas sentenced three Fateh members to death after them of killing a Gazan mosque preacher. A meeting convicting in Damascus between Fateh and Hamas representatives failed to reach an agreement on reconciliation. On the peace process front, the US announced that it has ceased to press Israel on the need to freeze settlement construction and urged Palestinians and Israelis to enter into indirect negotiations it promised to sponsor. This poll covers issues related to domestic conditions: the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of reconciliation and reunification, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. The poll also covers issues related to the peace process and public attitude toward a permanent settlement as well as Palestinian perception of the views of the Israeli Jewish majority of various calls and proposed legislation that seeks to discriminate against Arabs. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org.

#### **Main Findings:**

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2010 indicate an increase in the level of pessimism regarding the chances for reconciliation and restoration of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They also indicate an overwhelming rejection of alternative forms of relations between the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup><u>http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38e.html</u>

West Bank and the Gaza Strip such as a confederation or separate elections in each region. Findings also show widespread distrust in the authorities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip regarding Fateh-Hamas relationship. For example, only a quarter or less believe as true the news about a Hamas plot to assassinate the governor of Nablus or that the three Fateh members sentenced to death in Gaza have received a fair trial. Findings also point out to a significant and continued deterioration in public perception of the level of freedoms enjoyed by citizens in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the split between these two areas in June 2007. For example, belief that citizens can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear retreated from 56% in September 2007 to 27% in this poll. Similarly a retreat occurred in the belief that citizens can criticize the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe that the government of Salam Fayyad should conduct local elections now that the Palestinian Supreme Court of Justice has annulled a previous decision by the government to cancel local elections that were scheduled to take place last July.

Finally, findings show that the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas has remained almost unchanged compared to the situation during the third quarter of the year. The same is true regarding the popularity of president Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh. Moreover, findings regarding the balance of power in the fourth quarter of this year are very similar to those of the final quarter of 2009 which means that the internal and external developments throughout 2010 has left no impact on this critical issue of internal balance between Fateh and Hamas and Abbas and Haniyeh.

Findings show that two thirds of the public oppose return to US-sponsored indirect negotiations with Israel. But they also show that almost 60% believe that Israel would be the one to benefit from such a step while only 13% believe that Palestinians would benefit from not returning to negotiations. Findings also show that the public is still uncertain about the best alternative to negotiations: two groups support almost equally two options, going to the US Security Council and waging violent confrontations. A third group prefers a non violent resistance and a fourth prefers to dissolve the PA.

#### (1) Domestic Conditions

17% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 35% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good

61% believe corruption exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip and 71% believe corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank

60% believe that freedom of press exists, or exists to some extent, in the West Bank while 42% believe it exists, or exists to some extent, in the Gaza Strip

27% believe that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear while 19% believe that people can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip without fear

Perception of personal safety and security stands at 61% among residents of the West Bank and 58% among residents of the Gaza Strip

Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 36% and Fayyad's government at 43%, and 23% believe that Haniyeh's government is the legitimate one while 29% believe that Fayyad's government is the legitimate one

Satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas stands at 50% and dissatisfaction at 45%

If new presidential elections were to take place today, Abbas would receive 56% and Haniyeh 38%, and if the candidates wereMarwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter 31%

If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 25% of the vote, Fateh 44%, all other lists combined 11%, and 20% remain undecided

Pessimism about the chances for reconciliation increases with 39% believing that current separation is permanent

If Hamas wins the next elections, chances for reconciliation and chances for removing the current siege would decrease while such chances would increase if Fateh wins the next elections

65% reject alternative forms of association between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as a confederation, and 32% support them; moreover, 76% reject and 22% accept holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Less than one quarter believes that Hamas was indeed planning to assassinate the governor of Nablus and only 22% believe the three Fateh members sentenced to death in the Gaza Strip have received a fair trial

48% believe that the most vital Palestinian goal should be to end occupation and build a state and 21% believe it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, 20% believe it should be the right of return and 11% believe it should be democracy

70% believe that that the government of Salam Fayyad should hold local elections and 24% believe it should not

17% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 62% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in September-October, only 11% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% said it was bad or very bad. By contrast, 35% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and only 31% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 33% and 34% respectively. The evaluation of the residents of the West Bank to conditions in Gaza is not different from the evaluation of the residents of the Gaza Strip. But there is a difference between the evaluation of West Bank residents compared to that of the Gazans regarding West Bank conditions: 43% of the Gazans believe these conditions to be good or very good but 31% of West Bankers believe them to be good or very good.

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 61% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. Among residents of the West Bank, 72%, compared to 69% among Gazans, believe there is corruption in the PA in the West Bank. By contrast, a higher percentage of Gazans believe there is corruption in the public institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip reaching 66% compared to 57% among residents of the West Bank.

60% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 34% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 42% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 47% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Yet, only 27% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, only 19% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip. These percentages dropped in August 2008 to 47% for criticizing the authorities in the West Bank and 42% for criticizing the authorities in the Gaza Strip. A further drop occurred last September to 30% and 24% respectively.

| Table (1): Gradual decrease in belief about the ability to criticize authorities in the | West |
|---|------|
| Bank or Gaza Strip since the spilt between the two areas                                |      |

| Date           | Ability to criticize<br>authorities in the<br>West Bank | Ability to criticize<br>authorities in the<br>Gaza Strip |
|----------------|---|--|
| December 2010  | 27%   | 19%  |
| September 2010 | 30%   | 24%  |
| March 2009     | 37%   | 29%  |
| August 2008    | 47%   | 42%  |
| September 2007 | 56%   | 52%  |

Perception of safety and security stands at 61% in the West Bank and 58% in the Gaza Strip. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago.

Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad remains unchanged as it was three months ago standing at 36% for the Haniyeh's government and 43% for the Fayyad government. But findings show an increase in the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries from 37% three months ago to 45% in this poll. In the West Bank, the percentage of those wishing to immigrate remains unchanged at 24%.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas did not change during the past three months standing today at 50% while 45% say they are not satisfied. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank. 23% say the government of Haniyeh is the legitimate Palestinian government and 29% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. 34% say both governments are illegitimate. These results indicate a slight decrease in the percentage of those who view the Haniyeh government as legitimate. The percentage of those who believe Haniyeh's government is the legitimate one stands at 26% in the Gaza Strip compared to 21% in the West Bank. The percentage of those who believe Fayyad's government is the legitimate one stands at 31% in the Gaza Strip compared to 28% in the West Bank.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 56% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 59%. Three months ago, Abbas received 57% and Haniyeh 36%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 43% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 31% of the participants' votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 69%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 68% and Haniyeh 27%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to are Marwan Barghouti (selected respondents 27% of by the public). Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (16%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%), and Saeb Erekat (5%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 25% say they would vote for Hamas and 44% say they would vote for Fateh, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip is 26% and in the West Bank 24%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip is 48% and in the West Bank 42%.

In light of the failure of the latest Damascus meeting between Fateh and Hamas, the public remains pessimistic about the future of reconciliation and the restoration of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: belief that the split is permanent increases from 30% three months ago to 39% in this poll. Percentage of those who believe that unity will be restored soon drops from 14% to 8% during the same period. 49%, compared to 51% three months ago, say unity will return but only after a long time. Findings show that responsibility for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is placed on Hamas by 15% of the respondents and on Fateh by 13% and on both together by 62%. But when asked about the future of the unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if Hamas wins new elections, 55% say such a win would consolidate the split. But if Fateh wins, only 31% say its win would consolidate the split. Only 13% say a Hamas electoral victory would consolidate unity while 30% say a Fateh electoral victory would consolidate unity. Moreover, findings show that 86% believes that if Hamas wins the next presidential and legislative elections such victory would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government or would keep things as they are today. But if Fatehwins the next elections, only 41% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade or would keep conditions as they are today. 55% believe that a Fateh victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott but only 10% believe a Hamas victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott.

65% reject and 32% accept an alternative relationship between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip -- other than a full restoration of unity -- such as a confederation even if this alternative is temporary. In the confederate system that was rejected by two thirds, the government of Haniyeh would continue to administer the affairs of the Gaza Strip and the government of Fayyad would continue to administer the affairs of the West Bank, but President Abbas would preside over the two regions. Support for this alternative reaches 26% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank. Similarly, only 22% support and 76% oppose the holding of separate elections, one in the West Bank administered by the Fayyad government and one in the Gaza Strip administered by the Haniyeh government, even if this leads to the election of one legislative council and one president for the two regions. Support for the separate elections reaches 19% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank.

Less than one quarter (24%) believes that Hamas was indeed plotting to assassinate the governor of Nablus and 41% do not believe that while 35% say they do not know or are not certain. Belief that Hamas was indeed plotting to assassinate the governor reaches 30% in the Gaza Strip compared to 21% in the West Bank. Similarly, only 22% believe that the three Fateh members sentenced to death by a court in the Gaza Strip --after being convicted of killing a Gaza Mosque preacher-- have received a fair trial. 46% believe that they did not receive a fair trial and 32% are not sure or do not know. Belief that the trial was fair reaches 28% in the Gaza Strip compared to 19% in the West Bank.

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the *first* most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, only 21% believe the first most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and only 20% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return to refuges to their 1948 towns and villages, and only 11% believe that the first most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The largest percentage (39%) believes that the*second* most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return to refuges to their 1948 towns and villages. By contrast, only 24% believe that the second most vital goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 22% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 16% believe that the second and most vital goal should be to political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 26% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the split, 24% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 10% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, and 10% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions.

Findings show that 70% of the Palestinian public believe that now in the aftermath of the decision by the Supreme Court of Justice to annul the decision of the government of Salam Fayyad to cancel local elections, the government should hold local elections. 24% believe that the government should not hold local elections. Demand for local elections is higher in the West Bank (79%) than in the Gaza Strip (57%). It is worth noting that last June a majority of 56% of West Bank residents expressed its wish to participate in the local elections scheduled for July and that 51% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believed at that time that

these elections would be fair while 37% believed they would not be fair. Last March, support for holding local elections stood at 54% (60% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip).

#### (2) Peace Process

54% support and 42% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative

40% support and 58% oppose a permanent settlement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative; highest level of support (58%) goes to the item on ending the conflict and lowest (24%) to the item on state demilitarization, a state without an army.

49% support and 49% oppose recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in return for a recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian state is established

75% are worried and 25% are not worried that they or members of their families will be hurt at the hands of Israelis in their daily life or that their land will be confiscated or homes demolished

71% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent and 27% believe the chances are medium or high

67% oppose and 30% support return to negotiations without a settlement freeze but 59% believe that Israel would benefit more from such a step

In the absence of negotiations, 31% prefer to go the US Security Council, 29% prefer return to armed confrontations, 16% prefer non violent confrontations, and 16% prefer to dissolve the PA

Findings show a majority support (54%) for the Arab Peace Initiative while 42% oppose it. But a majority of 58% opposes, and 40% support, a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 38% in August 2009 and 49% in June 2010. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the US efforts to revive indirect negotiations.

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects all the items in the package with the exception of the one dealing with the end of conflict. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 49% support or strongly support and 50% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the

Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in June 2010, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 60% and opposition at 38%.

(2) **Refugees:** 41% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of property. In June 2010, 48% agreed with an identical compromise while 49% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In June 2010, an identical compromise obtained 37% support and 62% opposition.

(4) **Demilitarized Palestinian State:** 24% support and 74% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in June 2010, 28% support, and opposition reached 70%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 38% support and 61% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In June 2010, 41% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 57% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 58% support and 41% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in June 2010 were 63% support and 35% opposition.

|  | Dec<br>2003 | Dec<br>2004 | Dec<br>2005 | Dec<br>2006 | Dec<br>2007 | Dec<br>2008 | Aug<br>2009 | June<br>2010 | Dec<br>2010 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1) Borders and<br>Territorial Exchange | 57%         | 63%         | 55%         | 61%         | 56%         | 54%         | 49%         | 60%          | 49%         |
| 2) Refugees                            | 25%         | 46%         | 40%         | 41%         | 39%         | 40%         | 37%         | 48%          | 41%         |
| 3) Jerusalem                           | 46%         | 44%         | 33%         | 39%         | 36%         | 36%         | 31%         | 37%          | 36%         |
| 4) Demilitarized State                 | 36%         | 27%         | 20%         | 28%         | 23%         | 27%         | 24%         | 28%          | 24%         |
| 5) Security<br>Arrangements            | 23%         | 53%         | 43%         | 42%         | 51%         | 35%         | 34%         | 41%          | 38%         |
| 6) End of Conflict                     | 42%         | 69%         | 64%         | 62%         | 66%         | 55%         | 55%         | 63%          | 58%         |
| <b>Overall Package</b>                 | 39%         | 54%         | 46%         | 48%         | 47%         | 41%         | 38%         | 49%          | 40%         |

Summary Table: Support for Clinton's Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2010

Support for the package is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 49%, than in the West Bank, standing at 35%.

Findings show that the Palestinians are divided into two equal halves in support and opposition to the proposal that calls for mutual recognition of national identity with Palestinians recognizing Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognizing Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been settled and after a Palestinian state has been established. These figures are similar to those obtained in our last poll, three months ago.

Findings also show that an overwhelming majority (75%) is worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished. Percentage of worry is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (75%). Findings also show an overwhelming majority pessimistic about the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years: 71% believe chances to be slim or non existent and 27% believe them to be medium or high.

Findings also indicate that two thirds of the public oppose entering into US-sponsored indirect negotiations and 30% support it. Despite the clear opposition, a majority of 59% believes that Israel would be the one to benefit from such step in which Palestinians boycott negotiations. Only 13% believe Palestinians would be one to benefit and 16% believe the two sides will not benefit and 9% believe the two sides will benefit from such a step.

Finally, findings indicate that the public is still uncertain about the preferred alternative to negotiations: two alternatives are supported almost equally, going to the UN Security Council receives 31% support and waging armed confrontations against Israel receives 29% support. Two other alternatives receive lesser but equal support: waging a non violent confrontation and dissolving the PA, with each receiving 16%. While going to the UN Security Council receives similar support from residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (32% and 30% respectively), regional differences exist regarding other alternatives. Support for waging armed confrontations stands at 39% among Gazans but only 24% among West Bankers. Support for non violent

confrontations stands at 18% among West Bankers but only 13% among Gazans. Support for dissolving the PA receives similar support in the two areas: 15% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank.

#### (3) Discrimination and racism in Israeli society:

71% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the call of Rabbis prohibiting renting apartments to Arabs in the city of Safed.

75% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that would allow Israeli villages and towns to reject new non Jewish residents, such as Arabs

78% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that would ban the use of head and face cover for women (burqa) in public places

71% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that require non Jewish candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as Jewish and democratic

In this poll, we have asked Palestinians to assess the views of the majority of Israeli Jews toward a number of issues that indicate discrimination against non Jews such as the call for a ban on renting homes to Arabs in Safed and a number of proposed laws with a racist bent. Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports such steps. 71% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the call by a large number of Rabbis calling for a ban on renting homes and apartments to Arabs. Only 24% believe a majority of Israeli Jews does not support the call of the Rabbis.

We also found that 75% of the public believe that a majority of Israeli Jews support the proposed law that would allow Israeli villages and towns to reject admission on non Jewish residents while only 20% believe a majority of Israeli Jews reject the proposed law. Similarly, findings show that 78% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed law that would ban the wearing of the burqa by women, covering head and face, in public places in Israel while only 17% believe a majority of Israelis does not support the proposed law. We also found that 71% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that would require non Jewish candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as Jewish and democratic while only 23% believe a majority of Israeli Jews does not support the proposed law.

#### Public Opinion Poll (38) Main Results 16-19 December 2010

|     |                             | Total%           | West Bank%               | Gaza Strip%          |  |  |  |
|-----|-----------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|--|--|--|
| 00) | From among the              | following satell | ite news stations, which | one you watched most |  |  |  |
|     | during the last two months? |                  |                          |                      |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Al Arabia                | 12.8             | 8.7                      | 19.6                 |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Al Jazeera               | 52.4             | 61.7                     | 37.3                 |  |  |  |
|     | 3) Al Hurra                 | 0.6              | 0.5                      | 0.9                  |  |  |  |
|     | 4) Al Manar                 | 2.3              | 2.4                      | 2.0                  |  |  |  |
|     | 5) Palestine TV             | 13.7             | 13.2                     | 14.4                 |  |  |  |

| gious<br>ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>erally, do you<br>supportive of<br>peace process<br>opposed to the<br>ce process<br>between<br>port and<br>osition<br>DK/NA | 48.4<br>3.4<br>0.1<br>Total%<br>see yourself as:<br>63.2<br>18.7<br>17.0<br>1.1<br>Total%                            | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%<br>59.9<br>21.0<br>18.0<br>1.1<br>West Bank% | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%<br>68.5<br>15.0<br>15.4<br>1.1  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>erally, do you<br>supportive of<br>peace process<br>opposed to the<br>ce process<br>between<br>port and<br>osition                   | 3.4<br>0.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>see yourself as:<br>63.2<br>18.7  | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%<br>59.9<br>21.0<br>18.0                      | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%<br>68.5<br>15.0   |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>erally, do you<br>supportive of<br>peace process<br>opposed to the<br>ce process<br>between<br>port and                              | 3.4<br>0.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>see yourself as:<br>63.2<br>18.7  | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%<br>59.9<br>21.0                              | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%<br>68.5<br>15.0   |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>eerally, do you<br>supportive of<br>peace process<br>opposed to the<br>ce process  | 3.4<br>0.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>see yourself as:<br>63.2  | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%<br>59.9                                      | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%<br>68.5   |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>erally, do you<br>supportive of<br>peace process<br>opposed to the   | 3.4<br>0.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>see yourself as:<br>63.2  | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%<br>59.9                                      | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%<br>68.5   |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>erally, do you<br>supportive of<br>peace process   | 3.4<br>0.1<br>Total%<br>see yourself as:   | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%  | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%   |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br><b>herally, do you</b><br>supportive of  | 3.4<br>0.1<br>Total%<br>see yourself as:   | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1<br>West Bank%  | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2<br>Gaza Strip%   |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA<br>herally, do you  | 3.4<br>0.1<br>Total%<br>see yourself as:   | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1  | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2  |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious<br>DK/NA   | 3.4<br>0.1<br>Total%   | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1  | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2  |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious  | 3.4<br>0.1   | 50.1<br>2.8<br>0.1  | 45.6<br>4.4<br>0.2  |  |  |  |  |
| ot religious  | 3.4  | 50.1<br>2.8   | 45.6<br>4.4   |  |  |  |  |
|   |  | 50.1  | 45.6  |  |  |  |  |
| gious   | 48.4   |   |   |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |   |   |  |  |  |  |
| somewhat  |  |   |   |  |  |  |  |
| eligious  | 48.1   | 47.0  | 49.9  |  |  |  |  |
| erally, do you  | see yourself as:   |   |   |  |  |  |  |
|   | Total%   | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |  |  |  |  |
| OK/NA   | 3.3  | 0.4   | 8.0   |  |  |  |  |
| ery bad   | 7.8  | 9.2   | 5.6   |  |  |  |  |
| ad  | 23.3   | 25.4  | 19.9  |  |  |  |  |
| O SO  | 30.3   | 34.3  | 23.7  |  |  |  |  |
| iood  | 28.8   | 25.2  | 34.6  |  |  |  |  |
| ery good  | 6.5  | 5.4   | 8.2   |  |  |  |  |
|   | Bank these days?   |   |   |  |  |  |  |
| general, how w  |  | e conditions of the Palest  | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·   |  |  |  |  |
|   | Total%   | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |  |  |  |  |
| OK/NA   | 2.2  | 3.6   |   |  |  |  |  |
| ery bad   | 22.6   | 18.1  | 30.2  |  |  |  |  |
| ad  | 39.0   | 42.5  | 33.4  |  |  |  |  |
| O SO  | 19.1   | 19.1  | 19.3  |  |  |  |  |
| food  | 13.5   | 12.8  | 14.8  |  |  |  |  |
| ery good  | 3.4  | 4.1   | 2.3   |  |  |  |  |
| · ·   | •  |   |   |  |  |  |  |
| In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian  |  |   |   |  |  |  |  |
|   | Total%   | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |  |  |  |  |
| DK/NA   | 0.1  | 0.1   | 0.2   |  |  |  |  |
|   | 0.8  | 0.6   | 1.2   |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |   |   |  |  |  |  |
| Others  | 2.6  | 2.1   | 3.3   |  |  |  |  |
|   | 5.2  | 5.6   | 4.5   |  |  |  |  |
| -   |  |   | 16.7  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Do not have a<br>DK/NA<br>general, how w<br>as in Gaza Strip<br>fery good<br>food<br>o so<br>ad<br>fery bad<br>PK/NA | Do not watch<br>5.2<br>5.2<br>5.2<br>5.2<br>5.2<br>5.2<br>5.2<br>5.2          | Do         not         watch         5.2         5.6           Do         not         watch         5.2         5.6           Dthers         2.6         2.1         0.0           Do         not have a         0.8         0.6           DK/NA         0.1         0.1         0.1           Total%         West Bank%           general, how would you describe conditions of the Palest as in Gaza Strip these days?           Yery good         3.4         4.1           Good         13.5         12.8           o so         19.1         19.1          ad         39.0         42.5           Yery bad         22.6         18.1           DK/NA         2.2         3.6           Total%         West Bank% |  |  |  |  |

|                     | 1) Yes  | 70.5  | 72.1  | 67.8   |
|---------------------|---|---|---|--|
|                     | 2) No   | 17.7  | 15.7  | 21.0   |
|                     | 3) DK-NA  | 11.8  | 12.1  | 11.3   |
|                     |   | Total%  | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%  |
| M1                  | Do you think that   |   |   | ions under the control of t  |
|                     | dismissed governm   |   | -   |  |
|                     | 1) Yes  | 60.6  | 57.1  | 66.3   |
|                     | 2) No   | 20.1  | 17.9  | 23.8   |
|                     | 3) DK-NA  | 19.3  | 25.0  | 9.9  |
|                     | ,   | Total%  | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%  |
| M2                  |   | •   | ł   |  |
|                     | In your view, is th   | ere a press fr  | eedom in the West Bank  | ?  |
|                     | 1) Yes  | 22.7  | 19.2  | 28.6   |
|                     | 2) To some extent   | 37.6  | 38.4  | 36.3   |
|                     | 3) No   | 33.9  | 37.6  | 27.9   |
|                     | 4) DK-NA  | 5.8   | 4.8   | 7.3  |
|                     |   | Total%  | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%  |
| M3                  |   |   |   |  |
| )                   | In your view, is th   | ere a press fr  | eedom in the Gaza Strip   | 0  |
| ,                   |   | ere a press m   | eeuom m me Gaza Surp  | 7  |
| ,                   | 1) Yes  | 13.7  | 11.5  | 17.2   |
| ,                   |   | · •   |   |  |
| ,                   | 1) Yes  | 13.7  | 11.5  | 17.2   |
| ,                   | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> </ol>   | 13.7<br>28.6  | 11.5<br>26.6  | 17.2<br>31.9   |
| ,                   | 1) Yes2) To some extent3) No  | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6  | 11.5<br>26.6<br>45.8  | 17.2<br>31.9<br>47.8<br>3.0  |
| <br>                | 1) Yes2) To some extent3) No4) DK-NA  | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%  | 11.5<br>26.6<br>45.8<br>16.1<br>West Bank%  | 17.2<br>31.9<br>47.8<br>3.0<br><b>Gaza Strip%</b>  |
| <br>M8              | 1) Yes<br>2) To some extent<br>3) No<br>4) DK-NA<br>There are internal  | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br>Total%<br>and external  | 11.5<br>26.6<br>45.8<br>16.1<br>West Bank%  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia  |
| ,<br>               | 1) Yes<br>2) To some extent<br>3) No<br>4) DK-NA<br>There are internal  | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br>Total%<br>and external  | 11.5<br>26.6<br>45.8<br>16.1<br>West Bank%  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia  |
| ,<br>               | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> </ol>   | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br>Total%<br>and external  | 11.5<br>26.6<br>45.8<br>16.1<br>West Bank%  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia  |
| ,<br>M8<br>)        | 1) Yes2) To some extent3) No4) DK-NAThere are internal<br>Authority in the V1)Certainly   | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br>Total%<br>and external<br>Vest Bank. Do   | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the you support or oppose   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia these calls?   |
| ,<br>M8<br>)        | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> <li>Certainly<br/>support</li> </ol>  | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5  | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the pyou support or oppose         37.5   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3  |
| ,<br>               | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> <li>Certainly<br/>support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Oppose</li> </ol>  | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>and external<br>Vest Bank. Do<br>32.5<br>56.7  | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the you support or oppose         37.5         54.2   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9   |
| M8<br>)             | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> <li>Certainly<br/>support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Oppose</li> </ol>  | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>and external<br>Vest Bank. Do<br>32.5<br>56.7  | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the you support or oppose         37.5         54.2   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9   |
| M8                  | 1) Yes2) To some extent3) No4) DK-NAThere are internal<br>Authority in the V1)Certainly<br>support2) Support3) Oppose4)Certainly  | 13.7<br>28.6<br>46.6<br>11.1<br><b>Total%</b><br>and external<br>Vest Bank. Do<br>32.5<br>56.7<br>7.5   | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2  |
| M8                  | 1) Yes2) To some extent3) No4) DK-NAThere are internal<br>Authority in the V1)Certainly<br>support2) Support3) Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose  | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1   | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2         1.8  |
| )                   | 1) Yes2) To some extent3) No4) DK-NAThere are internal<br>Authority in the V1)Certainly<br>support2) Support3) Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5) DK/NA  | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1         2.2         Total%  | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7         1.7         West Bank%  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2         1.8         2.8         Gaza Strip%  |
| )                   | 1) Yes         2) To some extent         3) No         4) DK-NA         There are internal Authority in the V         1)       Certainly         support       2) Support         2) Support       3) Oppose         4)       Certainly         oppose       5) DK/NA         How would you e   | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1         2.2         Total%         valuate the c  | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7         1.7         West Bank%  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2         1.8         2.8         Gaza Strip%         cracy and human rights in the string stripts in the str  |
| )                   | 1) Yes         2) To some extent         3) No         4) DK-NA         There are internal Authority in the V         1)       Certainly         support       2) Support         2) Support       3) Oppose         4)       Certainly         oppose       5) DK/NA         How would you e   | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1         2.2         Total%         valuate the c  | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7         1.7         West Bank%         urrent status of democr  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2         1.8         2.8         Gaza Strip%         cracy and human rights in the string stripts in the str  |
| )                   | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> <li>Certainly<br/>support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Oppose</li> <li>Certainly</li> <li>Oppose</li> <li>DK/NA</li> <li>How would you e<br/>Palestinian Autho</li> </ol>                             | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1         2.2         Total%         valuate the c         rity under Ab                          | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7         1.7         West Bank%         urrent status of democrous and democrous for the status of the | 17.231.947.83.0Gaza Strip%institutions of the Palestiniathese calls?24.360.910.21.82.8Gaza Strip%cacy and human rights in the second secon |
| )<br>M8<br>)<br>06) | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> <li>Certainly<br/>support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Oppose</li> <li>Certainly<br/>oppose</li> <li>DK/NA</li> <li>How would you e<br/>Palestinian Autho</li> <li>Very good</li> <li>Good</li> </ol> | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1         2.2         Total%         valuate the c         rity under Ab         5.4              | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7         1.7         West Bank%         urrent status of democropu Mazin? Would you sa         4.4   | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2         1.8         2.8         Gaza Strip%         cacy and human rights in the second  |
| )                   | <ol> <li>Yes</li> <li>To some extent</li> <li>No</li> <li>DK-NA</li> <li>There are internal<br/>Authority in the V</li> <li>Certainly<br/>support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Support</li> <li>Oppose</li> <li>Certainly<br/>oppose</li> <li>DK/NA</li> <li>How would you e<br/>Palestinian Autho</li> <li>Very good</li> </ol>               | 13.7         28.6         46.6         11.1         Total%         and external         Vest Bank. Do         32.5         56.7         7.5         1.1         2.2         Total%         valuate the c         rity under Ab         5.4         31.9 | 11.5         26.6         45.8         16.1         West Bank%         calls for reforms on the         you support or oppose         37.5         54.2         5.9         0.7         1.7         West Bank%         urrent status of democrous of democrous and the status of the status and  | 17.2         31.9         47.8         3.0         Gaza Strip%         e institutions of the Palestinia         these calls?         24.3         60.9         10.2         1.8         2.8         Gaza Strip%         cacy and human rights in the sy it is:         6.9         33.6  |

|             | 6) DK/NA                            | 2.5             | 2.9  | 2.0                         |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|--|-----------------------------|
|             |                                     | Total%          | West Bank%                                     | Gaza Strip%                 |
| 07)         | Would you say th assured or not ass |                 | our security and safety, a                     | and that of your family, is |
|             | 1) Completely                       |                 |  |                             |
|             | assured                             | 6.9             | 5.0  | 10.2                        |
|             | 2) Assured                          | 52.8            | 55.9   | 47.7                        |
|             | 3) Not assured                      | 34.4            | 33.6   | 35.8                        |
|             | 4) Not assured at                   |                 |  |                             |
|             | all                                 | 5.9             | 5.6  | 6.3                         |
|             |                                     | Total%          | West Bank%                                     | Gaza Strip%                 |
| <b>M4</b>   |                                     |                 |  | - L                         |
| )           | In your view, can                   | people in the W | est Bank today criticize th                    | ne authority without fear?  |
|             | 1) Yes                              | 26.8            | 25.7   | 28.7                        |
|             | 2) No                               | 66.7            | 70.1   | 61.1                        |
|             | 3) DK-NA                            | 6.5             | 4.2  | 10.2                        |
|             | · · ·                               | Total%          | West Bank%                                     | Gaza Strip%                 |
| M5          |                                     |                 |  | <b>·</b>                    |
| )           | In your view, can                   | people in the G | aza Strip today criticize tł                   | ne authority without fear?  |
| ,           | 1) Yes                              | 18.8            | 18.4   | 19.3                        |
|             | 2) No                               | 71.1            | 67.8   | 76.5                        |
|             | 3) DK-NA                            | 10.2            | 13.8   | 4.2                         |
|             | ,                                   | Total%          | West Bank%                                     | Gaza Strip%                 |
| 08)         | Do current politic                  |                 |  | ad you to seek emigration   |
| ,           | abroad?                             | ,               |  | ,                           |
|             | 1) Certainly seek                   |                 |  |                             |
|             | to emigrate                         | 13.6            | 8.6  | 21.9                        |
|             | 2) Seek                             |                 |  |                             |
|             | emigration                          | 18.2            | 15.5   | 22.6                        |
|             | 3) Do not seek                      |                 |  |                             |
|             | emigration                          | 31.4            | 29.1   | 35.2                        |
|             | 4) Certainly do                     |                 |  |                             |
|             | not seek                            |                 |  |                             |
|             | emigration                          | 36.7            | 46.8   | 20.3                        |
|             | 5) DK/NA                            | 0.1             | 0.1  |                             |
|             |                                     | Total%          | West Bank%                                     | Gaza Strip%                 |
| <b>09</b> ) |                                     |                 | the performance of the<br>? Is it good or bad? | dismissed government of     |
|             | 1) Very good                        | 7.9             | 7.7  | 8.2                         |
|             | 2) Good                             | 28.2            | 27.8   | 28.8                        |
|             | 3) So so                            | 26.1            | 24.6   | 28.6                        |
|             | 4) Bad                              | 19.2            | 18.1   | 21.1                        |
|             | 5) Very bad                         | 8.1             | 5.4  | 12.7                        |

|     | 6) DK/NA  | 10.4             | 16.4   | 0.7                   |  |  |  |  |
|-----|---|------------------|--|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|
|     |   | Total%           | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%           |  |  |  |  |
| 10) | Tell us how do yo<br>Fayyad? Is it good   |                  | performance of the gover                           | <b>.</b>              |  |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Very good  | 8.2              | 8.0  | 8.7                   |  |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Good   | 34.9             | 36.7   | 32.0                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 3) So so  | 30.0             | 31.7   | 27.2                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 4) Bad  | 16.5             | 13.8   | 20.9                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 5) Very bad   | 5.2              | 3.4  | 8.2                   |  |  |  |  |
|     | 6) DK/NA  | 5.2              | 6.5  | 3.0                   |  |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%           | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%           |  |  |  |  |
| 12) | Are you satisfied   | or not satisfied | with the performance of 1                          |                       |  |  |  |  |
| ,   | election as preside   |                  |  |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Very satisfied   | 6.5              | 6.2  | 7.0                   |  |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Satisfied  | 43.7             | 46.0   | 40.0                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 3) Not satisfied  | 33.7             | 33.4   | 34.3                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 4) Not satisfied at   |                  |  |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | all   | 11.7             | 8.7  | 16.6                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 5) DK/NA  | 4.4              | 5.8  | 2.2                   |  |  |  |  |
|     | ,   | Total%           | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%           |  |  |  |  |
| 13) | If new presidential elections are to take place today, and Mahmud Abbas was<br>nominated byFateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, whom would you<br>vote for? |                  |  |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Mahmoud Abb  |                  |  |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | as  | 56.4             | 58.9   | 53.1                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Ismael Haniyya   |                  |  |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | h   | 37.9             | 33.7   | 43.2                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 4) DK/NA  | 5.7              | 7.3  | 3.7                   |  |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%           | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%           |  |  |  |  |
| 14) |   |                  | etween Marwan Barghou<br>is, whom would you vote f |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | 1) MarwanBargho<br>uti  | 64.7             | 67.6   | 60.8                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Ismael Haniyya   |                  |  |                       |  |  |  |  |
|     | h   | 30.9             | 26.7   | 36.7                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 4) DK/NA  | 4.3              | 5.7  | 2.5                   |  |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%           | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%           |  |  |  |  |
| 15) | If you were to see following list of ca   | -                | sident, whom would you                             | select from among the |  |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Ismail Haniyeh   | 18.4             | 14.1   | 25.6                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Salam Fayyad   | 15.5             | 15.6   | 15.4                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | 3) MarwanBargho<br>uti  | 26.9             | 28.8   | 23.9                  |  |  |  |  |
|     | w11   | -0.7             | 20.0   | =0.7                  |  |  |  |  |

|     | 4)                             | l      | I  |             |
|-----|--------------------------------|--------|--|-------------|
|     | MustafaBarghouti               | 11.2   | 11.6   | 10.5        |
|     | 5) Saeb Erekat                 | 5.1    | 5.2  | 4.9         |
|     | 6) Others                      | 6.1    | 7.2  | 4.3         |
|     | 7) DK/NA                       | 16.8   | 17.5   | 15.5        |
|     | .,                             | Total% | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip% |
| 17) | If new elections as            |        | actions are held today and                           | · ·         |
| ,   |                                | •      | nominated, for whom wo                               |             |
|     | 1) Alternative                 | 1.7    | 1.7  | 1.7         |
|     | 2) Independent                 |        |  |             |
|     | Palestine                      | 2.7    | 3.7  | 1.4         |
|     | 3) Abu Ali                     |        |  |             |
|     | Mustafa                        | 3.3    | 2.5  | 4.4         |
|     | 4) Abu al Abbas                | 0.7    | 0.1  | 1.4         |
|     | 5) Freedom and                 |        |  |             |
|     | social justice                 | 0.2    |  | 0.5         |
|     | 6) Change and                  |        |  |             |
|     | reform                         | 24.8   | 23.9   | 26.1        |
|     | 7) National                    |        |  |             |
|     | coalition for                  |        |  |             |
|     | justice and                    |        |  |             |
|     | democracy                      | 0.2    | 0.4  |             |
|     | 8) Third                       |        |  |             |
|     | way(headed by                  |        |  |             |
|     | Salam Fayyad)                  | 2.2    | 3.1  | 0.8         |
|     | 9) Freedom and                 | 0.1    |  |             |
|     | independence                   | 0.1    | 0.2  |             |
|     | 10) Palestinian                | 0.0    |  |             |
|     | justice                        | 0.0    | 0.0  | 0.0         |
|     | 11) Fateh                      | 44.4   | 42.1   | 47.8        |
|     | 12) None of the $\frac{12}{N}$ | 10.7   |  | 15.0        |
|     | above/ DK/NA                   | 19.7   | 22.4   | 15.8        |
| 10) |                                | Total% | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip% |
| 18) | -                              |        | a and the West Bank, Har                             | 5           |
|     | •                              | -      | wer in Gaza and conside                              | 8           |
|     | 8                              | -      | Mazin formed a new goven<br>nent headed by Fayyad ar | •           |
|     |                                |        | h of the two government                              |             |
|     | 0                              | • /    | government of Abu Mazin                              | •           |
|     | 1) Haniyehs'                   |        |  |             |
|     | government is the              |        |  |             |
|     | =                              | 1      |  |             |
| 1 1 | 0                              | 22.8   | 21.0   | 25.7        |
|     | legitimate one<br>2)           | 22.8   | 21.0   | 25.7        |

|         | Fayyad  |   | 1   |   |
|---------|---|---|---|---|
|         | government is the   |   |   |   |
|         | legitimate one  |   |   |   |
|         | 3) Both   |   |   |   |
|         | governments are   |   |   |   |
|         | legitimate  | 10.4  | 13.3  | 5.7   |
|         | 4) Both   |   |   |   |
|         | governments are   |   |   |   |
|         | not legitimate  | 33.6  | 32.8  | 35.0  |
|         | 5) DK/NA  | 4.2   | 5.3   | 2.4   |
|         |   | Total%  | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |
| 19)     | In your view who  | is responsible for  | or the continued split betw   | ween the West Bank and  |
|         | the Gaza Strip? H   | amas or Fateh?  |   |   |
|         | 1) Hamas  | 15.4  | 11.4  | 22.1  |
|         | 2) Fateh  | 13.0  | 10.0  | 17.8  |
|         | 3) both   | 61.9  | 65.5  | 56.0  |
|         | 4) neither side   | 4.2   | 5.2   | 2.5   |
|         | 5) other (specify -   |   |   |   |
|         | )   | 2.8   | 4.2   | 0.4   |
|         | 6) DK/NA  | 2.7   | 3.7   | 1.1   |
|         |   | Total%  | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |
|         |   | 10tal /0  | West Dalik /0   |   |
| 20)     |   | xt legislative and  | president elections, will   | this in your view lead to   |
| 20)     | the lifting or to   | xt legislative and  |   | this in your view lead to   |
| 20)     | the lifting or to government?   | xt legislative and  | president elections, will   | this in your view lead to   |
| 20)     | <pre>the lifting or to government? 1) will lead to the</pre>  | xt legislative and  | president elections, will   | this in your view lead to   |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of   | president elections, will<br>the international boye   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott  | xt legislative and  | president elections, will   | this in your view lead to   |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott2) will lead to the   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of   | president elections, will<br>the international boye   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the  | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6  | president elections, will<br>the international boy<br>9.0   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of   | president elections, will<br>the international boye   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott3) conditions will   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6  | president elections, will<br>the international boy<br>9.0   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott3) conditions will<br>stay as they are   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1  | <b>president elections, will</b><br><b>the international boy</b><br>9.0<br>67.4   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today  | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2  | president elections, will<br>the international boy9.067.418.8   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9  |
| 20)     | the lifting or to<br>government?1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott3) conditions will<br>stay as they are   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2   | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9  | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0   |
|         | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today<br>4) DK/NA  | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%   | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%  |
| 20)<br> | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today<br>4) DK/NA<br>And what about the  | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%<br>ne unity between   | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the G   | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>caza Strip? Will a Hamas  |
|         | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today<br>4) DK/NA<br>And what about the<br>victory in the next   | <ul> <li>kt legislative and<br/>tightening of</li> <li>9.6</li> <li>67.1</li> <li>19.2</li> <li>4.2</li> <li>Total%</li> <li>ne unity between</li> <li>legislative and point</li> </ul> | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the Goresidential elections lead                                    | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>aza Strip? Will a Hamas<br>to consolidation of unity                                |
|         | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today<br>4) DK/NA<br>And what about the<br>victory in the next   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%<br>he unity between<br>legislative and p<br>Bank and the C  | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the Goresidential elections lead                                    | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>caza Strip? Will a Hamas  |
|         | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today<br>4) DK/NA<br>And what about the<br>victory in the next<br>between the West<br>between the two an   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%<br>he unity between<br>legislative and p<br>Bank and the C  | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the Goresidential elections lead                                    | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>aza Strip? Will a Hamas<br>to consolidation of unity                                |
|         | <pre>the lifting or to government? 1) will lead to the lifting of the boycott 2) will lead to the tightening of the boycott 3) conditions will stay as they are today 4) DK/NA And what about th victory in the next between the West</pre>   | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%<br>he unity between<br>legislative and p<br>Bank and the C  | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the Goresidential elections lead                                    | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>aza Strip? Will a Hamas<br>to consolidation of unity                                |
|         | <pre>the lifting or to government? 1) will lead to the lifting of the boycott 2) will lead to the tightening of the boycott 3) conditions will stay as they are today 4) DK/NA And what about th victory in the next between the West between the two an 1) Will lead to</pre>  | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%<br>he unity between<br>legislative and p<br>Bank and the C  | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the Goresidential elections lead                                    | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>aza Strip? Will a Hamas<br>to consolidation of unity                                |
|         | the lifting or to<br>government?<br>1) will lead to the<br>lifting of the<br>boycott<br>2) will lead to the<br>tightening of the<br>boycott<br>3) conditions will<br>stay as they are<br>today<br>4) DK/NA<br>And what about the<br>victory in the next<br>between the West<br>between the two and<br>1) Will lead to<br>consolidation of | xt legislative and<br>tightening of<br>9.6<br>67.1<br>19.2<br>4.2<br>Total%<br>ne unity between<br>legislative and p<br>Bank and the G<br>reas?   | president elections, will         the international boys         9.0         67.4         18.8         4.9         West Bank%         the West Bank and the Goresidential elections lead         Gaza Strip or will it lead | this in your view lead to<br>cott of the Palestinian<br>10.5<br>66.7<br>19.9<br>3.0<br>Gaza Strip%<br>Gaza Strip? Will a Hamas<br>to consolidation of unity<br>to consolidating the split |

|     | WBGS split   |  |   |   |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
|     | 3) Conditions of   |  |   |   |
|     | WBGS will stay   |  |   |   |
|     | as they are today  | 27.2   | 28.7  | 24.6  |
|     | 4) DK/NA   | 5.2  | 6.1   | 3.7   |
|     |  | Total%   | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |
| 22) | And what if Fateh  |  | ative and president electio   | <u> </u>  |
| /   |  |  | g of the international bo   |   |
|     | 1) Will lead to the  |  |   |   |
|     | lifting of the boycott   | 55.2   | 42.9  | 75.4  |
|     | 2) Will lead to the  |  |   |   |
|     | tightening of the  |  |   |   |
|     | boycott  | 11.7   | 11.7  | 11.6  |
|     | 3) Conditions will   |  |   |   |
|     | stay as they are   |  |   |   |
|     | today  | 29.4   | 41.4  | 9.8   |
|     | 4) DK/NA   | 3.7  | 4.0   | 3.2   |
|     |  | Total%   | West Bank%  | Gaza Strip%   |
| 23) | a Fateh victory in   | the next legislat  | veen the West Bank and<br>ive and presidential elections of the comparison of the compa | ons lead to consolidation   |
| 23) | a Fateh victory in   | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a   |   | ons lead to consolidation   |
| 23) | a Fateh victory in<br>of unity between t   | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a   | ive and presidential electi   | ons lead to consolidation   |
| 23) | a Fateh victory in<br>of unity between t<br>the split between t<br>1) Will lead to<br>consolidation of   | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil  | ons lead to consolidation<br>l it lead to consolidating   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the split between the split lead to consolidation of WBGS unity</li> </ul>  | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a   | ive and presidential electi   | ons lead to consolidation   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil  | ons lead to consolidation<br>l it lead to consolidating   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4  | ons lead to consolidation<br>l it lead to consolidating<br>40.9   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil  | ons lead to consolidation<br>l it lead to consolidating   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4  | ons lead to consolidation<br>l it lead to consolidating<br>40.9   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4  | ons lead to consolidation         1 it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5  |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between to the split between to consolidation of WBGS unity</li> <li>2) Will lead to consolidation of WBGS split</li> <li>3) Conditions of WBGS will stay as they are today</li> </ul>  | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9  | ons lead to consolidation         1 it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0   | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2   | ons lead to consolidation         1 it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1   |
|     | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between to the split between to consolidation of WBGS unity</li> <li>2) Will lead to consolidation of WBGS split</li> <li>3) Conditions of WBGS will stay as they are today</li> <li>4) DK/NA</li> </ul>  | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%   | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%   | ans lead to consolidation   it lead to consolidating   40.9   35.5   21.5   2.1   Gaza Strip%   |
| 23) | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts   | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,  | ans lead to consolidation   it lead to consolidating   40.9   40.9   35.5   21.5   2.1   Gaza Strip%   like the continuation of   |
|     | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts<br>ettlements, the s  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,<br>pread of unemployment   | ons lead to consolidation         it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1         Gaza Strip%         like the continuation of and poverty, the lack of   |
|     | a Fateh victory in<br>of unity between t<br>the split between t<br>1) Will lead to<br>consolidation of<br>WBGS unity<br>2) Will lead to<br>consolidation of<br>WBGS split<br>3) Conditions of<br>WBGS will stay<br>as they are today<br>4) DK/NA<br>The Palestinian so<br>occupation and so<br>national unity du   | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts<br>ettlements, the s<br>e to the split b  | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,  | and to consolidation         it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1         Gaza Strip%         like the continuation of and poverty, the lack of and the Gaza Strip, the  |
|     | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in<br/>of unity between t</li> <li>the split between t</li> <li>1) Will lead to<br/>consolidation of<br/>WBGS unity</li> <li>2) Will lead to<br/>consolidation of<br/>WBGS split</li> <li>3) Conditions of<br/>WBGS will stay<br/>as they are today</li> <li>4) DK/NA</li> <li>The Palestinian so<br/>occupation and so<br/>national unity du<br/>continuation of the</li> </ul>  | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts<br>ettlements, the s<br>e to the split b<br>e siege and block   | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,<br>pread of unemployment a<br>etween the West Bank a   | and to consolidation         it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1         Gaza Strip%         like the continuation of and poverty, the lack of and the Gaza Strip, the the closure of its border  |
|     | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts<br>ettlements, the s<br>e to the split b<br>e siege and block<br>ad of corruption<br>he problem you s | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,<br>pread of unemployment a<br>etween the West Bank a<br>cade of the Gaza Strip and<br>in public institutions, an<br>see as the most fundamen   | ons lead to consolidation         it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1         Gaza Strip%         like the continuation of and poverty, the lack of and the Gaza Strip, the leth closure of its border         the closure of its border         d others. Tell us, what in |
|     | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in<br/>of unity between t</li> <li>the split between t</li> <li>1) Will lead to<br/>consolidation of<br/>WBGS unity</li> <li>2) Will lead to<br/>consolidation of<br/>WBGS split</li> <li>3) Conditions of<br/>WBGS will stay<br/>as they are today</li> <li>4) DK/NA</li> <li>The Palestinian so<br/>occupation and so<br/>national unity du<br/>continuation of the<br/>crossings, the spree</li> </ul>   | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts<br>ettlements, the s<br>e to the split b<br>e siege and block<br>ad of corruption<br>he problem you s | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,<br>pread of unemployment a<br>etween the West Bank a<br>cade of the Gaza Strip and<br>in public institutions, an<br>see as the most fundamen   | ons lead to consolidation         it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1         Gaza Strip%         like the continuation of and poverty, the lack of and the Gaza Strip, the leth closure of its border         the closure of its border         d others. Tell us, what in |
|     | <ul> <li>a Fateh victory in of unity between the split between the</li></ul> | the next legislat<br>the West Bank a<br>he two areas?<br>30.0<br>31.1<br>34.8<br>4.0<br>Total%<br>ociety confronts<br>ettlements, the s<br>e to the split b<br>e siege and block<br>ad of corruption<br>he problem you s | ive and presidential electi<br>and the Gaza Strip or wil<br>23.4<br>28.4<br>42.9<br>5.2<br>West Bank%<br>today various problems,<br>pread of unemployment a<br>etween the West Bank a<br>cade of the Gaza Strip and<br>in public institutions, an<br>see as the most fundamen   | ons lead to consolidation         it lead to consolidating         40.9         35.5         21.5         2.1         Gaza Strip%         like the continuation of and poverty, the lack of and the Gaza Strip, the leth closure of its border         the closure of its border         d others. Tell us, what in |

|     | settlements,  |                     |                            |                  |
|-----|---|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|
| 1   | 2) Spread of  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | unemployment  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | and poverty   | 28.1                | 31.3                       | 22.8             |
|     | 3) Lack of  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | national unity due  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | to the split  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | between the West  | 26.0                | 24.4                       | 28.6             |
|     | 4) Continuation of  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | the siege and   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | blockade of the   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | Gaza Strip  | 10.3                | 4.5                        | 19.9             |
|     | 5) The spread of  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | corruption in   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | public institutions   | 9.5                 | 12.4                       | 4.6              |
|     | 6) DK/NA  | 0.9                 | 0.6                        | 1.3              |
|     | 7) Other  | 1.0                 | 1.0                        | 0.9              |
|     | ,   | Total%              | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%      |
| 25- | From among the  | following vital n   | ational goals, which in yo | <u> </u>         |
| 1)  |   |                     | ould be the second most    |                  |
| ,   | Palestinian people  |                     |                            | I and game and a |
|     | 1) Israeli  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | withdrawal to the   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | 1967 borders and  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | the establishment   |                     |                            |                  |
|     |   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian  |                     |                            |                  |
|     |   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian state in the West  |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with  | 48.1                | 46.2                       | 51.3             |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as   | 48.1                | 46.2                       | 51.3             |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital  | 48.1                | 46.2                       | 51.3             |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right   | 48.1                | 46.2                       | 51.3             |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to   | 48.1                | 46.2                       | 51.3             |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their   | <u>48.1</u><br>19.5 | 46.2                       | 51.3<br>25.4     |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and<br>villages<br>3) Establish a<br>democratic   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and<br>villages<br>3) Establish a   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and<br>villages<br>3) Establish a<br>democratic<br>political system<br>that respects                              |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and<br>villages<br>3) Establish a<br>democratic<br>political system   |                     |                            |                  |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and<br>villages<br>3) Establish a<br>democratic<br>political system<br>that respects<br>freedoms and<br>rights of | 19.5                | 15.9                       | 25.4             |
|     | of a Palestinian<br>state in the West<br>Bank and the<br>Gaza Strip with<br>East Jerusalem as<br>its capital<br>2) Obtain the right<br>of return to<br>refuges to their<br>1948 towns and<br>villages<br>3) Establish a<br>democratic<br>political system<br>that respects<br>freedoms and              |                     |                            |                  |

|                 | or moral                                  |        | I                          |                          |
|-----------------|---|--------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
|                 | individual and a                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | religious society,                        |        |                            |                          |
|                 | one that applies                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | all Islamic                               |        |                            |                          |
|                 | teachings                                 |        |                            |                          |
|                 | touonings                                 | Total% | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%              |
| 25-             | From among the f                          |        | ational goals, which in yo | •                        |
| 2) <sup>2</sup> |   |        | ould be the second most    |                          |
| 2)              | Palestinian people                        |        |                            | important goar that the  |
|                 | 1) Israeli                                |        |                            |                          |
|                 | withdrawal to the                         |        |                            |                          |
|                 | 1967 borders and                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | the establishment                         |        |                            |                          |
|                 | of a Palestinian                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | state                                     | 23.6   | 23.7                       | 23.4                     |
|                 | 2) Obtain the right                       | 23.0   | 23.1                       | 2 <b>.</b>               |
|                 | of return to                              |        |                            |                          |
|                 | refuges to their                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | 1948 towns and                            |        |                            |                          |
|                 | villages                                  | 38.6   | 38.8                       | 38.3                     |
|                 |   | 30.0   | 38.8                       | 38.3                     |
|                 | 3) Establish a democratic                 |        |                            |                          |
|                 |   |        |                            |                          |
|                 | political system<br>that respects         |        |                            |                          |
|                 | that respects freedoms and                |        |                            |                          |
|                 |   |        |                            |                          |
|                 | rights of<br>Palestinians                 | 16.2   | 16.9                       | 15.0                     |
|                 |   | 10.2   | 10.9                       | 15.0                     |
|                 | 4) Build a pious                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | or moral                                  |        |                            |                          |
|                 | individual and a                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | religious society,                        |        |                            |                          |
|                 | one that applies                          |        |                            |                          |
|                 | all Islamic                               | 21.6   | 20.6                       | 22.2                     |
|                 | teachings                                 | 21.6   | 20.6                       | 23.3                     |
|                 |   | Total% | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%              |
| 26)             |   |        | of Justice has annulled th |                          |
|                 | government to can<br>hold local elections |        | s, in your view should the | e government hold or not |
|                 |   | S (    |                            |                          |
|                 | 1) Certainly                              |        |                            |                          |
|                 | should hold                               | 21.0   |                            | 0.2                      |
|                 | elections                                 | 21.0   | 28.2                       | 9.3                      |
|                 | 2) Should hold                            | 10.0   | 50.4                       | 47.0                     |
|                 | elections                                 | 49.2   | 50.4                       | 47.3                     |
|                 | 3) Should not                             | 20.7   | 15.5                       | 29.3                     |

|         | hold elections  |  |  |  |
|---------|---|--|--|--|
|         | 4) Certainly  |  |  |  |
|         | should not hold   |  |  |  |
|         | elections   | 3.3  | 2.7  | 4.3  |
|         | 5) DK/NA  | 5.7  | 3.2  | 9.8  |
|         | ,   | Total%   | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%  |
| 27)     | Now after the fa  |  | ciliation dialogue betwe   | •  |
| ,       |   |  | pectations for the future (  |  |
|         | Gaza Strip?   | , j j  | <b>F</b>   |  |
|         | 1) Unity will   |  |  |  |
|         | resume in the near  |  |  |  |
|         | future  | 8.3  | 6.3  | 11.6   |
|         | 2) Unity will   |  |  |  |
|         | resume but will   |  |  |  |
|         | take a long time  | 49.1   | 50.3   | 47.3   |
|         | 3) Unity will not   |  |  |  |
|         | resume and two  |  |  |  |
|         | separate entities   |  |  |  |
|         | will emerge   | 38.9   | 39.3   | 38.2   |
|         | 4) DK/NA  | 3.6  | 4.1  | 2.9  |
|         |   | Total%   | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%  |
|         |   | 1 Utal /0  | W CSU Dalik /0   |  |
| 28)     | While waiting for   |  |  | <b>^</b>   |
| 28)     | 9   | the resumption   | of full unity between the  | West Bank and the Gaza   |
| 28)     | 9   | the resumption   | of full unity between the ther forms of relationship   | West Bank and the Gaza between the two sides of  |
| 28)     | Strip, do you supp<br>the Palestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>rnment in charge  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and th  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you supp<br>the Palestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>rnment in charge  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you supp<br>the Palestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>rnment in charge  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and th  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you supp<br>the Palestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>rnment in charge  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and th  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you supp<br>the Palestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>rnment in charge  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and th  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>roment in charge<br>est Bank while  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and th<br>installing MahmudAbbas  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>ne Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two  |
| 28)     | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2)Support   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9   | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and the<br>installing MahmudAbbas   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>ne Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2) Support3) Oppose   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3   | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and th<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3   | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and th<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2) Support3) Oppose4)Certainlyoppose  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8   | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and th<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>ne Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8   |
| 28)     | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly  | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and the<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>he Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3  |
|         | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainlyoppose5)DK/NA   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and the<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1<br>West Bank%   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>ne Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%   |
| 28)<br> | Strip, do you supp<br>thePalestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?1)Certainly<br>support2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5)DK/NA   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole  | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and th<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1<br>West Bank%<br>ding separate elections,  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>ne Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank   |
|         | Strip, do you supp<br>thePalestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?1)Certainly<br>support2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5)DK/NADo you support<br>organized by the   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern                       | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and the<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1<br>West Bank%<br>ding separate elections,<br>ment and one in the G  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>a that would keep<br>be Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>caza Strip organized by  |
|         | Strip, do you supp<br>thePalestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?1)Certainly<br>support2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5)DK/NADo you support<br>organized by the   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern<br>mment to elect o   | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and th<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1<br>West Bank%<br>ding separate elections,  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>a that would keep<br>be Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>caza Strip organized by  |
|         | Strip, do you supp<br>thePalestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?1)Certainly<br>support1)Certainly<br>support2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5)DK/NADo you support<br>organized by the<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>for the two areas?          | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern<br>mment to elect o   | of full unity between the<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>of the Gaza Strip and the<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1<br>West Bank%<br>ding separate elections,<br>ment and one in the G  | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>a that would keep<br>be Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>caza Strip organized by  |
|         | Strip, do you supp<br>thePalestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?1)Certainly<br>support1)Certainly<br>support2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5)DK/NADo you supportorganized by the<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>for the two areas?1)Certainly   | the resumption<br>ort or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern<br>ment to elect o     | of full unity between the "<br>ther forms of relationship<br>as a confederation<br>e of the Gaza Strip and the<br>installing MahmudAbbas<br>4.5<br>31.5<br>43.2<br>17.8<br>3.1<br>West Bank%<br>ding separate elections,<br>ment and one in the G<br>ne Palestinian legislative of   | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>n that would keep<br>ne Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>aza Strip organized by<br>council and one president                |
|         | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2) Support3) Oppose4)Certainlyoppose5) DK/NADo you supportorganized by thethe Haniyeh goverfor the two areas?1)Certainlysupport   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while is<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern<br>ment to elect o | of full unity between the ther forms of relationship         as       a confederation         e of the Gaza Strip and the installing MahmudAbbas         4.5         31.5         43.2         17.8         3.1         West Bank%         ding separate elections, ment and one in the Gaza Strip and the Gaza Strip | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>a that would keep<br>be Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>caza Strip organized by<br>council and one president<br>3.8        |
|         | Strip, do you supp<br>thePalestinian<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>charge of the We<br>areas together?1)Certainly<br>support2)Support3)Oppose4)Certainly<br>oppose5)DK/NADo you support<br>organized by the<br>the Haniyeh gover<br>for the two areas?1)Certainly<br>support2)Support | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while i<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern<br>ment to elect o  | of full unity between the 'ther forms of relationship         as       a confederation         e of the Gaza Strip and the installing MahmudAbbas         4.5         31.5         43.2         17.8         3.1         West Bank%         ding separate elections, ment and one in the Gaza Strip and the Strip | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>a that would keep<br>be Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>aza Strip organized by<br>council and one president<br>3.8<br>14.9 |
|         | Strip, do you suppthePalestinianthe Haniyeh govercharge of the Weareas together?1)Certainlysupport2) Support3) Oppose4)Certainlyoppose5) DK/NADo you supportorganized by thethe Haniyeh goverfor the two areas?1)Certainlysupport   | the resumption<br>port or oppose of<br>entity, such<br>ment in charge<br>est Bank while is<br>3.9<br>28.3<br>47.2<br>17.8<br>2.8<br>Total%<br>or oppose hole<br>Fayyad govern<br>ment to elect o | of full unity between the ther forms of relationship         as       a confederation         e of the Gaza Strip and the installing MahmudAbbas         4.5         31.5         43.2         17.8         3.1         West Bank%         ding separate elections, ment and one in the Gaza Strip and the Gaza Strip | West Bank and the Gaza<br>between the two sides of<br>a that would keep<br>be Fayyad government in<br>as president of the two<br>3.1<br>23.1<br>53.7<br>17.8<br>2.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>one in the West Bank<br>caza Strip organized by<br>council and one president<br>3.8        |

|     | oppose  |   | 1  |   |
|-----|---|---|--|---|
|     | 5) DK/NA  | 2.2   | 2.0  | 2.7   |
|     |   | Total%  | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%   |
| 30) | Do you think that   |   | he Gaza Strip would sup  | •   |
| 20) | •   |   | k and the Gaza Strip?  | sport of oppose notanig   |
|     | 1) Certainly  |   | <b>^</b>   |   |
|     | support   | 2.1   | 2.2  | 2.0   |
|     | 2) Support  | 21.3  | 21.8   | 20.6  |
|     | 3) Oppose   | 56.6  | 52.4   | 63.4  |
|     | 4) Certainly  |   |  |   |
|     | oppose  | 10.1  | 10.0   | 10.1  |
|     | 5) DK/NA  | 9.9   | 13.6   | 3.9   |
|     |   | Total%  | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%   |
| 31) | What about the r  | esidents of the   | West Bank, do you think  | k they would support or   |
|     | oppose holding sep  | parate elections i  | in the West Bank and the   | Gaza Strip?   |
|     | 1) certainly  |   |  |   |
|     | support   | 3.3   | 3.0  | 3.7   |
|     | 2) support  | 23.5  | 25.8   | 19.7  |
|     | 3) oppose   | 52.4  | 49.7   | 56.8  |
|     | 4) certainly  |   |  |   |
|     | oppose  | 14.1  | 14.3   | 14.0  |
|     | 5) DK/NA  | 6.7   | 7.3  | 5.7   |
|     |   |   |  |   |
|     |   | Total%  | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%   |
| 32) |   | ecent media rep   | orts indicating that the P   | A has arrested an armed   |
| 32) | cell belonging to H   | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char   | oorts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to as   | A has arrested an armed sassinate the governor of   |
| 32) | cell belonging to H<br>Nablus. In your vi   | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas   | oorts indicating that the P<br>ged it with planning to as<br>really planning or was no   | A has arrested an armed sassinate the governor of   |
| 32) | cell belonging to H<br>Nablus. In your vi<br>the governor as PA   | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas   | oorts indicating that the P<br>ged it with planning to as<br>really planning or was no   | A has arrested an armed sassinate the governor of   |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)Certainly  | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas   | oorts indicating that the P<br>ged it with planning to as<br>really planning or was no   | A has arrested an armed sassinate the governor of   |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswas  | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas   | oorts indicating that the P<br>ged it with planning to as<br>really planning or was no   | A has arrested an armed sassinate the governor of   |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your viewthe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningthe   | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic  | borts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to ass<br>really planning or was no<br>es charged?  | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate  |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination  | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas   | oorts indicating that the P<br>ged it with planning to as<br>really planning or was no   | A has arrested an armed sassinate the governor of   |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)Hamaswas  | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic  | borts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to ass<br>really planning or was no<br>es charged?  | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate  |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vietthe governor as PA1)Certainly1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamasplanningthe   | ecent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8   | oorts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to ass<br>really planning or was no<br>es charged?<br>7.0   | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5  |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vietthe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)Hamaswasplanningtheassassinationthe   | ecent media rep<br>Iamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic  | borts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to ass<br>really planning or was no<br>es charged?  | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate  |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamasplanningtheassassination3)3)HamasHamaswasNotation3   | ecent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8   | oorts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to ass<br>really planning or was no<br>es charged?<br>7.0   | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5  |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamasplanningtheassassination3)3)Hamasmasswasplanningthethetheassassinationthe </th <th>recent media rep<br/>Hamas and char<br/>iew, was Hamas<br/>A security servic<br/>9.8<br/>14.3</th> <th>ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9</th> <th>A has arrested an armed<br/>sassinate the governor of<br/>ot planning to assassinate<br/>14.5<br/>15.1</th> | recent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3                                  | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9  | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>15.1                                |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your visitthe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamaswasplanningtheassassination3)Hamas was notplanningplanningtheassassination4   | ecent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8   | oorts indicating that the P.<br>ged it with planning to ass<br>really planning or was no<br>es charged?<br>7.0   | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5  |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your visit the governor as PA1)Certainly1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamas2)Hamasassassination3)Hamas was notplanningtheassassination4)Certainly  | recent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3                                  | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9  | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>15.1                                |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your visit the governor as PA1)Certainly1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamasylanningtheassassination3)3)Hamas was notplanningtheassassination4)4)CertainlyHamaswasMamaswas  | recent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3                                  | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9  | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>15.1                                |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamaswasplanningtheassassination3)3)Hamaswas notplanningtheassassination4)CertainlyHamaswasnotplanningtheassassination4)CertainlyHamaswasnotplanningthe   | recent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3<br>24.1                          | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9         26.4                           | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>15.1<br>20.3                        |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamaswasplanningtheassassination3)3)Hamas was notplanningtheassassination4)4)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination4)  | recent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3<br>24.1<br>16.4                  | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9         26.4         17.7              | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>15.1<br>20.3                        |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your vithe governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamaswasplanningtheassassination3)3)Hamaswas notplanningtheassassination4)CertainlyHamaswasnotplanningtheassassination4)CertainlyHamaswasnotplanningthe   | recent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3<br>24.1<br>16.4<br>35.4          | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9         26.4         17.7         35.0 | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>15.1<br>20.3<br>14.2<br>36.0        |
| 32) | cell belonging to HNablus. In your visit the governor as PA1)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination2)2)Hamas2)Hamasassassination3)Hamas3)Hamasassassination4)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination4)CertainlyHamaswasplanningtheassassination5)DK/NA   | ecent media rep<br>Hamas and char<br>iew, was Hamas<br>A security servic<br>9.8<br>14.3<br>24.1<br>16.4<br>35.4<br>Total% | ports indicating that the P.         ged it with planning to ass         really planning or was no         es charged?         7.0         13.9         26.4         17.7              | A has arrested an armed<br>sassinate the governor of<br>ot planning to assassinate<br>14.5<br>20.3<br>14.2<br>36.0<br>Gaza Strip% |

|     |                                 |                  | teh to death for killing a                           | mosque imam. Do you      |
|-----|---------------------------------|------------------|--|--------------------------|
|     |                                 | nen have or have | e not received a fair trial?                         |                          |
|     | 1) Certainly trial              | 7 7              | ()   | 10.2                     |
|     | was fair                        | 7.7              | 6.2  | 10.3                     |
|     | 2) Think trial was              | 14.2             | 12.5   | 17.2                     |
|     | fair                            | 14.3             | 12.5   | 17.2                     |
|     | 3) Think trial was not fair     | 23.7             | 25.6   | 20.7                     |
|     |                                 | 23.1             | 23.0   | 20.7                     |
|     | 4) Certainly trial was not fair | 21.8             | 24.1   | 18.1                     |
|     | 5) DK/NA                        | 32.4             | 31.7   | 33.8                     |
|     | J) DK/NA                        | Total%           | West Bank%   |                          |
| 24) | In an interview                 |                  |  | Gaza Strip%              |
| 34) |                                 |                  | TV station, President M<br>eps that he might take if |                          |
|     | 0                               |                  | otiations failed. Do you                             |                          |
|     | dissolution of the l            |                  |  | support of oppose the    |
|     | 1) Certainly                    |                  |  |                          |
|     | support                         | 10.1             | 11.1   | 8.4                      |
|     | 2) Support                      | 37.1             | 36.2   | 38.7                     |
|     | 3) Oppose                       | 39.5             | 37.7   | 42.5                     |
|     | 4) Certainly                    | 57.5             | 51.1   | 72.3                     |
|     | oppose                          | 8.1              | 10.0   | 4.9                      |
|     | 5) DK/NA                        | 5.2              | 5.0  | 5.6                      |
|     | J) DIA/INA                      | Total%           | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%              |
| 35) | What do you oyna                |                  | ween Palestinians and Isra                           | • •                      |
| 55) |                                 |                  | nt freeze and after the Pal                          |                          |
|     | to return to direct             |                  |  | estiman side nas refused |
|     | 1) Negotiations                 |                  |  |                          |
|     | will continue                   |                  |  |                          |
|     | and armed                       |                  |  |                          |
|     | confrontations                  |                  |  |                          |
|     | will stop                       | 18.9             | 20.5   | 16.3                     |
|     | 2) Negotiations                 |                  |  |                          |
|     | will continue                   |                  |  |                          |
|     | but some armed                  |                  |  |                          |
|     | attacks will                    |                  |  |                          |
|     | continue                        | 41.7             | 37.9   | 48.1                     |
|     | 3) Armed                        |                  |  |                          |
|     | confrontations                  |                  |  |                          |
|     | will not stop                   |                  |  |                          |
|     | and the two                     |                  |  |                          |
|     | sides will not                  |                  |  |                          |
|     | return to                       |                  |  |                          |
|     | negotiations                    | 35.1             | 36.7   | 32.5                     |

|             | 4) DK/NA  | 4.2               | 5.0  | 3.1                       |  |  |
|-------------|---|-------------------|--|---------------------------|--|--|
|             |   | Total%            | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%               |  |  |
| 36)         | Now more than 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza<br>Strip, what in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent<br>Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years? Are they high,<br>medium, low, or none existent? |                   |  |                           |  |  |
|             | 1) None existent  | 32.9              | 35.6   | 28.5                      |  |  |
|             | 2) Low  | 37.7              | 35.1   | 42.0                      |  |  |
|             | 3) Medium   | 24.1              | 24.3   | 23.8                      |  |  |
|             | 4) High   | 3.4               | 3.4  | 3.3                       |  |  |
|             | 5) DK/NA  | 1.9               | 1.6  | 2.3                       |  |  |
|             |   | Total%            | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%               |  |  |
| 37)         | And generally spesettlement with Isi1)Definitely  |                   | ole or impossible to reach   | these days a final status |  |  |
|             | possible  | 1.9               | 0.8  | 3.8                       |  |  |
|             | 2) Think it is possible   | 25.1              | 24.9   | 25.3                      |  |  |
|             | 3) Think it is impossible   | 44.1              | 41.8   | 47.9                      |  |  |
|             | 4) definitely impossible  | 27.6              | 31.1   | 21.8                      |  |  |
|             | 5) DK/NA  | 1.3               | 1.4  | 1.1                       |  |  |
|             |   | Total%            | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%               |  |  |
| 38)         |   | Israel in your da | not worried that you or a not worried that you or a not worried that your land |                           |  |  |
|             | 1) Very Worried   | 30.3              | 30.4   | 30.2                      |  |  |
|             | 2) Worried  | 45.1              | 44.3   | 46.4                      |  |  |
|             | 3) Not worried  | 20.3              | 21.4   | 18.6                      |  |  |
|             | 4) Not worried at all   | 4.2               | 3.9  | 4.8                       |  |  |
|             | 5) DK/NA  | 0.0               | 0.1  |                           |  |  |
|             |   | Total%            | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%               |  |  |
| <b>39</b> ) | What do you think   | are the aspirati  | ons of Israel for the long <b>1</b>  | run?                      |  |  |
|             | 1) Withdrawal<br>from the<br>territories it<br>occupied in 1967<br>after guaranteeing   |                   |  |                           |  |  |
|             | <ul><li>its security</li><li>2) Withdrawal</li></ul>  | 7.7               | 5.4  | 11.5                      |  |  |
|             | form part of the  | 10.6              | 10.1   | 11.5                      |  |  |

|             | occupied   |   |  | 1 1   |
|-------------|--|---|--|---|
|             | territories after  |   |  |   |
|             | guaranteeing its   |   |  |   |
|             | security   |   |  |   |
|             | 3) Annexation of   |   |  |   |
|             | the West Bank  |   |  |   |
|             |  |   |  |   |
|             | while denying  |   |  |   |
|             | political rights of  |   |  |   |
|             | Palestinian  | 10.1  | 17.0   | 10.5  |
|             | citizens   | 18.1  | 17.9   | 18.5  |
|             | 4) Extending the   |   |  |   |
|             | borders of the   |   |  |   |
|             | state of Israel to   |   |  |   |
|             | cover all the area   |   |  |   |
|             | between the  |   |  |   |
|             | Jordan River and   |   |  |   |
|             | the  |   |  |   |
|             | Mediterranean  |   |  |   |
|             | Sea and expelling  |   |  |   |
|             | its Arab citizens  | 62.4  | 65.3   | 57.5  |
|             | 5) DK/NA   | 1.1   | 1.2  | 1.1   |
|             |  | Total%  | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%   |
|             |  |   |  |   |
| <b>40</b> ) | e  | • ·   | el will retreat from all ter   | -   |
| 40)         | including Gaza the   | e West Bank, Je   | rusalem and the Golan H  | eights, and a Palestinian   |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establ   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation   |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be established a just and agree   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establin a just and agree<br>allows return of re   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel   | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re  | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be estab-<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an  | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to see  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign pe   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and   |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be estable<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to se<br>iplomatic relatio  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign per<br>ons. Do you agree or disag  | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>gree to this plan?   |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relatio<br>6.5  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign pe-<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>gree to this plan?<br>6.1  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be estable<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to se<br>iplomatic relatio  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign per<br>ons. Do you agree or disag  | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>gree to this plan?   |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree<br>3) Disagree  | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relatio<br>6.5  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be reso<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign pe-<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>gree to this plan?<br>6.1  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relation<br>6.5<br>47.6   | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be resolved<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign per<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8<br>46.9   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>tree to this plan?<br>6.1<br>48.7  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree<br>3) Disagree  | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relation<br>6.5<br>47.6   | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be resolved<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign per<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8<br>46.9   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>tree to this plan?<br>6.1<br>48.7  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree<br>3) Disagree<br>4) Certainly  | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relatio<br>6.5<br>47.6<br>32.0  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be resolved<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign per-<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8<br>46.9<br>32.5  | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>gree to this plan?<br>6.1<br>48.7<br>31.2  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree<br>3) Disagree<br>4) Certainly<br>Disagree  | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relation<br>6.5<br>47.6<br>32.0<br>10.2   | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be resolved<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign pea-<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8<br>46.9<br>32.5<br>10.4  | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>ree to this plan?<br>6.1<br>48.7<br>31.2<br>9.7  |
| 40)         | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re-<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree<br>3) Disagree<br>4) Certainly<br>Disagree<br>5) DK/NA   | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relation<br>6.5<br>47.6<br>32.0<br>10.2<br>3.8<br>Total%  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be resolved<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign pea-<br>ons. Do you agree or disage<br>6.8<br>46.9<br>32.5<br>10.4<br>3.4  | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>ree to this plan?<br>6.1<br>48.7<br>31.2<br>9.7<br>4.3<br>Gaza Strip%  |
|             | including Gaza the<br>state will be establish<br>in a just and agree<br>allows return of re<br>recognize Israel an<br>establish normal d<br>1) Certainly agree<br>2) Agree<br>3) Disagree<br>4) Certainly<br>Disagree<br>5) DK/NA<br>There is a propose  | e West Bank, Je<br>lished. The refug<br>ed upon manner<br>efugees to Israel<br>nd its right to sec<br>iplomatic relatio<br>6.5<br>47.6<br>32.0<br>10.2<br>3.8<br>Total%<br>al that after the  | rusalem and the Golan H<br>gees problem will be resolved<br>and in accordance with<br>and compensation. In re-<br>cure borders, will sign per-<br>ons. Do you agree or disag<br>6.8<br>46.9<br>32.5<br>10.4<br>3.4<br>West Bank%   | eights, and a Palestinian<br>lved through negotiation<br>UN resolution 194 which<br>turn, all Arab states will<br>ace treaties with her and<br>gree to this plan?<br>6.1<br>48.7<br>31.2<br>9.7<br>4.3<br>Gaza Strip%<br>pendent Palestinian state  |
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| Disagree       16.6       18.3       13.7         5) DK/NA       1.6       1.6       1.6         Total% West Bank% Gaza Strip%         When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement         1. An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.         2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.         3. East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Palestinian stovereignty.         4. With regard to the refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli area trans/erred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange me  | Î   | 4) Certainly   | I                  | I                            |                           |  |
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| 5) DK/NA       1.6       1.6       1.6         Total%       West Bank%       Gaza Strip%         When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement         1. An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.         2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.         3. East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty.         4. With regard to the refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two   |     | · ·  |                    | 18.3                         | 13.7                      |  |
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| <ul> <li>attached map {show map}.</li> <li>2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.</li> <li>3. East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty.</li> <li>4. With regard to the refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.</li> <li>5. When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples</li> <li>6. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli</li> </ul>   |     | -  |                    |                              |                           |  |
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| 6. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli   |     |  |                    |                              |                           |  |
|  |     |  |                    |                              |                           |  |
| will be allowed to use the Palastinian aircrass for training nurnesses and will maintain   |     |  |                    |                              | -                         |  |
|  |     |  |                    |                              | -                         |  |
| two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will   |     | -  | -                  |                              |                           |  |
| remain in the Palestinian state for an indefinite period of time and its responsibility  |     |  |                    |                              |                           |  |
| will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial  |     |  |                    |                              |                           |  |
| borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings.   |     |  |                    | -                            |                           |  |
| Now that you have been informed of each element of the permanent compromise settlement, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it.  |     | •  |                    |                              |                           |  |
| 42- Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap  | 42- |  |                    |                              | or of ulbagice with it.   |  |

42- Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap

| 1)        |                     |                   |                             |             |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
|           | 1) Strongly agree   | 7.5               | 7.0                         | 8.4         |
|           | 2) Agree            | 41.6              | 35.1                        | 52.3        |
|           | 3) Disagree         | 36.7              | 42.1                        | 28.0        |
|           | 4) Strongly         |                   |                             |             |
|           | disagree            | 12.8              | 14.3                        | 10.2        |
|           | 5) DK/NA            | 1.4               | 1.6                         | 1.1         |
|           |                     | Total%            | West Bank%                  | Gaza Strip% |
| 42-       |                     |                   |                             |             |
| 2)        | Item #2: a state wi |                   | out with international forc |             |
|           | 1) Strongly agree   | 2.6               | 1.1                         | 5.0         |
|           | 2) Agree            | 21.8              | 19.3                        | 26.0        |
|           | 3) Disagree         | 54.1              | 55.7                        | 51.3        |
|           | 4) Strongly         |                   |                             |             |
|           | disagree            | 20.1              | 22.4                        | 16.3        |
|           | 5) DK/NA            | 1.4               | 1.4                         | 1.4         |
|           |                     | Total%            | West Bank%                  | Gaza Strip% |
| 42-       |                     |                   |                             |             |
| 3)        |                     | · · · · ·         | of the state of Palestine a |             |
|           | 1) Strongly agree   | 4.1               | 2.5                         | 6.8         |
|           | 2) Agree            | 31.4              | 29.1                        | 35.3        |
|           | 3) Disagree         | 44.9              | 46.2                        | 42.7        |
|           | 4) Strongly         |                   |                             |             |
|           | disagree            | 18.2              | 20.7                        | 14.3        |
|           | 5) DK/NA            | 1.3               | 1.5                         | 0.9         |
|           |                     | Total%            | West Bank%                  | Gaza Strip% |
| 42-<br>4) | Item #4: refugees   | with five ontions | s for permanent residence   |             |
| -)        | 1) Strongly agree   | 5.0               | 2.3                         | 9.5         |
|           | 2) Agree            | 35.5              | 35.8                        | 35.0        |
|           | 3) Disagree         | 41.2              | 40.8                        | 41.8        |
|           | 4) Strongly         |                   |                             |             |
|           | disagree            | 15.9              | 18.4                        | 11.9        |
|           | 5) DK/NA            | 2.3               | 2.7                         | 1.8         |
|           | ,                   | Total%            | West Bank%                  | Gaza Strip% |
| 42-       |                     | -                 |                             |             |
| 5)        | Item #5: end of con | nflict            |                             |             |
|           | 1) Strongly agree   | 8.1               | 6.4                         | 10.9        |
|           | 2) Agree            | 49.5              | 47.9                        | 52.1        |
|           | 3) Disagree         | 29.5              | 31.4                        | 26.2        |
|           | 4) Strongly         |                   |                             |             |
|           | , 0,                | 11.2              | 10.7                        | 9.1         |
|           | disagree            | 11.3              | 12.7                        | 9.1         |

|     | 1   | Total%   | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%                |  |  |  |
|-----|---|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|--|
| 42- |   |  |                            | •                          |  |  |  |
| 6)  |   |  | curity arrangements        |                            |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Strongly agree   | 5.6  | 3.2                        | 9.5                        |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Agree  | 32.6   | 24.7                       | 45.6                       |  |  |  |
|     | 3) Disagree   | 43.7   | 50.6                       | 32.3                       |  |  |  |
|     | 4) Strongly   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | disagree  | 16.8   | 20.0                       | 11.4                       |  |  |  |
|     | 5) DK/NA  | 1.4  | 1.5                        | 1.1                        |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%   | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%                |  |  |  |
| 42- |   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
| 7)  | Item #7: the comb   | ined elements a  | s one permanent status set | ttlement                   |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Strongly agree   | 4.3  | 2.6                        | 7.0                        |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Agree  | 35.8   | 32.1                       | 42.0                       |  |  |  |
|     | 3) Disagree   | 42.0   | 46.3                       | 35.0                       |  |  |  |
|     | 4) Strongly   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | disagree  | 16.4   | 17.6                       | 14.4                       |  |  |  |
|     | 5) DK/NA  | 1.5  | 1.4                        | 1.6                        |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%   | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%                |  |  |  |
| 43) | And what is the   | Palestinian m  | ajority opinion on this    | combined package for a     |  |  |  |
| /   |   |  |                            | ne West Bank and Gaza      |  |  |  |
|     | -   |  | final status package?      |                            |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Majority   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | supports  | 40.1   | 35.9                       | 47.0                       |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Majority   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | opposes   | 51.1   | 54.6                       | 45.4                       |  |  |  |
|     | 3) DK/NA  | 8.8  | 9.5                        | 7.6                        |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%   | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%                |  |  |  |
| 44) | And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
| )   |   | status settlement? Do most Israelis support or oppose this combined final status |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | package?  |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Majority   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | supports  | 35.3   | 33.2                       | 38.8                       |  |  |  |
|     | 2) Majority   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | opposes   | 53.3   | 56.3                       | 48.3                       |  |  |  |
|     | 3) DK/NA  | 11.4   | 10.5                       | 12.8                       |  |  |  |
|     |   | Total%   | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%                |  |  |  |
| 45) | Now that the US   |  |                            | nent freeze as a condition |  |  |  |
| ,   |   |  |                            | has resumed settlement     |  |  |  |
|     | 8   | 0  |                            | into indirect negotiations |  |  |  |
|     | with Israel though  |  |                            | negotiutions               |  |  |  |
|     | 1) Certainly  |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |
|     | support   | 3.6  | 3.4                        | 3.7                        |  |  |  |
|     |   |  |                            |                            |  |  |  |

|             | 2) Support            | 26.3             | 24.8                         | 28.8                     |
|-------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
|             | 3) Oppose             | 49.5             | 50.7                         | 47.5                     |
|             | 4) Certainly          |                  |                              |                          |
|             | oppose                | 17.1             | 18.0                         | 15.5                     |
|             | 5) DK/NA              | 3.6              | 3.1                          | 4.5                      |
|             |                       | Total%           | West Bank%                   | Gaza Strip%              |
| <b>46</b> ) | Who in your opini     | on would come    | out the winner if the Pales  |                          |
|             | to indirect negotia   | ations with Isra | el through American me       | diation? Would it be the |
|             | Israeli, the Palestin |                  |                              |                          |
|             | 1) Israeli            | 58.9             | 62.9                         | 52.3                     |
|             | 2) Palestinian        | 13.4             | 12.1                         | 15.5                     |
|             | 3) Both sides         | 8.5              | 6.2                          | 12.2                     |
|             | 4) Neither side       | 15.9             | 15.9                         | 15.7                     |
|             | 5) DK/NA              | 3.4              | 2.9                          | 4.3                      |
|             |                       | Total%           | West Bank%                   | Gaza Strip%              |
| 47)         | If you oppose r       | eturn to indir   | ect negotiations with Is     | rael through American    |
| ,           | • • •                 |                  | going about ending occ       | 6                        |
|             |                       |                  | choose from among the fo     |                          |
|             | one you would pre     | •                | 0                            |                          |
|             | 1) Going to the       |                  |                              |                          |
|             | UN Security           |                  |                              |                          |
|             | Council to obtain     |                  |                              |                          |
|             | recognition of        | 31.2             | 32.1                         | 29.8                     |
|             | 2) Return to          |                  |                              |                          |
|             | armed                 |                  |                              |                          |
|             | confrontations        |                  |                              |                          |
|             | and attacks           |                  |                              |                          |
|             | against Israel        | 29.4             | 23.5                         | 39.0                     |
|             | 3) Organizing         |                  |                              |                          |
|             | widespread            |                  |                              |                          |
|             | peaceful and          |                  |                              |                          |
|             | nonviolent            | 160              | 10.4                         | 10.5                     |
|             | confrontations        | 16.2             | 18.4                         | 12.5                     |
|             | 4) Dissolve the       | 16.1             | 16.0                         | 147                      |
|             | PA<br>5) Other        | 16.1             | 16.9                         | 14.7                     |
|             | 5) Other              | 2.2              | 3.1                          | 0.7                      |
|             | 6) DK/NA              | 4.9              | 5.8                          | 3.3                      |
| 40          |                       | Total%           | West Bank%                   | Gaza Strip%              |
| <b>48</b> ) |                       | -                | esidents of the city of Zafe |                          |
|             |                       | ads. Do you thi  | nk the majority of Israeli   | Jews support or oppose   |
|             | such a call?          |                  |                              |                          |
|             | 1) Majority           | 22 6             | 25.2                         | 10.2                     |
|             | certainly supports    | 22.6             | 25.3                         | 18.2                     |
|             | 2) Majority           | 48.8             | 46.4                         | 52.7                     |

|             | supports  |   |  |  |
|-------------|---|---|--|--|
|             | 3) Majority   |   |  |  |
|             | opposes   | 22.4  | 22.8   | 21.8   |
|             | 4) Majority   |   |  |  |
|             | certainly opposes   | 1.9   | 2.1  | 1.6  |
|             | 5) DK/NA  | 4.3   | 3.5  | 5.8  |
|             | ,   | Total%  | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%  |
| <b>49</b> ) | A new Israeli pro   | posed law which   | is being considered thes   | ±  |
|             | -   | -   | ge allegiance to Israel as a   |  |
|             |   |   | of Israeli Jews support or   |  |
|             | law?  |   |  |  |
|             | 1) Majority   |   |  |  |
|             | certainly supports  | 22.4  | 23.8   | 20.1   |
|             | 2) Majority   |   |  |  |
|             | supports  | 48.7  | 45.2   | 54.4   |
|             | 3) Majority   |   |  |  |
|             | opposes   | 21.7  | 25.7   | 15.2   |
|             | 4) Majority   |   |  |  |
|             | certainly opposes   | 1.4   | 1.2  | 1.6  |
|             | 5) DK/NA  | 5.8   | 4.0  | 8.7  |
|             |   | Total%  | West Bank%   | Gaza Strip%  |
| 1           |   |   |  |  |
| 50)         | Another Israeli pr  |   | g considered these days a  | llows Israeli villages and   |
| 50)         | towns to reject a   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo   |  |
| 50)         |   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo   |  |
| 50)         | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews suppo1)Majority   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?  | u think the majority of  |
| 50)         | towns to reject a<br>Israeli Jews suppo   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo   |  |
| 50)         | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews suppo1)Majority   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?  | u think the majority of  |
| 50)         | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?  | u think the majority of  |
| 50)         | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)Majority   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc<br>21.1<br>54.2  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2  | 18.4<br>55.9   |
| 50)         | towns to reject asIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes   | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc<br>21.1  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8  | u think the majority of 18.4   |
| 50)         | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)  | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6   | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5  | u think the majority of         18.4         55.9         17.0   |
| 50)         | towns to reject asIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)4)Majoritycertainly opposes  | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5   | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5  | u think the majority of         18.4         55.9         17.0         1.2   |
| 50)         | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)  | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8  | u think the majority of         18.4         55.9         17.0         1.2         7.4   |
|             | towns to reject asIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)DK/NA   | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%  | u think the majority of         18.4         55.9         17.0         1.2         7.4         Gaza Strip%   |
| 50)<br>51)  | towns to reject asIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)DK/NA   | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed  | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered th   | u think the majority of18.455.917.01.27.4Gaza Strip%use days to ban the use  |
|             | towns to reject adIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or other   | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w                                   | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered th<br>omen in public places in   | u think the majority of18.455.917.01.27.4Gaza Strip%tese days to ban the useIsrael. Do you think the   |
|             | towns to reject adIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli  | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w                                   | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered th   | u think the majority of18.455.917.01.27.4Gaza Strip%tese days to ban the useIsrael. Do you think the   |
|             | towns to reject asIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)Majority3)Majorityopposes4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli1)Majority  | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w<br>Jews support or                 | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered th<br>omen in public places in<br>oppose such a proposed I                   | u think the majority of         18.4         55.9         17.0         1.2         7.4         Gaza Strip%         nese days to ban the use         Israel. Do you think the         aw? |
|             | towns to reject asIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)3)Majorityopposes4)4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli1)Majoritycertainly supports                              | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w                                   | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered th<br>omen in public places in   | u think the majority of18.455.917.01.27.4Gaza Strip%tese days to ban the useIsrael. Do you think the   |
|             | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)Majority3)Majorityopposes4)Majority4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli1)Majoritycertainly supports2)Majority   | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w<br>Jews support or<br>27.5        | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered the<br>romen in public places in<br>oppose such a proposed l<br>28.2         | 18.4   55.9   17.0   1.2   7.4   Gaza Strip%   use largel. Do you think the aw?   26.4   |
|             | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)Majority3)Majorityopposes4)Majority4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majority | oposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w<br>Jews support or                 | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered th<br>omen in public places in<br>oppose such a proposed I                   | u think the majority of         18.4         55.9         17.0         1.2         7.4         Gaza Strip%         nese days to ban the use         Israel. Do you think the         aw? |
|             | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)Majority3)Majorityopposes4)Majority4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli1)Majoritycertainly supports2)Majority   | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose suc<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w<br>Jews support or<br>27.5<br>51.1 | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered the<br>romen in public places in<br>oppose such a proposed I<br>28.2<br>51.8 | u think the majority of   18.4   55.9   17.0   1.2   7.4   Gaza Strip%   ese days to ban the use   Israel. Do you think the   aw?   26.4   50.0  |
|             | towns to reject aIsraeli Jews support1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majoritysupports3)Majority3)Majorityopposes4)Majority4)Majoritycertainly opposes5)5)DK/NAThere is anotherof burkas or othermajority of Israeli1)Majoritycertainly supports2)2)Majority | roposed law bein<br>dmission of non<br>rt or oppose such<br>21.1<br>54.2<br>18.6<br>1.5<br>4.6<br>Total%<br>Israeli proposed<br>face cover of w<br>Jews support or<br>27.5        | g considered these days a<br>Jewish residents. Do yo<br>h a proposed law?<br>22.8<br>53.2<br>19.5<br>1.7<br>2.8<br>West Bank%<br>I law being considered the<br>romen in public places in<br>oppose such a proposed l<br>28.2         | 18.4   55.9   17.0   1.2   7.4   Gaza Strip%   use largel. Do you think the aw?   26.4   |

|     | certainly opposes   |                         |                            |              |
|-----|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
|     | 5) DK/NA            | 4.7                     | 3.8                        | 6.1          |
|     |                     | Total%                  | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%  |
| 52) | Concerning armed    | l attacks again         | st Israeli civilians insid | le Israel, I |
|     | 1) strongly         |                         |                            |              |
|     | support             | 13.8                    | 9.7                        | 20.6         |
|     | 2) support          | 34.4                    | 26.2                       | 47.7         |
|     | 3) oppose           | 40.2                    | 47.9                       | 27.5         |
|     | 4) strongly appose  | 7.9                     | 11.3                       | 2.2          |
|     | 5) DK/NA            | 3.8                     | 4.9                        | 1.9          |
|     |                     | Total%                  | West Bank%                 | Gaza Strip%  |
| 53) | Which of the follow | wing political <b>j</b> | parties do you support?    | ?            |
|     | 1) PPP              | 0.7                     | 0.2                        | 1.4          |
|     | 2) PFLP             | 3.9                     | 2.2                        | 6.5          |
|     | 3) Fateh            | 31.5                    | 30.0                       | 34.0         |
|     | 4) Hamas            | 18.8                    | 17.5                       | 20.8         |
|     | 5) DFLP             | 0.7                     | 0.8                        | 0.6          |
|     | 6) Islamic Jihad    | 2.5                     | 2.2                        | 2.9          |
|     | 7) Fida             | 0.0                     | 0.0                        | 0.0          |
|     | 8)                  |                         |                            |              |
|     | National Initiative |                         |                            |              |
|     | (almubadara)        | 1.3                     | 1.2                        | 1.5          |
|     | 9) Independent      |                         |                            |              |
|     | Islamist            | 2.4                     | 2.2                        | 2.8          |
|     | 10) Independent     |                         |                            |              |
|     | nationalist         | 2.2                     | 2.8                        | 1.4          |
|     | 11) Third way       |                         |                            |              |
|     | headed by Salam     |                         |                            |              |
|     | Fayyad              | 1.4                     | 1.7                        | 0.9          |
|     | 12) None of the     | 22.0                    |                            | 250          |
|     | above               | 33.9                    | 38.3                       | 26.9         |
|     | 13) Others          | 0.7                     | 0.8                        | 0.5          |

# WEST AND CENTRAL ASIA

Pakistanis Believe That Taxes Are Unjust and Too Many


Views On Taxes: Over The Decades Majority Continues To Believe That Taxes Are Unjust And Too Many, Acceptability Of Taxes Rose From 34% In 1991 To 45% In 2002 And Then Declined To 34% Again By 2010: GILANI POLL/GALLUP PAKISTAN

Islamabad, January 4, 2011

According to a Gilani Research Foundation survey carried out by Gallup Pakistan , acceptability of taxes rose from 34% in 1991 to 45% in 2002 and then declined to 34% again by 2010.<sup>2</sup>

In two different surveys, a nationally representative sample of men and women from across the country were asked the following question: "Some people believe that the tax collected by the government is just while others believe it is unjust. What is your opinion?" In 2010 34% find taxes to be just while 65% consider them un just. 1% have given no response. The comparable figures in response to the same question in 2002 were: 45% stated that taxes were reasonable where as 54% said they were unreasonable. In 1991 the corresponding figures were 24% said taxes were just and 64% unjust.


"Some people believe that the tax collected by the government is just while others believe it is unjust. What is your opinion?"




Source: 30 Years of Gallup and Gilani Surveys (1980-2010) the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International Association (<u>www.gallup-international.com</u>; <u>www.gallup.com.pk</u>)

In a follow up question, a nationally representative sample of men and women from across the country were asked the following question: "*What is your opinion about the amount of tax collected by the government?*" *In* 2010 81% say the amount of taxes are more than required, 12% find the amount to be appropriate 6% believe they sum is less than justified. The comparable figures in response to the same question in 2002 were: 56% considered the amount to be more than justified, 38% appropriate and 5% less than required. In 1991 the figures in response to the same question were 61% considered the amount to be justified, 32% appropriate and 6% less than justified.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> <u>http://gallup.com.pk/Polls/4-12-10%20Taxes.pdf</u>





Source: 30 Years of Gallup and Gilani Surveys (1980-2010) the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International Association (<u>www.gallup-international.com</u>; <u>www.gallup.com.pk</u>)

The study was released by Gilani foundation and carried out by Gallup Pakistan , the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International. The recent survey was carried out among a sample of 2641 men and women in rural and urban areas of all four provinces of the country, during December 2010. Error margin is estimated to be approximately  $\pm$  2-3 per cent at 95% confidence level.

Two Third of Pakistanis Repent For Their Sins Everyday

Religious Beliefs, Repentance And Sins: 64% Claim To Repent For Their Sins Everyday: Gilani Poll/Gallup Pakistan

Islamabad, January 6, 2011


According to a Gilani Research Foundation survey carried out by Gallup Pakistan , almost two third of all Pakistanis (64%) state that they seek forgiveness for their sins from the Creator everyday, 28% sometimes and 7% never.<sup>3</sup>

In a survey, a nationally representative sample of men and women from across the country were asked the following question: "*Some people are in a habit of seeking forgiveness for their sins everyday. How often would you say you do that?*" 64% claimed to often repent daily, 28% sometimes and 7% never. 1% gave no response.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> http://gallup.com.pk/Polls/6-01-2011.pdf

The findings of the survey reveal no significant difference in opinion of people from across various demographics.

"Some people are in a habit of seeking forgiveness for their sins everyday. How often would you say you do that?"



Source: Gallup and Gilani Surveys the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International Association (<u>www.gallup-international.com; www.gallup.com.pk</u>)

The study was released by Gilani foundation and carried out by Gallup Pakistan , the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International. The recent survey was carried out among a sample of 2599 men and women in rural and urban areas of all four provinces of the country, during November 2010. Error margin is estimated to be approximately  $\pm$  2-3 per cent at 95% confidence level.

# SOUTH ASIA

# Indian Muslims Doing Well in Hindu Majority Country

In a comprehensive nationwide survey, TSI-CVoter maps a community in flux. Muslims constitute 13.4 per cent of the world's second most populous nation. This opinion poll is an attempt to grasp their hopes, aspirations and worries on a wide range of issues.<sup>4</sup>

This survey was conducted across three segments of Muslims - students of minority institutions, students of madrasas and the rest of the community. Respondents from minority colleges are denoted by a blue dot, those from madrasas by a green dot and the rest of India by a yellow dot.

The survey was conducted between November 2 to November 23, 2010 in Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Srinagar, Kolkata, Guwahati Lucknow, Patna, Bhopal, Chennai, Bangalore and covered people from all major universities, colleges and madrasas including DU, Jamia Millia Islamia, AMU, Osmania University, Darul Uloom Deoband, Nadwa and Jamia Al-Falah.

The age of the respondents ranged between 18-40 years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> <u>http://teamcvoter.com/teamcvoter/newsletter12i2/newsletter\_12issue2.pdf</u>

# Do you know about the Sachar Committee and its recommendations?

|   | CAN'T<br>SAY | YES, BUT NOT<br>ABOUT ITS<br>RECOMMEN-<br>DATION | YES, I KNOW<br>ABOUT BOTH | NO, NOT<br>AT ALL |
|---|--------------|--|---------------------------|-------------------|
| • | 6.8          | 45.5   | 21.4                      | 26.3              |
| • | 16.4         | 42.8   | 13.2                      | 27.6              |
|   | 3.8          | 18.8   | 17.6                      | 59.7              |

As a Muslim, do you think the community is wrongly targetted because of the acts of some people elsewhere?



| Are religious<br>organisations/<br>heads justified | YES  | MAYBE | NOT<br>AT ALL |
|--|------|-------|---------------|
| in interfering                                     | 28.3 | 16.9  | 54.8          |
| in political                                       | 35.1 | 12.8  | 52.1          |
| developments and issues?                           | 30.3 | 10.7  | 59.0          |

# Are you satisfied with the present multi-party system or should it be a two-party system?

|   | CAN'T<br>SAY | SATISFIED<br>WITH<br>THE SYSTEM | NO, WANT<br>TWO-PARTY<br>SYSTEM |
|---|--------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| • | 22.0         | 37.0                            | 41.0                            |
| • | 35.2         | 38.8                            | 26.0                            |
| ٠ | 15.4         | 34.5                            | 50.1                            |


| ne | there<br>ed fo<br>parat<br>litica | ra<br>e Mu |               |
|----|-----------------------------------|------------|---------------|
|    | YES                               | MAY-<br>BE | NOT<br>AT ALL |
| •  | 50.5                              | 13.6       | 35.9          |
| •  | 65.2                              | 5.8        | 29.0          |
|    | 43.6                              | 4.9        | 51.5          |


India's largest minority community has been the subject of frenetic discussions across the political spectrum in recent decades. on the right of the divide, they are pilloried for being beneficiaries of an alleged policy of minority appeasement. On the other side, they usually end up being used and abused as a convenient vote bank. At election time, for candidates in a large number of crucial constituencies across the length and breadth of india, muslims assume great significance because they possess the power to impact the final outcome at the hustings. But how much really has the indian muslim suffered as a result of being a pawn in a game of political expediency? How has continuing economic backwardness and a lack of mainstream educational and employment opportunities impacted the way members of the community think? this exhaustive survey conducted across multiple locations and social segments seeks out the answers from a complex web of questions that confront the indian muslim in contemporary india...

| lni<br>(ge<br>lav<br>dis<br>to | the<br>dian s<br>overn<br>w, etc.<br>scrimi<br>wards<br>uslims | ment,<br>)<br>natory | th<br>re<br>of<br>M | iould<br>ere be<br>servat<br>seats<br>uslim<br>ection | tion<br>for<br>s in |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|
|                                | YES  | NO                   |                     | YES   | NO                  |
|                                |  |                      |                     |   | 14.4                |
| •                              | 53.9   | 46.1                 |                     | 85.6  | 1.47.4              |
| •                              | 53.9<br>74.8   | 46.1<br>25.2         |                     | 85.6<br>95.1  | 4.9                 |

Do you prefer govt jobs or business? Are you satisfied with the working of Muslim religious organisations? GOVT PRIVATE JOB JOB NOT AT ALL YES MAYBE BUSINESS 43.3 23.2 35.7 33.5 52.7 11.6 66.3 5.8 27.9 41.2 35.6 23.2 41.9 25.0 33.1 46.6 10.4 43.0

# Which political party do you support?





Much water has flowed down the Saryu since the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and the idea that is India was reduced to rubble nearly two decades ago. One of independent India's most cataclysmic flashpoints, this outrage committed by Hindutva's foot soldiers occurred a year or so after the process of economic liberalisation was set in motion. The nation as a whole has definitely moved on since then. But has the Indian Muslim been allowed to keep pace? Have the fruits of economic progress touched his day-to-day existence quite to the extent that it has the lives of India's burgeoning middle class?

|   | CAN'T SAY | AGREE | DISAGREE | NEITHER<br>AGREE NOR<br>DISAGREE |
|---|-----------|-------|----------|----------------------------------|
| • | 8.8       | 35.1  | 35.4     | 20.7                             |
| • | 39.3      | 10.3  | 34.5     | 15.9                             |
| • | 7.0       | 39.1  | 49.3     | 4.7                              |

# USA is a good friend of India.

| Pa | kistani   | is a go | od neig  | hbour.                           |
|----|-----------|---------|----------|----------------------------------|
|    | CAN'T SAY | AGREE   | DISAGREE | NEITHER<br>AGREE NOR<br>DISAGREE |
| •  | 13.6      | 28.6    | 33.7     | 24.2                             |
| •  | 40.1      | 27.4    | 24.2     | 8.3                              |
|    | 5.6       | 30.3    | 57.0     | 7.1                              |



|   | YES,<br>ALWAYS | YES, AT<br>TIMES | NO,<br>NEVER |
|---|----------------|------------------|--------------|
| • | 40.9           | 33.7             | 25.4         |
| • | 54.9           | 31.8             | 13.3         |
| • | 31.0           | 27.4             | 41.6         |

# Do you feel that Muslims in India face discrimination in getting jobs/promotions etc?

VES, MYSELF VES, FAMILY MEMBER 20.6 13.4 32.1 19.6 34.1 35.3 31.1 25.2 12.9 27.2 28.7 19.6 MADARIA STUDENTS Minoerry Counces REST OF INDU

Let's face it, it hasn't. The Rajinder Sachar Committee report, tabled in Parliament in 2006, provided confirmation of that fact and, ironically, appeared to vindicate the BJP's contention that the left and the left-of-centre political parties have only indulged in 'minority appeasement' and exploited Muslims merely as a vote bank. Therefore, six decades and a bit after Independence, true empowerment continues to elude major swathes of India's largest minority community.

# Do you think that there should be Sharia law for the Muslim population in India?

|   | YES,<br>TOTALLY | YES, BUT ONLY<br>CERTAIN PARTS | NO, COMMON CIVIL<br>CODE FOR ALL INDIANS |
|---|-----------------|--------------------------------|--|
| • | 46.7            | 21.9                           | 31.4                                     |
|   | 77.2            | 5.0                            | 17.8                                     |
| ٠ | 40.8            | 25.3                           | 33.9                                     |

While more than 40 per cent of the Muslim respondents across the three categories covered by the survey minority college students, madarsa pupils and the rest of India asserted that they are satisfied with the role that religious organisations play in their lives, a majority felt that they But it is amply clear from the findings of the exhaustive TSI-Team CVoter survey on the following pages that Indian Muslims want to put the past behind them and find their rightful place in the national scheme of things in terms of both socio-economic indices and educational parameters. But who will show them the way? Muslims are crucial to the electoral fortunes of all leading political formations of the country, but economically and socially they have constantly oscillated between real despair and false hope as those who claim to represent the community's interests have only flattered to deceive.

While more than 40 per cent of the Muslim respondents across the three categories covered by the survey minority college students, madarsa pupils and the rest of India asserted that they are satisfied with the role that religious organisations play in their lives, a majority felt that they do not need a separate Muslim political party to espouse their cause. Clearly, the leadership within and outside the community has failed them. Significantly, however, 58 per cent of minority college students, 50 per cent of madarsa students and 65 per cent of general Muslims said that they do not feel insecure in Hindu majority India and an overwhelmingly large percentage asserted that they would never opt for Pakistan or Bangladesh given a chance.



It is a community in flux. Even though a whole new generation has emerged for them the baggage of Partition is a thing of the past they have reason to look back in anger. Yet, the dignity

and maturity with which Muslims in general have reacted to the contentious Ayodhya verdict is an indication that the dust is probably beginning to settle and happier days could be up ahead.

But it can never be easy to live down the past no matter how enticing the future may appear to be. It is especially difficult when the past is littered with turns of events that have engendered fear and distrust. It is a bit of a cul-de-sac: while the doctrine of majoritarian supremacy often stares the Muslim community in the face, most political, social or administrative moves aimed at bettering the community's lot evokes instant cynicism. They get battered by Muslimbaiters even as they are accused of being mollycoddled by the so-called pseudo secularists. It's a no-win situation.

The Indian Muslim has had to weather many storms in the past few decades as a result. The Shah Bano case of the 1980s and the then Rajiv Gandhi government's response to it triggered the accusations of appeasement that have, sadly, continued to dominate all discourse pertaining to Indian Muslims ever since.

In the 1970s, there were riots after riots in different parts of the country and in each case ordinary people bore the brunt as political and religious forces sought to cash in on heightened emotions. In the 1980s, Muslims had to repeatedly 'pass' the cricket loyalty test to prove their allegiance to India. In the 1990s, they had to live under the shadow of a Masjid dome that was no more. And in the first decade of the new millennium, the post-Godhra Gujarat riots exposed their vulnerability like never before.

And now, every time a terror strike takes place somewhere in india, the common Muslim cowers in trepidation. The historical spectre of the two-nation theory refuses to stop haunting them. As of April 2010, the 160 million-strong community constitutes 13.4 per cent of India's population only two nations, Indonesia (200 million) and Pakistan (174 million), have more Muslims. But their representation in Indian government jobs and security agencies is grossly lower than what it should ideally be.

But all is certainly not lost. The literacy rate among Muslims is 59 per cent against the all-India overall rate of 65 per cent – with a just a little effort, the gap is eminently bridgeable. A Muslim child today attends school for three years and four months compared to the national average of four years. Once again, the distance does not seem to be so yawning that it cannot be closed.

Indeed, once the education gap that separates Muslims and the rest of India is eliminated, everything else could begin to fall in place. What is needed is genuine political will. Indian Muslims have kept their faith in India's 'secularism' in the face of the gravest of provocations. The nation owes them more than mere lip service.

Indians See Corruption As One of The Main Ailment in The Country

Close on the heels of scams such as that involving Mumbai's Adarsh housing society, a majority of Indians identify corruption in the public sphere as India's biggest bane, a CVOTER survey finds...<sup>5</sup>

According to Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which measures perceived, public sector corruption in various countries across the world, India is ranked 87 amongst 180 nations even below the likes of Rawanda, Namibia and Botswana, all relatively deprived countries but ostensibly more honest than us. But "rankings" such as these should come as no surprise to most of us: We already know how corrupt the system really is. In fact, the sometimes-praised, uniquely Indian trait of "jugaad" somehow making do and making things happen is nothing but an offshoot of the highly corrupt system in which we all live. Even children in India probably realize that getting things done in a straightforward, transparent manner in the country is not easy.

While we may celebrate our growth rate and economic prowess, the sad truth is that economic benefits of development are being shared by just a few, privileged and powerful people in India. The license raj of the pre-Liberalisation era may have gone but that has not lessened the power of politicians and bureaucrats in the country, who along with interested corporates, are able to bend rules, grant favours, and so on—all with a view to subverting the system, making a mockery of just and fair practices and making money for private gain rather than for the good of the nation.

So which are the most corrupt states in the country? If you were to ask the general public, many fingers would no doubt be pointed towards the Hindi heartland—UP and Bihar, because of chaotic politics and bureaucrats and politicians who have made private gain their overreaching, all encompassing "philosophy", have a notorious reputation for harbouring and promoting corruption even as the masses here live on, by now immune to this way of the world. Yet, recent scams that have caused uproar in the country show that other states are just

| Is the Country's Political Leadership really serious<br>about combating Corruption? |    |
|---|----|
| Can't Say   | 17 |
| Definitely Yes  | 20 |
| Yes, but not as much as required  | 26 |
| No,not at all   | 37 |

**Base: All Respondents** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> <u>http://teamcvoter.com/teamcvoter/newsletter12i1/newsletter\_12issue1.pdf</u>

| Are Karnataka and Maharashtra in danger of going<br>the Bihar way? |    |
|--|----|
| Can't Say  | 29 |
| Yes  | 47 |
| No   | 25 |

Base: All Respondents

as corrupt, if not worse. You only have to look at the likes of the recent Adarsh Housing scam in Maharashtra to realize how this cancer in our society is spreading and even venerable institutions such as the army possibly are affected by this deep rot.

The Adarsh controversy erupted over how a society in Colaba, Mumbai, initially meant to be just six-storey high and house Kargil war heroes and their widows got converted into a 31-storeyed tower through a collusion of bureaucrats, politicians and top defence brass. In fact, commentators watching the whole drama unravel have noted that everyone who moved the file along, giving permissions and clearances where none should have come—the environment ministry has not cleared the project—benefited. Flats were awarded to these people and close kith and kin. A look at the final 104 allotments reveals that there were many such cases of conflict of interest, with the allottees being related to bureaucrats involved in the clearances granted. Also caught in the eye of the storm were the then Maharashtra CM Ashok Chavan and another senior leader from the state union minister Vilasrao Deshmukh. But Congress politicians apart, the party alleged, big politicos from other parties too were ostensibly involved. The stench of corruption could be felt across party lines.

But this kind of corruption is obviously not limited to just one state. What this points to a deeper rot within out entire polity which can only be stemmed through serious action and a will to clean up the entire system. Rigorous investigation into all instances of corruption—whether it is the CWG mess or this one—and credible punishment to the funding should also take place. Whether or not that happens in the near future—one thing is sure: the Indian masses are fed up with this state of affairs.

A recent CVOTER survey conducted across 21 states found that an overwhelming 72 per cent of respondents agreed that corruption was the biggest bane in the country. Another 15 per cent added "may be" it is while just 4 per cent outrightly denied that that was the problem.

| Do you agree that corruption is modern India's big-<br>gest bane? |    |
|---|----|
| Can't Say   | 9  |
| Definitely Yes  | 72 |
| Yes, may be   | 15 |
| No,not at all   | 4  |

#### Base: All Respondents

We may think that Indians are immune to corruption by now but the survey revealed that people strongly look forward to credible action being taken against the tainted. When asked whether they felt that the wrongdoers in scams such as Adarsh housing and CWG will be brought to book, a majority of 47 per cent replied in the affirmative. A further 18 per cent said "may be" while just 19 per cent were pessimistic and said "never".

On the other hand, close to half (47 per cent) of the respondents said that Maharashtra and Karnataka were in danger of going the Bihar way. Only 20 per cent said that the political leadership was definitely interested in weeding out corruption from the public sphere. 26 per cent said that it was taking action but not as much as required. While a substantial 37 per cent said that the government was not serious at all about this issue. Clearly, there is a strong sense of discontent with the corrupt polity of the day. It is high time that our leaders woke up and took notice.

| Do you think that the CWG and Adarsh Society wrong-<br>doers will be brought to book? |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| Can't Say 16  |                       |
| Definitely Yes  | 47                    |
| Yes, may be   | 18                    |
| No, never   | 19                    |
|   | Base: All Respondents |

# Methodology

National representative sample of 1000 randomly selected respondents by CATI across 21 states in India during 8th to 9th Nov. 2010. Data weighted to known census profile. Margin of error + 3% at national level.

# NORTHEAST ASIA

# Japanese Not Satisfied With Their Government

Asahi Shimbun December 2010 Regular Public Opinion Poll Dates Conducted December 11 and 12, 2010 Released December 14, 2010 (Morning edition of the Asahi Shimbun).

# Methodology

The poll was conducted by telephone on December 11 and 12 with voters from across Japan, whose telephone numbers were selected by a computer at random. Subjects were selected using a three-stage random sampling method (the Asahi RDD). The total number of those polled was 3,413, with 2,019 responses and a 59% response rate. Decimals were rounded up. Unless otherwise noted, the numbers in () are the results from a poll conducted on November 13 and 14,  $2010.^{6}$ 

# **Key Issues**

- Support for the Kan cabinet
- Dissolution of the House of Representatives
- Ozawa political funding scandal

# Disclaimer

The Mansfield Foundation is responsible for the translation of this Asahi Shimbun poll, subject to the Mansfield Foundation <u>Terms of Use</u>

Q1. Do you support or not support the Kan cabinet?

| Support        | 21% (27) |
|----------------|----------|
| Do not support | 60% (52) |

# Q2. Which political party do you currently support?

| Democratic Party of Japan | 23% (25) |
|---------------------------|----------|
| Liberal Democratic Party  | 17% (19) |
| New Komeito               | 3% (4)   |
| Japan Communist Party     | 1% (1)   |
| Social Democratic Party   | 1% (1)   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> http://mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2010/poll-10-33.htm

| Your Party                      | 3% (2)   |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| The People's New Party          | 0% (0)   |
| The Sunrise Party of Japan      | 0% (0)   |
| The New Party Nippon            | 0% (0)   |
| New Renaissance Party           | 0% (0)   |
| The Happiness Realization Party | 0% (0)   |
| Other party                     | 1% (0)   |
| Do not support any party        | 45% (42) |
| No answer/Do not know           | 6% (6)   |

Q3. Do you think it is necessary or not necessary to quickly dissolve the lower house and hold a general election? The numbers in () are the results of a poll conducted on July 12 and 13.

| It is necessary to do so quickly     | 34% (31) |
|--------------------------------------|----------|
| It is not necessary to do so quickly | 53% (60) |

Q4. If the general election were being held today, which party do you think you would vote for in the proportional representation section?

| Democratic Party of Japan | 23% (28) |
|---------------------------|----------|
| Liberal Democratic Party  | 27% (27) |
| New Komeito               | 4% (4)   |
| Japan Communist Party     | 2% (2)   |
| Social Democratic Party   | 1% (1)   |
| Your Party                | 8% (5)   |
| The People's New Party    | 0% (0)   |

| The Sunrise Party of Japan      | 0% (0)   |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| The New Party Nippon            | 0% (0)   |
| New Renaissance Party           | 0% (0)   |
| The Happiness Realization Party | 0% (0)   |
| Other party                     | 1% (1)   |
| No answer/Do not know           | 34% (32) |

Q5. How do you evaluate Prime Minister Kan's performance so far? (Please choose one)

| Greatly evaluate                 | 1% (1)   |
|----------------------------------|----------|
| Somewhat positively evaluate     | 25% (28) |
| Somewhat not positively evaluate | 51% (51) |
| Do not evaluate at all           | 22% (18) |

Q6. Going forward, what is your level of expectations for Prime Minister Kan.? (Please choose one)

| High expectations     | 6% (8)   |
|-----------------------|----------|
| Some expectations     | 28% (33) |
| Not many expectations | 43% (39) |
| No expectations       | 22% (19) |

Q7. How much longer would you like Prime Minister Kan to remain prime minister? (Please choose one)

| I want him to be prime minister for a long time    | 8%  |
|--|-----|
| I want him to be prime minister for the time being | 49% |
| I want him to resign immediately                   | 39% |

Q8. Do you think the current LDP is a party that can or cannot be trusted to lead the government?

| I think the LDP can be trusted to lead the government        | 26% |
|--|-----|
| I do not think the LDP can be trusted to lead the government | 57% |

Q9. Do you think the change of government has made politics better, worse, or unchanged?

| Better    | 8%  |
|-----------|-----|
| Worse     | 22% |
| Unchanged | 66% |

Q10. The House of Councillors passed a resolution censoring Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku. Do you think it is necessary or unnecessary for Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku to resign?

| He should resign                      | 39% |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| It is not necessary for him to resign | 46% |

Q11. The DPJ's Ichiro Ozawa is currently involved in a political funding scandal and a mandatory indictment has been issued. Do you think Mr. Ozawa should explain his situation in the Diet or is it sufficient if he explains it in court?

| He should explain it in the Diet.            | 68% (65) |
|--|----------|
| It is sufficient if he explains it in court. | 24% (27) |

Q12. Has the DPJ's handling of Mr. Ozawa's political funding scandal been appropriate or not appropriate?

| Appropriate     | 8%  |
|-----------------|-----|
| Not appropriate | 83% |

WEST EUROPE

# Expected 'Slow Burn' Turned Into A 'Deep Freeze' As Retail Footfall Suffers In December

# Synovate

# 7 January 2011

UNITED KINGDOM — Final figures for December released by <u>Synovate Retail Performance</u> confirm that the month was significantly quieter on the high street than last year. The <u>Retail</u> <u>Traffic Index</u> (RTI), the UK metric of non-food store footfall was down 7.0% for the month compared to December 2009. This was worse than Synovate's forecast of -4.2%. Against November retail footfall was up by 24.9%, but it was considerably lower than the previous 3 year December versus November average of 30.6%.<sup>7</sup>

"Heavy snowfall throughout the month at different times in different regions played havoc with shoppers in December," comments Dr Tim Denison, Director of Retail Intelligence at Synovate Retail Performance. "Retailers had high hopes that the impeding 2011 VAT increase combined with creative and competitive promotional campaigns would encourage people to make the most of the lower tax rate and the money in consumers' pockets before the year end. Whether heavy spending featured in people's intentions or not we shall never know. We had anticipated a 'slow burn' run-in to Christmas, not the 'deep freeze' it became. Circumstances were rapidly overtaken by weather conditions that restricted shoppers' access during the build up to Christmas to local town centres as well as retail honey pots further afield. The very fact that the wintry weather continued in many parts of the country beyond the cut-off deadlines of on-line retail sites also suggests that the deficit of footfall on the high streets will not have been reconciled by website traffic. It is a bad outcome for retailers, a bad outcome for shoppers and a bad outcome for the UK economy, just at the wrong time."

On a more positive note, footfall levels did improve over the last fortnight of the month. Christmas week itself (w/c 19th December) saw the gap against last year shrink to just 2.8%, as shoppers did their best to complete their gift buying in the final run in to Christmas. The surge, however, was nowhere near great enough to make up the ground lost to the weather.

As Synovate had forecast, the last week of the year proved to be the busiest of 2010, 9% above Christmas week (the second busiest of the year) and only 3% down on the corresponding week of the year before. Tuesday 28th turned out to be the busiest day of the post-Christmas week, with 3.1% more people out shopping than on the day before, which had been the expected footfall peak. Whilst every trading day registered high volumes of traffic, the busiest day of the year fell on Saturday December 11th, when shoppers made the most of the temporary respite in the weather conditions.

"2010 was the most unusual Christmas I have analysed in terms of retail traffic patterns, continues Denison. "The weather turned everything on its head, disrupting shopping plans and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> http://www.synovate.com/news/article/2011/01/expected-slow-burn-turned-into-a-deep-freeze-as-retail-footfall-suffers-in-december-says-synovate.html

behaviour. We had correctly anticipated that the final week of the year would be its busiest. Increasingly we are seeing what I call 'me-gifting' kicking in post-Christmas, at the start of the Sales, when people buy for themselves, rather than friends and family. What is most telling though is that retail footfall during the final week was not on a par with 2009. It suggests a reluctance on the shopper's part to get carried away with the moment and an underlying weakening in their appetite to shop that can only be exacerbated as the higher VAT rate is introduced on January 4th. These are anxious times for retailers particularly in sectors such as high street fashion, where raw materials inflation is pushing prices higher, irrespective of the VAT increase."

As for the year as a whole, retail traffic fell exactly in line with Synovate's forecast. In 2010 the RTI recorded a year-on-year decline of 3.6% in non-food store footfall across the UK. The year ended on a downward trajectory with the gap widening against 2009 for every month since August. The start of 2011 looks equally downbeat as shoppers are exposed to higher living costs and take stock of how this affects their daily living.

# **About Synovate Retail Performance**

<u>Synovate Retail Performance</u> provides footfall monitoring solutions, shopper tracking systems and in-store behavioural research to retailers worldwide. Its core products - Shopper Count, Shopper Interact and Shopper Engage - scientifically measure all aspects of a shopper experience from store entry to exit. It supplies national and international retailers with essential business metrics to drive accountability and performance improvement.

Synovate Retail Performance is home to the <u>Retail Traffic Index</u> series, which for over 10 years has been the industry's leading tracker of national, regional and sector retail footfall trends. It is also co-founder of the KPMG / Synovate <u>Retail Think Tank</u>, offering thought leadership on the state of retail health and the future of retailing.

# **About Synovate**

Synovate, the market research arm of <u>Aegis Group plc</u>, generates insights to help clients drive competitive brand, product and customer experience strategies. A truly borderless company with <u>offices in over 60 countries</u>, our 'biggest small company' approach combines best in class global research capabilities with personalised service, local knowledge and the flexibility to create teams and processes that meet clients' specific requirements. At Synovate, our clients sit at the top of our organisational chart, driving us to continually develop more innovative research solutions that predict actual business outcomes.


# EU Residents Downbeat About Local Job Market in 2010

Nearly all in Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Slovakia said it was a bad time to find a job January 4, 2011

Europeans' evaluations of their local job markets were universally grim last year and even more dismal than Americans' assessments; neither are positive signs heading into 2011. A median of

13% across the 25 EU countries Gallup surveyed in 2010 said it was a good time to find a job in their communities, compared with 24% of Americans.<sup>8</sup>

# Thinking about the job situation in the city or area where you live today, would you say that it is now a good time or a bad time to



<sup>2010</sup> surveys were conducted in the EU in May through August. 2010 surveys in the U.S. were conducted in August.

#### GALLUP

Americans historically have been more positive about their job market than many EU residents, but that gap narrowed as views became more negative on both sides of the Atlantic during the global economic crisis. The gap showed signs of widening last year, with residents in only a few countries -- Germany, Austria, and Belgium -- as likely as Americans to say it was a good time to find a job.

EU residents' overall assessment of their job market in 2010 was better than in 2009, but they were still more negative than before the global economic crisis hit. A mix of euro-zone and noneuro-zone countries such as Sweden, France, Denmark, Austria, the United Kingdom, and others led any improvements, but assessments didn't change meaningfully elsewhere.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145451/Residents-Downbeat-Local-Job-Market-

<sup>2010.</sup>aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_te\_m=Business%20-%20USA

Thinking about the job situation in the city or area where you live today, would you say that it is now a good time or a bad time to find a job?

|                   | Good time | Bad time | Difference in % "good<br>time" since 2009 |
|-------------------|-----------|----------|---|
| Sweden            | 32%       | 60%      | 16  |
| Belgium           | 25%       | 65%      | 8   |
| Germany           | 22%       | 72%      | 6   |
| Austria           | 22%       | 69%      | 7   |
| France            | 19%       | 74%      | 12  |
| Netherlands       | 19%       | 71%      | 8   |
| Poland            | 19%       | 64%      | 3   |
| Denmark           | 19%       | 73%      | 7   |
| Finland           | 19%       | 74%      | 8   |
| Luxembourg        | 15%       | 79%      | 3   |
| Malta             | 14%       | 63%      | 1   |
| United<br>Kingdom | 13%       | 79%      | 6   |
| Slovenia          | 13%       | 81%      | 5   |
| Cyprus            | 12%       | 81%      | -5  |
| Czech<br>Republic | 11%       | 81%      | ٠   |
| Portugal          | 11%       | 85%      | 0   |
| Spain             | 7%        | 91%      | 2   |
| Italy             | 7%        | 86%      | 0   |
| Hungary           | 7%        | 87%      | 2   |
| Romania           | 7%        | 85%      | 0   |
| Bulgaria          | 7%        | 84%      | 8   |
| Lithuania         | 6%        | 89%      | 2   |
| Greece            | 5%        | 92%      | -8  |
| Ireland           | 5%        | 93%      | 3   |
| Slovakia          | 4%        | 91%      | 8   |

Surveys conducted between May and August 2010. Estonia and Latvia were

not surveyed in 2010.

\* No measure available in 2009.

#### GALLUP'

In countries where unemployment was highest last year, such as Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Slovakia, nearly all residents said it was a bad time to find a job in their local communities. Perceptions about the job market have been dismal in these countries in the past two years, but in

bailout recipient Greece, they have worsened with austerity measures and efforts to shrink the public sector.

# Implications

Across Europe, governments are cutting hundreds of thousands of public-sector jobs and wages and employing other drastic measures to reduce their deficits. For many Europeans, 2011 will be a difficult year, and their perceptions about the job market aren't likely to improve in the immediate future. Governments will need to focus intently on stimulating job creation in the private sector to not only keep their economies growing, but also to keep a skeptical public on board with the austerity measures leaders hope will make economic growth possible.

For complete data sets or custom research from the more than 150 countries Gallup continually surveys, please contact <u>SocialandEconomicAnalysis@gallup.com</u> or call 202.715.3030. **Survey Methods** 

Results are based on face-to-face and telephone interviews with approximately 1,000 adults in each EU member state, aged 15 and older, between May and August 2010. For results based on each sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error ranged from a low of  $\pm 3.5$  percentage points to a high of  $\pm 4.0$  percentage points.

Results are based on telephone interviews with approximately 1,000 adults in the United States, aged 15 and older, conducted in August 2010. For results based on each sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 3.9$  percentage points.

**Labour Still Leads in Britain, Even if Coalition Partners Run Together**<sup>9</sup> (01/07/11) -

Only a third of people who voted for the Liberal Democrats in 2010 would support the party if it runs in tandem with the Tories.

The opposition Labour Party remains ahead of the Conservatives in Britain, while the Liberal Democrats have recovered from their poor showing in December, a new Vision Critical / Angus Reid poll has found.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/43729/labour-still-leads-in-britain-even-if-coalition-partners-run-together/

| British Political Scene  |                      |     |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|----------------------|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| If a General Election were held tomorrow, which one of the following parties would you be most likely to support in the constituency? – <i>Decided Voters with leaners</i> |                      |     |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | January 6-7,<br>2011 |     |     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Labour   | 40%                  | 41% | 40% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Conservative   | 35%                  | 35% | 35% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberal Democrats  | 12%                  | 9%  | 13% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| United Kingdom Independence<br>Party (UKIP)  | 5%                   | 5%  | 4%  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Scottish National Party (SNP)  | 3%                   | 3%  | 2%  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Green Party  | 2%                   | 3%  | 3%  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| British National Party (BNP)   | 2%                   | 2%  | 2%  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Plaid Cymru  | 1%                   | 1%  | 1%  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other party  | 1%                   | 1%  | 0%  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

In the online survey of a representative sample of 2,010 British adults, 40 per cent of decided voters and leaners (-1 since late December) say they would support the Labour candidate in their constituency in the next General Election.

The Conservative Party is second with 35 per cent (=), followed by their coalition partners—the Liberal Democrats—with 12 per cent (+3).

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is next on the list with five per cent, followed by the Scottish National Party (SNP) with three per cent, the Green Party with two per cent, the British National Party (BNP) also with two per cent, and Plaid Cymru with one per cent.

Labour is practically tied with the Tories in London (38% to 36%) and holds a 20-point lead in the North (46% to 32%) and a four-point edge in Midlands and Wales (41% to 37%). The Tories are ahead in the South of England (43% to 34%). In Scotland, Labour maintains its eight-point advantage on the SNP (42% to 34%).

# A Merged Coalition Party?

The survey was conducted at the height of speculation related to the possibility of the two coalition partners running together in the next General Election. Respondents were asked to reconsider their options in a campaign in which the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats ran as a single party. Under this scenario, Labour remains on top with the support of 45 per cent of decided voters and leaners. The joint Conservative / Liberal Democrats is second with 38 per cent.

# Analysis

Support for the Conservatives has remained stagnant, while the Liberal Democrats managed to get back to double digits after a severe drop in December. Labour has solidified its position as the most popular party at the moment.

The prospect of a unified coalition party would be particularly beneficial for Labour in the North. The Coalition partners would be slightly ahead of Labour in London, but make little headway among particular demographics, with the exception of voters over the age of 55.

The main hindrance for the unified Coalition party—if it ever materializes—would be the patent disappointment from Liberal Democrat supporters. While the merged party would hold on to four-in-five voters who cast a ballot for a Conservative candidate in 2010 (83%), only one third of Liberal Democrat voters in 2010 (32%) would support a joint Tory/Lib-Dem candidate. In fact, almost half of them (46%) would vote for Labour instead.

Methodology: From January 6 to January 7, 2010, Vision Critical conducted an online survey among 2,010 randomly selected British adults who are Springboard UK panelists. The margin of error—which measures sampling variability—is +/- 2.2%. The results have been statistically weighted according to the most current education, age, gender and region data to ensure samples representative of the entire adult population of Great Britain. Discrepancies in or between totals are due to rounding.

# NORTH AMERICA

# Obama & Congress Job Approval Improves

January 05, 2011

# Fewer Say Nation Headed in Wrong Direction<sup>10</sup>

**UTICA, NY -** President Barack Obama's job approval rating has bounced back to 43% after tying an all-time low of 39% in early December. Also increasing over that time are the number of voters who approve of the performance of Congress and the number that believe the nation is headed in the right direction. These changes were caused primarily by positive movement among Democratic voters.

The Dec. 30, 2010 - Jan. 3, 2011 interactive poll of likely voters shows Obama's job approval among Democrats at 86%, compared to 73% on Dec. 10. However, approval among independents continued to slip to 32%. On Dec. 14, 36% of independents approved of the President's job performance, and on Nov. 22 that number was 39%. Approval from Republicans is again 7%.

Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Barack Obama's job as president?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> <u>http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1938</u>

| Obama Job   | Jan. | Dec. | Dec. | Nov. | Nov. | Nov. | Nov. | Oct. | Oct. | Oct. | Oct. | Oct. |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Performance | 4    | 10   | 1    | 22   | 15   | 10   | 1    | 27   | 25   | 18   | 14   | 11   |
| Approve     | 43%  | 39%  | 42%  | 39%  | 42%  | 42%  | 45%  | 43%  | 47%  | 46%  | 44%  | 49%  |
| Disapprove  | 56%  | 61%  | 58%  | 60%  | 58%  | 57%  | 54%  | 56%  | 53%  | 54%  | 56%  | 51%  |
| Not sure    | 1%   | <1%  | <1%  | 1%   | <1%  | 1%   | <1%  | <1%  | <1%  | <1%  | <1%  | <1%  |

Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding

The pollfound an increase in those saying the nation is heading in the right direction, from 22% on Dec. 10, 2010 to 29% now, while those saying we are headed in the wrong direction fell from 68% to 60%. Among Democrats, the number choosing right direction increased from 48% to 62%. There was also an uptick among independents choosing right direction, from 14% to 19%.

On Dec. 10, approval of the job performance of Congress was 12%, and it is now 21%. Among Democrats, approval increased from 23% to 44%. Overall approval of Democrats in Congress went up from 27% to 32%, and approval of their Republican colleagues fell slightly from 28% to 25%.

*Pollster John Zogby:* "Democratic voters are pleased with both the President and Congress for their success at the close of the 2010 session. However, independents apparently still need to be convinced. Now, with Republicans running the House, it's a whole new ballgame."

The interactive poll of 2,073 likely voters has a margin of error of  $\pm 2.2\%$ . A sampling of Zogby International's online panel, which is representative of the adult population of the U.S., was invited to participate. Slight weights were added to region, party, age, race, religion, gender, and education to more accurately reflect the population.

Christie Trumps Field Of Potential Presidential Candidates; Only One Who Beats Obama

January 03, 2011

# New Jersey Governor Leads Obama, 43%-40%<sup>11</sup>

**UTICA, New York -** New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie leads a hypothetical field of contenders for the Presidential nomination among Republican voters, and is the only Republican tested who leads President Barack Obama among all voters, while Obama and former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney are tied, a new Zogby Interactive poll finds.

*Of the following, which Republican would you vote for in 2012 for President if they are on the ballot?* 

| Canoloales | Republican<br>Voters |
|------------|----------------------|
|------------|----------------------|

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> <u>http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1937</u>

| Chris Christie | 27% |
|----------------|-----|
| Mitt Romney    | 17% |
| Sarah Palin    | 16% |
| Mike Huckabee  | 14% |
| Mitch Daniels  | 5%  |
| Tim Pawlenty   | 2%  |
| John Thune     | 2%  |
| Not sure/Other | 18% |

Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

The poll, conducted from Dec. 30, 2010 to Jan. 3, 2011, shows Christie leads among conservative Republicans with 28%, followed by Palin (18%), Huckabee (15%) and Romney (14%). Christie also leads among Born-Again Christians with 27%. He also does well with moderate Republicans (23%). Romney leads that group with 28%.

Looking at age groups, Christie does best with those 18-29 (36%) and 30-49 (33%).

If the 2012 Presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote? (Asked of all voters.)

| Candidate | Chris<br>Christie |     | Mike<br>Huckabee |     |     |     | John<br>Thune |
|-----------|-------------------|-----|------------------|-----|-----|-----|---------------|
| Obama     | 40%               | 41% | 42%              | 41% | 40% | 45% | 42%           |
| Opponent  | 43%               | 41% | 39%              | 38% | 36% | 38% | 35%           |
| Neither   | 9%                | 12% | 14%              | 10% | 12% | 16% | 12%           |
| Not Sure  | 9%                | 6%  | 6%               | 12% | 12% | 1%  | 12%           |

Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Both Christie and Romney lead Obama among independent voters. For Christie, that margin is 42%-29%; and for Romney, 39%-31%. Of the listed Republicans, Palin does the worst against Obama among independents, losing 38%-32%.

Obama loses to each of the Republicans among voters over age 65; and trails by the biggest margins to Romney (51%-38%) and Christie (49%-39%).

*Pollster John Zogby:* "Christie's blunt talk about public employees and his aggressive actions on the New Jersey state budget have made him very popular both within the Republican Party and with independents. His style and appearance would present quite the contrast to that of the President. He adds not only an alternative governing philosophy, but also real efforts at cutting spending. If he decided to run, Christie could quickly oust Romney as the favorite of establishment Republicans. Our results are not good news for Palin. She isn't winning independents, and despite her star power with conservatives, she is not their first choice to take on Obama."

The interactive poll of 2,073 likely voters has a margin of error of  $\pm -2.2\%$ . The subset of 746 Republican likely voters has a margin of error of  $\pm -3.7\%$ . A sampling of Zogby International's

online panel, which is representative of the adult population of the U.S., was invited to participate. Slight weights were added to region, party, age, race, religion, gender, and education to more accurately reflect the population.

Americans Happier, Less Stressed in 2010

Happiest days coincide with holidays; most stressful, with negative news January 4, 2011

Americans were, on average, happier and less stressed in 2010 than they were in 2009. The percentage of Americans experiencing a lot of happiness and enjoyment without a lot of stress and worry increased by one percentage point in 2010, while stress decreased by about the same amount.<sup>12</sup>

# Gallup-Healthways Daily Mood Yearly Averages, 2008-2010

Asked of American adults

|   | 2008 average | 2009 average | 2010 average |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| % With a lot of<br>happiness/enjoyment<br>without a lot of stress/worry | 48.2         | 47-4         | 48.4         |
| % With a lot of stress/worry without a lot of enjoyment/happiness       | 11.0         | 11.7         | 11.0         |

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

#### GALLUP'

Americans' self-reports of daily happiness and stress in 2010 improved to match 2008, after declining in 2009.

Data for each year are based on more than 350,000 surveys, conducted as part of the <u>Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index</u>. As part of the survey, Gallup asks the question "Did you experience a lot of the following yesterday?" and then inquires about several personal experiences, including happiness, enjoyment, stress, and worry. Gallup combines the responses to determine the percentage of respondents who experience a lot of happiness and enjoyment each day but not a lot of stress and worry, and vice versa. Happiness is typically higher on weekends and lower during the workweek.

# **Holidays Bring Happiest Days of 2010**

There were six days in 2010 when happiness rose above 60%, and all of them were on or close to holidays, as they were in prior years. Holidays are days when most Americans spend a more-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> <u>http://www.gallup.com/poll/145457/Americans-Happier-Less-Stressed-</u>

<sup>2010.</sup>aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_te\_m=Americas%20-%20Northern%20America%20-%20USA%20-%20Wellbeing

than-normal amount of time socializing with friends and family, which Gallup research has previously shown torelate to higher levels of happiness and enjoyment and lower levels of stress.

Christmas was the happiest day of 2010, with 65% of Americans reporting experiencing happiness and enjoyment without a lot of stress and worry. Mother's Day, Independence Day, and the Sunday before Labor Day followed closely behind, with happiness at 63%. Thanksgiving and Easter also made it onto the list of the top six happiest days of the year.

Gallup-Healthways Daily Mood: The Six Happiest Days of 2010

Asked of American adults

| Date   | % With a lot of happiness/enjoyment<br>without a lot of stress/worry | Day of<br>the year         |
|--------|--|----------------------------|
| Dec 25 | 65   | Christmas Day              |
| May 9  | 63   | Mother's Day               |
| Sep 5  | 63   | Sunday before Labor<br>Day |
| Jul 4  | 63   | Independence Day           |
| Nov 25 | 62   | Thanksgiving               |
| Apr 4  | 61   | Easter Sunday              |

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

GALLUP'

# Negative News Coincides With Most Stressful, Worrisome Days of 2010

The most stressful day in 2010 coincided with negative economic news, as it did in 2009 and 2008. Stress rose to 18% on Dec. 1, 2010, the day after Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke publicly expressed concern that the economy was not growing fast enough to reduce unemployment. The statement was widely covered by the media.

Stress had also increased to 18% about two months earlier as severe flooding damaged property and disrupted the lives of thousands of Midwest residents.

The other three most stressful days of 2010 came amid three of the biggest news stories of the year: the 33 trapped Chilean miners, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and the devastating earthquake in Haiti.

Gallup-Healthways Daily Mood: Six Most Stressful and Worrisome Days of 2010

Asked of American adults

| Date   | % With a lot of stress/worry without<br>a lot of enjoyment/happiness | Key headlines  |
|--------|--|--|
| Dec 1  | 18   | The day after Federal Reserve Chairman<br>Ben Bernanke said he was concerned that<br>the economy is "not growing fast enough to<br>materially reduce the unemployment rate." |
| Sep 27 | 18   | Severe flooding in the Midwest causes<br>thousands to evacuate homes.  |
| Oct 12 | 17   | The final day of preparation before the<br>attempt to rescue 33 trapped Chilean<br>miners began.   |
| Jun 21 | 16   | BP CEO Tony Hayward draws fire for<br>attending yacht race as Gulf oil spill enters<br>third month.  |
| Feb 4  | 16   | Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive<br>claims at least 200,000 believed dead in<br>massive January earthquake in Haiti.  |
| Feb 2  | 16   | Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive<br>criticizes U.S. missionaries arrested trying<br>to take children out of Haiti.  |

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

#### GALLUP'

While it is important to note that it is not possible to definitively determine the cause of unusual increases in daily stress and worry, Gallup has over the past three years tracked a pattern that finds high stress and low happiness days occurring on or close to high-profile negative news stories.

# About the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

The Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index tracks U.S. wellbeing and provides best-in-class solutions for a healthier world. To learn more, please visit <u>well-beingindex.com</u>. **Survey Methods** 

Results are based on annual sample sizes of more than 350,000 surveys per year and on daily sample sizes of at least 1,000 surveys per day.

For annual results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 0.2$  percentage points. For daily results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 3$  percentage points.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

Majority of Americans Say 2011 Will Be Better Than 2010

*Democrats much more positive than Republicans about the new year* January 3, 2011

Americans enter the new year with considerably more optimism than pessimism about what it may bring: 58% say 2011 will be better than 2010, 20% say 2011 will be worse, and 21% say it will be the same.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, do you think the year 2011 will be -- [ROTATED: a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, (or) a lot worse] -- than the year 2010?

|                    | % A lot | % A little | % The | % A little | % A lot | % No    |
|--------------------|---------|------------|-------|------------|---------|---------|
|                    | better  | better     | same  | worse      | worse   | opinion |
| National<br>adults | 13      | 45         | 21    | 14         | 6       | 1       |

USA Today/Gallup, Dec. 10-12, 2010

#### GALLUP'

Americans, however, are cautious in making these prognostications. The substantial majority of optimists say things will be "a little" better rather than "a lot" better, and pessimists are more likely to say things will be a little worse rather than a lot worse.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> <u>http://www.gallup.com/poll/145430/Majority-Americans-Say-2011-Better-</u>

<sup>2010.</sup>aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_te rm=Americas%20-%20Northern%20America%20-%20Politics%20-%20USA

This is the first year in which Gallup has asked this question, and thus it is not known if Americans' relative optimism at this point is greater or less than it has been in the past.

Democrats are considerably more positive than independents and, in particular, Republicans about the year ahead. More than 7 in 10 Democrats say things will be better in 2011, contrasted with slightly less than half of Republicans. The remaining Republicans tilt toward saying things will stay the same in 2011 rather than getting worse. This pattern is consistent with Gallup's overall measure of U.S. satisfaction, which finds <u>Democrats more positive than Republicans</u> about the direction of the nation over the past two years since President Barack Obama took office.

Overall, do you think the year 2011 will be -- [ROTATED: a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, (or) a lot worse] -- than the year 2010?

|                 | % Better | % Same | % Worse |
|-----------------|----------|--------|---------|
| National adults | 58       | 21     | 20      |
|                 |          |        |         |
| Republicans     | 48       | 29     | 23      |
| Independents    | 57       | 20     | 23      |
| Democrats       | 71       | 14     | 13      |
|                 |          |        |         |
| 18-34           | 69       | 20     | 11      |
| 35-54           | 58       | 20     | 21      |
| 55+             | 51       | 23     | 25      |
|                 |          |        |         |

USA Today/Gallup, Dec. 10-12, 2010

#### GALLUP'

Younger Americans are also more optimistic than older Americans, although a majority of each age group says things will be better in 2011.

# Less Optimism About the Way the Nation Is Governed

In contrast to their lower overall level of optimism about the new year, Republicans are slightly more positive than either independents or Democrats when it comes to perceptions of how the nation will be governed in 2011.

Do you think the year 2011 will be - [ROTATED: a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, (or) a lot worse] -- than the year 2010 in terms of the way the U.S. is governed?

|                 | % Better | % Same | % Worse |
|-----------------|----------|--------|---------|
| National adults | 42       | 29     | 27      |
|                 |          |        |         |
| Republicans     | 48       | 28     | 22      |
| Independents    | 32       | 36     | 29      |
| Democrats       | 45       | 23     | 28      |
|                 |          |        |         |
| 18-34           | 38       | 37     | 23      |
| 35-54           | 44       | 28     | 27      |
| 55+             | 42       | 25     | 29      |

USA Today/Gallup, Dec. 10-12, 2010

#### GALLUP'

Republicans' views on whether the nation's governance will be better or worse in 2011 are +26 percentage points more positive than negative, while the gap among Democrats is +17 points. Among the three groups, independents are the most likely to say the nation's governance in the new year will be about the same.

Younger Americans are slightly less positive about the way the nation will be governed in 2011 than those who are older, which contrasts with their relatively more optimistic general views about the new year.

All in all, optimism about the nation's governance in 2011 is low, with 42% of all Americans saying it will be better, compared with more than half who say it will be the same or worse.

#### **Bottom Line**

Americans enter the new year with substantially more optimistic than pessimistic views about what 2011 may bring -- which could represent their <u>generally optimistic nature</u>, or it could reflect views of a recovering economy. Gallup.com will this week publish a separate story revealing Americans' views on the future of the U.S. economy.

The new year will bring a significant change in the way the nation is governed as Republicans take over control of the House of Representatives and Democrats retain control of the Senate and the White House. Nevertheless, Americans -- at least when polled prior to the productive conclusion of the lame-duck Congress -- are not strongly optimistic that the nation's governance is headed toward brighter days in 2011.

#### **Survey Methods**

Results for this USA Today/Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted Dec. 10-12, 2010, with a random sample of 1,019 adults, aged 18 and older, living in the continental U.S., selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 4$  percentage points.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones (for respondents with a landline telephone) and cellular phones (for respondents who are cell phone-only). Each sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone-only respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, education, region, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in continental U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

# Looking at 2011 Economy, Optimists Double Pessimists

Slightly fewer (44%) think their personal financial situation will be better in 2011 January 3, 2011

Twice as many Americans think the U.S. economy will be better rather than worse in 2011.<sup>14</sup>

Americans living in the East and Midwest are a little more optimistic about the economic outlook for 2011 than those living in the South and West. Americans making \$75,000 or more in annual income are slightly more optimistic than other Americans, and Democrats are considerably more optimistic than their independent and Republican counterparts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145439/Twice-Say-Economy-Better-

<sup>2011.</sup>aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_te rm=Americas%20-%20Business%20-%20Northern%20America%20-%20USA

Overall, do you think the year 2011 will be -- [ROTATED: a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, (or) a lot worse] -- than the year 2010 in terms of the economy?

|                                   | % Better | % Same | % Worse |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--------|---------|
| National adults                   | 52       | 21     | 25      |
|                                   |          |        |         |
| East                              | 55       | 24     | 21      |
| Midwest                           | 56       | 25     | 18      |
| South                             | 51       | 20     | 27      |
| West                              | 48       | 17     | 32      |
|                                   |          |        |         |
| \$75,000 or more                  | 55       | 23     | 22      |
| Less than \$75,000 to<br>\$30,000 | 52       | 21     | 25      |
| Less than \$30,000                | 51       | 20     | 27      |
|                                   |          |        |         |
| Republicans                       | 46       | 23     | 31      |
| Independents                      | 50       | 23     | 26      |
| Democrats                         | 62       | 19     | 16      |

USA Today/Gallup, Dec. 10-12, 2010

#### GALLUP'

# **Americans Report More Modest Differences in Their Personal Financial Situations**

Americans are somewhat less positive about their personal economic situations than the economy more broadly. Forty-four percent think their personal situation will be better in 2011, while 16% think it will be worse. Fewer Americans in the West are optimistic about their personal situations than in other regions. Americans making \$75,000 or more in annual income are more optimistic than other Americans, and Democrats are slightly more optimistic than independents and Republicans.

Overall, do you think the year 2011 will be -- [ROTATED: a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, (or) a lot worse] -- than the year 2010 in terms of your personal financial situation?

|                                   | % Better | % Same | % Worse |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--------|---------|
| National adults                   | 44       | 39     | 16      |
|                                   |          |        |         |
| East                              | 44       | 37     | 18      |
| Midwest                           | 45       | 40     | 14      |
| South                             | 46       | 38     | 15      |
| West                              | 38       | 40     | 19      |
|                                   |          |        |         |
| \$75,000 or more                  | 49       | 40     | 11      |
| Less than \$75,000 to<br>\$30,000 | 44       | 40     | 14      |
| Less than \$30,000                | 42       | 34     | 24      |
|                                   |          |        |         |
| Republicans                       | 42       | 41     | 17      |
| Independents                      | 44       | 35     | 19      |
| Democrats                         | 46       | 42     | 12      |

USA Today/Gallup, Dec. 10-12, 2010

GALLUP'

## Implications

Americans' optimism about the economy parallels their <u>generally optimistic expectations for</u> <u>2011</u>. This tends to be the case across regions, incomes, and party affiliation.

This overall increase in optimism was in place prior to the passage of new legislation at the end of the lame-duck Congress and the <u>surge in spending at the end of the Christmas holiday</u>. Recent Gallup Daily tracking results show that consumers only became increasingly <u>optimistic about the economy as 2010 came to an end</u>.

On the other hand, the potential fragility surrounding Americans' optimism as they look toward 2011 is reflected by consumers' view of their own financial situations. Americans express less optimism about their own situations, and this reveals more modest differences across regions, incomes, and party affiliation. This may result from Americans being closer to their own financial situations and recognizing the relative stability of those situations. In turn, it also suggests that at least some part of Americans' optimism about 2011 is based on their general perceptions of the overall economic climate rather than their own experiences and expectations about their personal financial situations.

# **Survey Methods**

Results for this USA Today/Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted Dec. 10-12, 2010, with a random sample of 1,019 adults, aged 18 and older, living in the continental U.S., selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 4$  percentage points.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones (for respondents with a landline telephone) and cellular phones (for respondents who are cell phone-only). Each sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone-only respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, education, region, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in continental U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

**Obama Job Approval Reaches 50% for First Time Since Spring** 

Returns to that level for first time since late May/early June 2010 January 3, 2011

Barack Obama's job approval rating reached the symbolic 50% mark in <u>the latest three-day</u> <u>average from Gallup Daily tracking</u>. Obama's approval rating has been in the mid-40% range for much of the latter half of 2010. He last hit 50% approval in a three-day average near the end of May/beginning of June.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> <u>http://www.gallup.com/poll/145442/Obama-Job-Approval-Reaches-First-Time-</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>Spring.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_t</u> <u>erm=Americas%20-%20Northern%20America%20-%20Politics%20-%20USA</u>

#### Gallup Daily three-day averages % Approve 70 60 53 50 50 50 ł 40 41 41 30 20 Jan '10 Mar '10 May '10 Jul '10 Sep '10 Nov '10 Jan '11

## President Obama Job Approval Ratings, December 2009-January 2011

## GALLUP'

The latest results are based on Gallup Daily tracking conducted Dec. 28-29 and Jan. 2. Gallup did not conduct its daily poll Dec. 30-Jan. 1.

It is not yet clear if Obama's approval rating will stay above 50% in the coming days; his approval rating in each of the individual days comprising the latest three-day average has remained near the 50% mark. The current 50% average over the last three days could reflect a temporary increase in optimism that Gallup sometimes sees at the beginning of a new year. The latest numbers also come at a time when the president was on vacation in Hawaii and out of the political spotlight, following a highly publicized pre-Christmas session with Congress that resulted in the passage of several major pieces of legislation.

Obama's current approval rating is 80% among Democrats, 47% among independents, and 16% among Republicans in the three most recent days of polling. The figures for independents and Republicans are slightly higher than what Gallup has measured for Obama in recent weeks.

Obama reached 50% on several occasions in early 2010, including averaging 50% or better for full weeks in January, February, April, and May. However, he was never able to sustain ratings above that level for more than two weeks at a time. The last time his weekly averages were 50% or higher for three consecutive weeks was at the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010.

More broadly, Obama's three-day approval averages in 2010 ranged between a low of 41% in mid-August and again in late October to a high of 53% in mid-February.

Gallup will have more on Obama's yearly figures once his full second year in office is complete on Jan. 19.

Explore Obama's approval ratings in depth and compare them with those of past presidents in the Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center.

## **Survey Methods**

Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted Dec. 28-29, 2010, and Jan. 2, 2011, on the Gallup Daily tracking survey, with a random sample of 1,544 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 4$  percentage points.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

# 111th Congress Averaged 25% Approval, Among Recent Lowest

Pelosi has presided over least popular Congresses of past two decades January 5, 2011

The 111<sup>th</sup> Congress received an average 25% approval rating from Americans over the course of 2009 and 2010. While this is similar to the 23% average approval rating for the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress spanning 2007 and 2008, it is among the lowest average approval ratings for a Congress that Gallup has recorded in the past two decades.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> <u>http://www.gallup.com/poll/145460/111th-Congress-Averaged-Approval-Among-Recent-</u>

Lowest.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_term=Americas%20-%20Northern%20America%20-%20Politics%20-%20USA

| Congress | Years<br>in Session | Sitting U.S.<br>House Speaker | Approve | Disapprove |
|----------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------|------------|
|          |                     |                               | %       | %          |
| 102nd    | 1991-1992           | Tom Foley-D                   | 27      | 66         |
| 103rd    | 1993-1994           | Tom Foley-D                   | 25      | 66         |
| 104th    | 1995-1996           | Newt Gingrich-R               | 34      | 56         |
| 105th    | 1997-1998           | Newt Gingrich-R               | 42      | 49         |
| 106th    | 1999-2000           | Dennis Hastert-R              | 45      | 47         |
| 107th    | 2001-2002           | Dennis Hastert-R              | 55      | 34         |
| 108th    | 2003-2004           | Dennis Hastert-R              | 44      | 48         |
| 109th    | 2005-2006           | Dennis Hastert-R              | 30      | 62         |
| 110th    | 2007-2008           | Nancy Pelosi-D                | 23      | 70         |
| 111th    | 2009-2010           | Nancy Pelosi-D                | 25      | 69         |

## Job Approval for Recent Congresses -- Two-Year Averages

#### GALLUP

Gallup first measured Americans' approval of the job Congress is doing in 1974, but did not consistently update it at least annually until the 1991-1992 term of the 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress. Approval of subsequent Congresses has varied mostly from the low 20s to the mid-40s, although it reached 55% for the 107<sup>th</sup>Congress' 2001-2002 term.

Over the last two decades, the country has experienced good economic times and bad, and those differences are clearly reflected in the approval ratings of Congress, just as they are in presidents' job approval ratings. However, the speakers for each Congress could be a factor. Both the 110<sup>th</sup> and 111<sup>th</sup>Congress were controlled by the Democrats and led by Nancy Pelosi as House speaker. The Gallup record shows that approval of Congress during her tenure, from 2007 through 2010, averaged a fairly meager 24%, including a record-low 13% approval rating in December 2010. By contrast, for the eight years that Republican House Speaker Dennis Hastert presided over the U.S. House of Representatives, from early 1999 through the end of 2006, Congress' approval averaged 44%. From 1995 through 1998, when Republican Newt Gingrich served as speaker, Congress' approval averaged 38%, and for the last four years of Democrat Tom Foley's speakership, from 1991 through 1994, it averaged 26%.

## 9/11, Economy, and Scandals Influence Congress' Ratings


The high approval of the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, which met from 2001-2002, was partly the result of Americans' high approval of Congress in September 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Approval of Congress doubled immediately after the attacks, from 42% in early September to 84% in early October, and it remained above 50% for the remainder of 2001 and in much of 2002.

Public approval of Congress over the years was also likely influenced by various political scandals, most notably the House banking scandal in 1992 and bribery scandals in 2005/2006

related to lobbyist Jack Abramoff, both of which corresponded with low points in congressional approval.

The economy also seems to be a major factor in Americans' views of Congress, with that body earning higher approval ratings in years of relatively strong economic growth, and lower approval ratings when gross domestic product grew by less than 2% per year. The major exception to this came during the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, when 9/11 contributed to higher job approval ratings for Congress at the same time the economy was contracting. Also, the 25% average approval for the 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress may have been lower than would be predicted from the average 3.5% increase in gross domestic product from 1993 to 1994, perhaps because of the same issues that led to the Republican congressional victories in the 1994 midterm elections.

Average Approval Rating for Each Congress vs. Average Change in U.S. GDP



Job approvals represent two-year averages for each Congress; change in U.S. GDP during the 111th Congress is based on economic data from January 2009 through September 2010.

GALLUP

## **Bottom Line**

Pundits on the political right and left are offering widely divergent assessments of the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress as it closes its second term and makes way for an incoming Republican majority to take control of the U.S. House of Representatives. Its champions call it one of the most productive Congresses in recent history, heralding its accomplishments relative to healthcare reform, Wall Street regulatory reform, economic stimulus, and nuclear arms reduction. Its critics point to major increases in government spending and debt, increased regulation of the economy, and expansion of government involvement in healthcare. While history will issue a more reflective judgment on how well this Congress performed its constitutional duties, Americans' real-time ratings over the course of the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress are among the least positive for the last 10 Congresses.

## **Survey Methods**

The average Congress approval rating for the 111th Congress is based on 25 separate Gallup Poll surveys conducted between January 2009 and December 2010. Each survey is based on telephone interviews with a random sample of approximately 1,000 adults aged 18 and older, living in the continental U.S., selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For the aggregated sample of more than 25,000 national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 1$  percentage point.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

# Democratic Party ID Drops in 2010, Tying 22-Year Low


Democrats still outnumber Republicans, while independent identification increases

January 5, 2011

In 2010, 31% of Americans identified as Democrats, down five percentage points from just two years ago and tied for the lowest annual average Gallup has measured in the last 22 years. While Democrats still outnumber Republicans by two points, the percentage identifying as independents increased to 38%, on the high end of what Gallup has measured in the last two decades.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145463/Democratic-Party-Drops-2010-Tying-Year-

Low.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_ter m=Americas - Northern America - Politics - USA



## Party Identification Annual Averages, Gallup Polls, 1988-2010

#### GALLUP

These results are based on aggregated data from 21 separate Gallup and USA Today/Gallup polls conducted in 2010, encompassing more than 25,000 interviews with U.S. adults. Gallup has computed annual averages for party identification since 1988, when it began conducting most of its polls by telephone.

The Gallup Daily tracking poll, initiated in 2008, shows similar party identification figures for 2010 -- 32% Democratic, 28% Republican, and 37% independent. The tracking data also show the same trend toward declining Democratic identification coupled with greater increases among independents than Republicans.

While there is usually some year-to-year variation in party identification at the aggregate level, the changes are typically not large. Thus, the five-point drop in Democratic identification over the past two years, from the party's 22-year high of 36% (tying the 1988 figure) to its 22-year low of 31%, is notable.


Perhaps equally significant is that the percentage of Americans identifying as Republicans has increased only slightly to 29% during this time, and remains on the low end of what Gallup has measured the past two decades.

Nevertheless, 2010 was a good year for Republicans, given the party's major gains in the midterm elections. Those gains were in part driven by the party's appeal to independents, evident in the strong support for Republican congressional candidates among independent voters.

Independents' increasing affinity for the GOP is also evident in a separate measure of party affiliation Gallup tracks, which takes into account the party leanings of independents. In 2010, 45% of Americans identified as Democrats or said they were independent but leaned toward the Democratic Party, while 44% identified as Republicans or said they were independent but leaned Republican. The 1-point Democratic advantage is the party's smallest since 2003, when the

parties were even, and represents a sharp decline from the record 12-point Democratic advantage in 2008.

Party Identification (Including Independent Leanings) Annual Averages, Gallup Polls, 1991-2010



Note: Gallup began regularly measuring independents' party leanings in 1991.

## GALLUP

The Gallup Daily tracking poll shows a similar pattern, from a 13-point Democratic edge in 2008 down to just 3 points in 2010.

## Implications

Although 2010 brought some major legislative successes for the Democratic majority, it was not a good year for the party politically. In addition to losing control of the House of Representatives and seeing the number of Democratic senators and governors reduced, the party saw its support among the general population drop to tie its 22-year low.

However, even as Republicans were enjoying great electoral success, the percentage of Americans identifying with the GOP, the core base of the party, barely increased. Instead, the major movement in American politics since 2008 seems to be away from the Democratic Party and toward independent political status, rather than alignment with the GOP. Still, the Republican Party appeared to capitalize on many independents' frustration with the majority Democratic Party, in much the same way the Democrats capitalized on independents' frustration with the Republicans between 2006 and 2008.

As 2011 begins, the parties appear to be on fairly equal footing in terms of public support. The key to success in the 2012 elections may hinge on which party can win over the increasing number of independent voters. And it is quite possible that the pool of independents will expand in 2011, given that Gallup has seen an increase in the percentage of independents in each of the last five years after a midterm election (1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007).

## **Survey Methods**

Results are based on aggregated data from telephone interviews conducted in 2010, with a random sample of 25,396 adults, aged 18 and older, living in the continental U.S., selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 1$  percentage point.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

# **American Views on Immigration Temper Slightly Since the Summer** (12/30/10) -

Two-in-five Americans would deport all illegal immigrants currently working in the U.S., while three-in-ten endorse the "path to citizenship."<sup>18</sup>

While more than half of Americans continue to have negative views on immigration, the attitudes of respondents have softened since the heated public debates of summer regarding the Arizona immigration law, a new survey conducted by Vision Critical has found.

In the online survey of a representative national sample of 1,005 Americans, 57 per cent of respondents believe that immigration is having a negative effect in the U.S. This represents a tenpoint drop since the question was last asked by Vision Critical/Angus Reid Public Opinion in July. However, all of the movement has been toward not sure (from 16% to 25%), driven mainly by Democrats and Independents. Four-in-five Republicans (80%) say immigration has a negative impact in this country.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/43721/american-views-on-immigration-temper-slightly-since-the-summer/

| Immigration<br>Next, we'd like to ask you some questions about immigration. All things considered, do you think<br>immigration is having a positive effect or a negative effect in the U.S.? |     |     |     |     |  |  |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|--|
| United<br>States Democrat Republican Independent   |     |     |     |     |  |  |
| Positive effect  | 18% | 28% | 8%  | 19% |  |  |
| Negative effect         57%         43%         80%         55%  |     |     |     |     |  |  |
| Not sure   | 25% | 29% | 12% | 26% |  |  |

## Legal and Illegal Immigration

Two-in-five Americans (39%) think the number of legal immigrants who are allowed to relocate in the U.S. should decrease, while only 15 per cent favor an increase.

More than half of respondents (56%) believe the illegal immigrants in the United States take jobs away from American workers, while one third (34%) think these illegal immigrants are employed in jobs that American workers do not want. Large majorities of Republicans (74%) and Independents (60%) believe illegal immigrants take jobs away from American workers, but only 42 per cent of Democrats concur.

| Immigration<br>From what you have seen, read or heard, do you think the number of legal immigrants who are allowed<br>to relocate in the U.S. should increase, remain the same, or decrease? |     |     |     |     |  |  |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|--|
| United<br>States Democrat Republican Independent   |     |     |     |     |  |  |
| Increase   | 15% | 20% | 14% | 13% |  |  |
| Remain the same  | 34% | 36% | 29% | 36% |  |  |
| Decrease   | 39% | 32% | 51% | 40% |  |  |
| Not sure   | 12% | 12% | 6%  | 10% |  |  |

When asked about the status of illegal immigrants who are currently working in the United States, a tempering of opinion is also observed. Three-in-ten respondents (31%, +4 since July) believe that these illegal immigrants should be allowed to eventually apply for citizenship—the highest level of support for this policy throughout 2010. Two-in-five Americans (43%, -7) believe illegal immigrants should be required to leave their jobs and be deported.

#### Immigration

Which of these statements comes closer to your own point of view on the status of illegal immigrants who are currently working in the United States?

|  | United<br>States | Democrat | Republican | Independent |
|--|------------------|----------|------------|-------------|
| They should be allowed to stay in the U.S.,<br>and eventually apply for citizenship                        | 31%              | 48%      | 13%        | 31%         |
| They should be allowed to work in the U.S.<br>on a temporary basis, but they should not<br>become citizens | 15%              | 12%      | 21%        | 14%         |
| They should be required to leave their jobs and be deported from the U.S.                                  | 43%              | 30%      | 61%        | 42%         |
| Not sure   | 11%              | 10%      | 5%         | 13%         |

While Democrats (48%) remain more likely than Republicans (13%) and Independents (31%) to support a "path to citizenship" for illegal immigrants who are working in the U.S., no party can count on majority support to implement this policy in the current political environment.

In a finding that has remained consistent since the summer, many Americans continue to express support for the implementation of the four primary policy provisions of the Arizona law in their own state. However, there is a marked decrease in the proportion of respondents who endorse arresting people who are unable to provide documentation to prove they are in the U.S. legally (from 69% in July to 62% this month).

## Analysis

Immigration remains a passionate emotional and policy issue in the melting pot that is America, and most Americans in all walks of life hold some negative feelings about it. While opinion remains divided along party lines, the idea of a "path to citizenship" for illegal immigrants has no majority support. Still, other provisions of immigration policy reform could be in play in 2011, along with a now larger swing voter group waiting to hear all sides of the debate.

Methodology: From December 16 to December 17, 2010, Vision Critical conducted an online survey among 1,005 American adults who are Springboard America panelists. The margin of error—which measures sampling variability—is +/- 3.1%. The results have been statistically weighted according to the most current education, age, gender and region Census data to ensure a sample representative of the entire adult population of the United States.

# Standard-of-Living Perceptions in U.S. Are Slightly Upbeat<sup>19</sup>


Optimism gap between upper- and lower-income Americans may be widening

January 7, 2011

Americans' perceptions of whether their standard of living is getting better or getting worse were fairly steady throughout 2010. Gallup Daily tracking in December found 45% saying their standard of living was getting better, while 35% said it was getting worse, for a +10 "net improving" score.

Americans' Standard of Living Outlook, January 2008-December 2010

Right now, do you feel your standard of living is getting better or getting worse?



Gallup Daily tracking, monthly averages

## GALLUP

The stability in Americans' outlook for their living standards during 2010 contrasts with the gradual recovery of perceptions in 2009 from the negative outlook that set in shortly after the Wall Street financial crisis erupted in September 2008. Still, Americans ended 2010 less optimistic about their standard of living than they were as 2008 began.


Americans in the highest-income households have consistently been more optimistic about their standard of living than those in the lowest-income households. However, after 2 1/2 years when the paths of optimism among the various income groups were generally parallel, Americans making \$60,000 and above maintained their optimism in the second half of 2010, while those making less than \$60,000 became less optimistic.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145505/Standard-Living-Perceptions-Slightly-

Upbeat.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_ term=Americas - Northern America - USA - Wellbeing

## Americans' Standard of Living Assessments -- by Income

Net improving (% getting better minus % getting worse)




Gallup Daily tracking, monthly averages

#### GALLUP

This divergence in the net optimism trends of the highest and lowest income groups can be seen more clearly in the relatively large net optimism gap between the two at the end of 2010. Net optimism among those in households earning at least \$90,000 was 26 points in December, compared with 1-point net optimism among those earning less than \$24,000. This 25-point gap (and the 24-point gap in November) contrasts with much lower gaps of no more than 20 points since October 2008.

#### Income Gap in Standard of Living Net "Getting Better" Score



Difference between high- and low-income households^

^High income=\$75,000 or more annually; Low income=less than \$24,000 annually

Gallup Daily tracking, monthly averages

GALLUP'

#### **Bottom Line**

Americans' outlook for their standard of living was fairly steady and positive in 2010, although still subdued after a long, slow climb out of the rut it fell into in October 2008. The increased optimism seen in November and December among Americans in the two highest income categories marks a full recovery of these groups from the economic shock created by the Wall Street financial crisis, although their relative optimism is still not as high as it was at the start of 2008.

Key questions for 2011 are whether lower-income groups will soon follow the higher-income groups in feeling more hopeful about their standard of living, and whether upper-income Americans can sustain the increased optimism they expressed in the past two months. The late December extension of the Bush tax cuts into 2011, as well as the reduction in Social Security payroll taxes now taking effect, might be expected to promote greater optimism among both groups. Gallup's initial January <u>standard of living data</u>, available daily on Gallup.com, suggests that may already be occurring.

# **Survey Methods**

Results are based on telephone interviews conducted as part of Gallup Daily tracking Dec. 1- 29, 2010, with a random sample of 26,232 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 1$  percentage point.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 200 cell phone respondents and 800 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2010 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

# In U.S., 46% Favor, 40% Oppose Repealing Healthcare Law

Three-quarters of Republicans favor repeal; 64% of Democrats oppose it

January 7, 2011

Americans do not strongly endorse the new Republican House majority's efforts to repeal the landmark healthcare legislation passed last year. A new Gallup poll finds that 46% of Americans want their representative in Congress to vote to repeal the healthcare law, 40% want their representative to vote to let the law stand, and 14% have no opinion.<sup>20</sup>

As you may know, a vote is scheduled in the House of Representatives next week on a proposed bill that would repeal the healthcare overhaul legislation that became law last March. Would you want your representative in Congress to vote "yes" to repeal the healthcare law or to vote "no" and let the healthcare law stand?

|              | Vote to repeal | Vote to let stand | No opinion |
|--------------|----------------|-------------------|------------|
| 2011 Jan 4-5 | 46%            | 40                | 14         |

GALLUP'

Gallup conducted the Jan. 4-5 poll as the new Congress elected last fall began its work. Republicans' gains in the 2010 midterm elections were partly the result of <u>voter frustration with</u> <u>the growth in the size of government</u>, exemplified by the new healthcare law President Obama signed into law last March. Republican congressional leaders vowed to attempt to overturn the law as one of their first acts after taking majority control of the U.S. House of Representatives. However, with Democrats still in control of the Senate, it is unlikely a repeal would pass both houses of Congress, and President Obama would surely veto it if it does.

Americans' broadly divided opinions on repealing the healthcare legislation are in line with Gallup polling from much of the past two years that showed the bill struggling to gain majority public support both <u>before</u> and <u>shortly after</u> its passage. Polls conducted more recently have shown Americans generally <u>more opposed to than in favor of the healthcare law</u>.

The current poll finds the vast majority of Republicans, 78%, in favor of repealing the law, underscoring the degree to which the new Republican leadership is attempting to represent the views of its supporters. Meanwhile, Democrats oppose repeal (64%), but not to the same extent that Republicans favor it. Independents are almost evenly divided in their views, with a substantial proportion (18%) not having an opinion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145496/Favor-Oppose-Repealing-Healthcare-

Law.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_ter m=Americas - Northern America - Politics - USA

## Views of Healthcare Law Repeal, by Political Party

|              | Vote to repeal | Vote to let stand | No opinion |
|--------------|----------------|-------------------|------------|
| Republicans  | 78%            | 15%               | 7%         |
| Independents | 43%            | 39%               | 18%        |
| Democrats    | 24%            | 64%               | 12%        |

Gallup, Jan. 4-5, 2011

GALLUP'

## Implications

Americans' opinions on repealing the healthcare legislation are in keeping with their generally divided views on healthcare reform throughout the process leading up to its passage. The consistency of opinion indicates that Americans' views on healthcare reform have been fairly fixed, and little that has occurred legislatively or politically in the past year has affected their views.

While the chances that the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives will successfully repeal the healthcare law are slim, the party is nevertheless taking action that its core supporters favor.

## **Survey Methods**

Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted Jan. 4-5, 2011, on the Gallup Daily tracking survey, with a random sample of 1,025 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 4$  percentage points.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 200 cell phone respondents and 800 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell-phone-only status, cell-phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2010 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

The questions reported here were asked of a random half-sample of respondents for two nights on the Gallup Daily tracking survey.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.


# Gallup Finds Unemployment at 9.6% in December

Underemployment rose to 19.0% in December from 17.2% at the end of November

January 6, 2011

Unemployment, as measured by Gallup without seasonal adjustment, increased to 9.6% at the end of December -- up from 9.3% in mid-December and 8.8% at the end of November.<sup>21</sup>





^ Numbers reflect rolling averages for the 30-day periods ending Jan. 6, Jan. 15, and Jan. 31, and on the 15th and the last day of each month from February through Dec. 29, 2010

Gallup Daily tracking

GALLUP'


Meanwhile, the percentage of part-time workers who want full-time work increased to 9.4% of the workforce in December -- up from 9.2% in mid-December and 8.4% at the end of November.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145478/Gallup-Finds-Unemployment-

December.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&ut m\_term=Americas - Business - Northern America - USA

## Percentage of Americans Working Part Time and Wanting Full-Time Work

30-day averages^; not seasonally adjusted



^ Numbers reflect rolling averages for the 30-day periods ending Jan. 6, Jan. 15, and Jan. 31, and on the 15th and the last day of each month from February through Dec. 29, 2010

Gallup Daily tracking


GALLUP'

## Underemployment at 19.0% in December

The increase in Gallup's U.S. unemployment rate and the worsening in the percentage of parttime workers wanting full-time work combined to raise underemployment to 19.0% in December from 18.5% in mid-December and 17.2% at the end of November.

#### U.S. Underemployment

30-day averages^; not seasonally adjusted



^ Numbers reflect rolling averages for the 30-day periods ending Jan. 6, Jan. 15, and Jan. 31, and on the 15th and the last day of each month from February through Dec. 29, 2010

Gallup Daily tracking

GALLUP

# Implications

The U.S. unemployment picture may seem unusually confusing these days. Gallup monitoring showed <u>a sharp improvement in the jobs situation in November</u>, particularly as companies added holiday workers. However, the government surprised Gallup and most other economic observers as it reported last month that the U.S. unemployment rate increased to 9.8% in November. It appears that the government made a larger seasonal adjustment than was generally anticipated for the month.

ADP on Wednesday reported that the economy added 297,000 private-sector jobs -- far above the consensus expectation that the government on Friday will report the U.S. economy added 140,000 new jobs overall in December. In contrast, Gallup shows the unemployment rate increasing as companies let go of holiday workers. At the same time, <u>Gallup's Job Creation Index</u> shows monthly average hiring and firing conditions essentially unchanged over the past three months.

Because the Gallup unemployment measure is not seasonally adjusted, it tends to more accurately reflect what is actually taking place in the U.S. job market -- and may not agree with the government's estimate that is seasonally adjusted. Further, Gallup's data tend to be more up-to-date than the government's because Gallup polls on the unemployment situation continuously. Combined, seasonal adjustments and timing differences likely explain much of the disparity between Gallup's measures of underemployment and unemployment, compared with those reported by others.

Whatever the government reports about unemployment on Friday, Gallup's U.S. underemployment data for the end of 2010 show that nearly one in five Americans continue to be unemployed or employed part-time looking for full-time work. In turn, this underscores the importance of job creation as <u>a top national priority</u>.

## **Survey Methods**

Gallup classifies American workers as underemployed if they are either unemployed or working part time but wanting full-time work. The findings reflect more than 18,000 phone interviews with U.S. adults aged 18 and older in the workforce, collected over a 30-day period. Gallup's results are not seasonally adjusted and tend to be a precursor of government reports by approximately two weeks.

Results are based on telephone interviews conducted as part of Gallup Daily tracking Nov. 30-Dec. 29, 2010, with a random sample of 18,071 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 1$  percentage point.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

# Faith on the Hill

The Religious Composition of the 112th Congress

January 5, 2011

Many analysts described the November 2010 midterm elections as a sea change, with Republicans taking control of the U.S. House of Representatives and narrowing the Democratic majority in the Senate. But this political overhaul appears to have had little effect on the religious composition of Congress, which is similar to the religious makeup of the previous Congress and of the nation, according to an analysis by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life.<sup>22</sup>

The 112th Congress, like the U.S. public, is majority Protestant and about a quarter Catholic. Baptists and Methodists are the largest Protestant denominations in the new Congress, just as they are in the country as a whole.

A few of the country's smaller religious groups, including Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Jews, have greater numerical representation in Congress than in the general population. Some others, including Buddhists and Muslims, are represented in Congress in roughly equal proportion to their numbers in the adult U.S. population. And some small religious groups, such as Hindus and Jehovah's Witnesses, are not represented at all in Congress.

Perhaps the greatest disparity between the religious makeup of Congress and the people it represents, however, is in the percentage of the unaffiliated -- those who describe their religion as atheist, agnostic or "nothing in particular." According to information gathered by CQ Roll

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1846/religious-composition-112th-congress

Call and the Pew Forum, no members of Congress say they are unaffiliated. By contrast, about one-sixth of U.S. adults (16%) are not affiliated with any particular faith. Only six members of the 112th Congress (about 1%) do not specify a religious affiliation, which is similar to the percentage of the public that says they don't know or refuses to specify their faith.<sup>1</sup>

These findings are based on a comparison of the religious affiliations of members of the new Congress with data on the U.S. public from the <u>U.S. Religious Landscape Survey</u>, conducted by the Pew Forum in 2007 among more than 35,000 U.S. adults. CQ Roll Call gathered information on the religious affiliations of members of Congress through questionnaires and follow-up phone calls to members' offices. The Pew Forum supplemented that information with an extensive review of media reports on candidates in 2010 House and Senate races. It should be noted, however, that there is an important difference between a confidential telephone survey of a sample of U.S. adults and media inquiries about the religious identification of an elected official or candidate. Media inquiries may find fewer "unaffiliated" people because those inquiries are more public.

The New, 112th Congress

## How the 112th Congress (2011-2012) Compares With the American Public

| Religion              | Number in<br>Congress |       | %<br>American<br>adults |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------|-------------------------|
| Protestant            | 304                   | 56.8% | 51.3%                   |
| Baptist               | 68                    | 12.7% | 17.2%                   |
| Methodist             | 51                    | 9.5%  | 6.2%                    |
| Presbyterian          | 45                    | 8.4%  | 2.7%                    |
| Anglican/Episcopal    | 41                    | 7.7%  | 1.5%                    |
| Lutheran              | 26                    | 4.9%  | 4.6%                    |
| Congregationalist     | 4                     | 0.7%  | 0.8%                    |
| Nondenom. Prot.       | 2                     | 0.4%  | 4.5%                    |
| Restorationist        | 2                     | 0.4%  | 2.1%                    |
| Holiness              | 2                     | 0.4%  | 1.2%                    |
| Adventist             | 2                     | 0.4%  | 0.5%                    |
| Reformed              | 2                     | 0.4%  | 0.3%                    |
| Friends/Quakers       | 1                     | 0.2%  | <0.3%                   |
| Pentecostal           | 0                     | 0.0%  | 4.4%                    |
| Anabaptist            | 0                     | 0.0%  | <0.3%                   |
| Pietist               | 0                     | 0.0%  | <0.3%                   |
| Unspecified/Other     | 58                    | 10.8% | 5.1%                    |
| Catholic              | 156                   | 29.2% | 23.9%                   |
| Mormon                | 15                    | 2.8%  | 1.7%                    |
| Jehovah's Witness     | 0                     | 0.0%  | 0.7%                    |
| Orthodox              | 5                     | 0.9%  | 0.6%                    |
| Other Christian       | 3                     | 0.6%  | 0.3%                    |
| Jewish                | 39                    | 7.3%  | 1.7%                    |
| Buddhist              | 3                     | 0.6%  | 0.7%                    |
| Muslim                | 2                     | 0.4%  | 0.6%                    |
| Hindu                 | 0                     | 0.0%  | 0.4%                    |
| Other World Religions | 5 0                   | 0.0%  | <0.3%                   |
| Other Faiths          | 2                     | 0.4%  | 1.2%                    |
| Unaffiliated          | 0                     | 0.0%  | 16.1%                   |
| Don't Know/Refused    | 6                     | 1.1%  | 0.8%                    |
| Total                 | 535                   | 100%  | 100%                    |

Source: Data for Congress from CQ Roll Call and Pew Forum; data for American public from the Pew Forum's U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, conducted in 2007 (Muslim data from Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, 2007).

For Congress, the "Other Christian" category includes only Christian Scientists, who make up <0.3% of the overall adult population. For all adults, "Other Christians" also includes metaphysical Christians. For Congress, "Other Faiths" includes only Unitarians, who make up 0.3% of the overall adult population. For all adults, "Other Faiths" also includes other liberal faiths including people who are "spiritual but not religious," New Age groups and Native American religions.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, Jan. 5, 2011. - or 57% -- are Protestants, which is slightly higher than the share of Protestants in the U.S. adult population (51%). Compared with <u>the previous Congress</u>, the 112th Congress has added 12 Protestants, an increase of roughly two percentage points.

Baptists remain the largest Protestant denominational family in Congress, essentially unchanged from the 111th Congress, though there are somewhat fewer self-described Baptists on Capitol Hill (13%) than in the national population (17%). Methodists have declined slightly in their proportion of Congress, dropping by six members, or about one percentage point. Nonetheless, Methodists still comprise a larger share of Congress (10%) than of the public (6%).

Some other Protestant groups also are overrepresented in Congress relative to their numbers in the general population. For instance, while fewer than 2% of American adults identify themselves as Episcopalians, about 8% of Congress is affiliated with the Episcopal Church. In addition, 8% of Congress is Presbyterian, about three times the percentage of American adults who say they are Presbyterians (3%).

Protestants who do not specify a particular denomination grew the most from the 111th to the 112th Congress, increasing their ranks by 19 members, to a total of 58. They now comprise 11% of Congress, up from 7% two years ago. The proportion of unspecified Protestants is nearly as high among incumbents (10%) as among newly elected members (13%). It is unclear whether any of these unspecified Protestants are affiliated with nondenominational churches; just two members of the 112th Congress specify that they belong to nondenominational Protestant churches.

## How the 112th Congress Compares With the 111th Congress

|                       | 112th Congress111th ( |       | 111th C | Congress % |                    |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------|--------------------|
| Religion              | Number                | %     | Number  | %          | American<br>adults |
| Protestant            | 304                   | 56.8% | 292     | 54.7%      | 51.3%              |
| Baptist               | 68                    | 12.7% | 66      | 12.4%      | 17.2%              |
| Methodist             | 51                    | 9.5%  | 57      | 10.7%      | 6.2%               |
| Presbyterian          | 45                    | 8.4%  | 43      | 8.1%       | 2.7%               |
| Anglican/Episcopal    | 41                    | 7.7%  | 38      | 7.1%       | 1.5%               |
| Lutheran              | 26                    | 4.9%  | 24      | 4.5%       | 4.6%               |
| Congregationalist     | 4                     | 0.7%  | 6       | 1.1%       | 0.8%               |
| Nondenom. Prot.       | 2                     | 0.4%  | 5       | 0.9%       | 4.5%               |
| Restorationist        | 2                     | 0.4%  | 4       | 0.7%       | 2.1%               |
| Holiness              | 2                     | 0.4%  | 2       | 0.4%       | 1.2%               |
| Adventist             | 2                     | 0.4%  | 2       | 0.4%       | 0.5%               |
| Reformed              | 2                     | 0.4%  | 2       | 0.4%       | 0.3%               |
| Friends/Quakers       | 1                     | 0.2%  | 1       | 0.2%       | <0.3%              |
| Pentecostal           | 0                     | 0.0%  | 2       | 0.4%       | 4.4%               |
| Anabaptist            | 0                     | 0.0%  | 0       | 0.0%       | <0.3%              |
| Pietist               | 0                     | 0.0%  | 1       | 0.2%       | <0.3%              |
| Unspecified/Other     | 58                    | 10.8% | 39      | 7.3%       | 5.1%               |
| Catholic              | 156                   | 29.2% | 161     | 30.1%      | 23.9%              |
| Mormon                | 15                    | 2.8%  | 14      | 2.6%       | 1.7%               |
| Jehovah's Witness     | 0                     | 0.0%  | 0       | 0.0%       | 0.7%               |
| Orthodox              | 5                     | 0.9%  | 7       | 1.3%       | 0.6%               |
| Other Christian       | 3                     | 0.6%  | 3       | 0.6%       | 0.3%               |
| Jewish                | 39                    | 7.3%  | 45      | 8.4%       | 1.7%               |
| Buddhist              | 3                     | 0.6%  | 2       | 0.4%       | 0.7%               |
| Muslim                | 2                     | 0.4%  | 2       | 0.4%       | 0.6%               |
| Hindu                 | 0                     | 0.0%  | 0       | 0.0%       | 0.4%               |
| Other World Religions | ; 0                   | 0.0%  | 0       | 0.0%       | <0.3%              |
| Other Faiths          | 2                     | 0.4%  | 3       | 0.6%       | 1.2%               |
| Unaffiliated          | 0                     | 0.0%  | 0       | 0.0%       | 16.1%              |
| Don't Know/Refused    | 6                     | 1.1%  | 5       | 0.9%       | 0.8%               |
| Total                 | 535                   | 100%  | 534     | 100%       | 100%               |

Source: Data for Congress from CQ Roll Call and Pew Forum; data for American public from the Pew Forum's U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, conducted in 2007 (Muslim data from Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, 2007). Data for the 111th Congress excludes the Senate seat vacated by President Barack Obama, which had not been filled when the data were collected in 2008.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, Jan. 5. 2011.

If Protestants are not counted together but as separate denominations, then Catholics are the largest religious group in the 112th Congress, with 156 members. Compared with the previous Congress, their ranks have thinned by five members. Still, Catholics comprise about 29% of the House and Senate, compared with about one-quarter of the U.S. adult population (24%).

Jews, who make up about 2% of the U.S. adult population, account for 7% of Congress as a whole and 12% of the Senate. However, there are six fewer Jewish members in the 112th Congress than there were in the 111th, a one-percentage-point decline. Mormons also make up about 2% of the U.S. public and a slightly larger portion of Congress (nearly 3%). That figure is about the same as in the previous Congress; there are 15 Mormons in the 112th Congress, one more than previously.<sup>2</sup>

Some other small religious groups are about as numerically well-represented on Capitol Hill as in the general population. Muslims, who account for 0.6% of the U.S. adult population, make up 0.4% of Congress, while Buddhists make up 0.7% of the U.S. adult population and 0.6% of Congress. There are no Jehovah's Witnesses, Hindus or people who practice other world religions in Congress; these groups each have a small presence (less than 1%) in the U.S. population as a whole.

As previously mentioned, members of Congress are more likely than the public overall to affiliate with any particular religion. Six members of the new Congress (about 1%) do not specify a religious affiliation, and no members describe themselves as unaffiliated. By comparison, about one-sixth of the American public (16%) falls into the unaffiliated category, with another 1% saying they don't know or refusing to specify. The low number of religiously unaffiliated elected officials is perhaps not surprising given Americans' attitudes toward religion and politics. According to a <u>summer 2010 survey</u> by the Pew Forum and the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 61% of Americans say it is important for members of Congress to have strong religious beliefs. This view is expressed by eight-in-ten white evangelical Protestants (83%); seven-in-ten black Protestants (71%); and at least six-in-ten white mainline Protestants (64%), white Catholics (66%) and Hispanic Catholics (61%). Even among self-identified atheists and agnostics, 15% say it is important for members of Congress to have strong religious beliefs.



1 All six members of Congress who decline to specify an affiliation are incumbents and are counted in this analysis in the "Don't Know/Refused" category. In addition, one member of the House of Representatives, Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.), identifies his religion as Unitarian but has also said he is an atheist (does not believe in God). He is counted in this analysis in the "Other Faiths" category, which includes Unitarianism. If he were counted, instead, as an atheist and added to the six members in the "Don't know/Refused" category, the portion of members of Congress who either do not specify a faith or are unaffiliated with any particular faith would still be about 1%. 2. The Mormon category includes those who identify their faith as Mormon (14 members) as well as those who identify with the Community of Christ (one member).

## The 2010 Congressional Reapportionment and Latinos

#### January 5, 2011

Hispanic voters are nearly three times more prevalent in states that gained congressional seats and Electoral College votes in the 2010 reapportionment than they are in states that lost seats, according to an analysis of Census data by the Pew Hispanic Center, a project of the Pew Research Center. Based on averages reflecting congressional gains and losses, 15.2% of the eligible voter population in states that gained seats is Hispanic, compared with just 5.4% of eligible voters in those states that lost seats.<sup>23</sup>

## Table 1 – 2010 Census Reapportionment and Latinos

|                        |                            | Latino Share of                  |                          |   |  |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|---|--|
|                        | Congressional<br>Gain/Loss | Eligible<br>Voters,<br>2009<br>% | Population,<br>2009<br>% | Population<br>Growth,<br>2000-2009<br>% |  |
| States That Gaine      | ed Congressional           | Seats                            |                          |   |  |
| Texas                  | 4                          | 25.5                             | 36.9                     | 63.1                                    |  |
| Florida                | 2                          | 15.0                             | 21.5                     | 51.1                                    |  |
| South Carolina         | 1                          | 1.6                              | 4.5                      | 19.8                                    |  |
| Georgia                | 1                          | 2.8                              | 8.3                      | 23.2                                    |  |
| Arizona                | 1                          | 19.7                             | 30.8                     | 50.2                                    |  |
| Utah                   | 1                          | 6.5                              | 12.3                     | 25.7                                    |  |
| Nevada                 | 1                          | 14.1                             | 26.5                     | 47.5                                    |  |
| Washington             | 1                          | 5.3                              | 10.3                     | 31.9                                    |  |
| State weighted average |                            | 15.2                             | 23.6                     | 46.1                                    |  |

#### States That Lost Congressional Seats

| New York               | -2 | 11.7 | 16.8 | 72.0  |
|------------------------|----|------|------|-------|
| Ohio                   | -2 | 1.8  | 2.8  | 55.9  |
| Massachusetts          | -1 | 5.9  | 8.8  | 62.8  |
| New Jersey             | -1 | 11.0 | 16.7 | 114.4 |
| Pennsylvania           | -1 | 3.5  | 5.1  | 77.8  |
| Illinois               | -1 | 8.4  | 15.3 | 89.5  |
| Michigan               | -1 | 2.6  | 4.2  | 316.3 |
| Iowa                   | -1 | 2.0  | 4.3  | 59.1  |
| Missouri               | -1 | 1.9  | 3.4  | 21.3  |
| Louisiana              | -1 | 2.3  | 3.6  | 234.4 |
| State weighted average |    | 5.4  | 8.4  | 102.6 |

Note: Eligible voters are U.S. citizens ages 18 and older. The state weighted average gives greater weight to states that gained more seats in Congress. For example, Texas (+4) receives a weight four times greater than the state of Washington (+1). Similarly, for states that lost seats, New York (-2) gets twice as much weight as Louisiana (-1).

Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of the 2009 ACS (1% IPUMS sample) and 2010 December Census Release

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With these reapportionment changes, Latinos likely will play a larger role in national politics in the coming decade. Two states that gained seats, Florida and Nevada, have been key battlegrounds in recent presidential

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1845/2010-congressional-reapportionment-hispanics

elections (having voted for the Republican nominee in 2004 and the Democratic candidate in 2008). In both states, Latinos are a growing share of eligible voters.

According to the Census Bureau, there were <u>308 million people residing in the U.S. in 2010</u>, up 9% from 2000. Overall, based on 2009 population estimates, Hispanics accounted for more than half (51%) of that growth.<sup>1</sup> However, because many Latinos are either too young to vote or are not U.S. citizens, not all of their population growth translates into immediate electoral strength. Among the nation's 48.4 million Hispanics in 2009, a record 20.1 million are eligible to vote. Yet an even greater number are not eligible to vote. Some 15.5 million Hispanics<sup>2</sup> are U.S. citizens 17 years of age or younger, and 12.8 million of all ages are not U.S. citizens.<sup>3</sup>

Even so, the number of the Latinos eligible to vote continues to grow. Since 2000, nearly six million more Latinos have become eligible to vote. The bulk of this growth was attributable to the five million U.S.-born Latino youths nationwide who turned age 18 during this past decade. That translates into an additional half-million U.S.-born Latinos coming of age each year -- a pattern that is certain to persist, and grow, in the coming decades.

No matter what happens with immigration patterns in the future, the aging of the U.S.-born Latino youth bulge ensures that the electoral strength of the nation's largest minority group will continue to grow in the coming decades. And much of that growth will take place in states that have gained congressional seats and Electoral College votes.

## **Reapportionment Gains and Hispanic Population Growth**

Based on <u>results of the 2010 Census</u>, eight states -- Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Washington -- will gain congressional seats and Electoral College votes. Texas will gain four, Florida two, and all others one. Ten states will lose seats -- Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. New York and Ohio will lose two and all others one.

Overall Latinos represent a greater share of eligible voter and resident populations in states that will gain seats than they do in states that will lose seats. Among eligible voters, in states that will gain seats, 15.2% are Latino, while in states that will lose seats just 5.4% are Latino. Among resident populations, 23.6% is Latino in states that will gain seats compared with 8.4% in states that will lose seats.

# [*The apportionment of congressional seats is based upon total residents in each state including those who are ineligible to vote. See "Census 2010: Apportionment Basics."*]

In Texas, Latinos account for one-in-four (25.5%) of the state's eligible voters and 36.9% of the state's population. In Florida, Latinos account for one-in-seven (15%) of the state's eligible voters and 21.5% of the state's population. And in Arizona and Nevada, Hispanics represent 19.7% and 14.1% of eligible voters, respectively.

Many of the states that gained congressional seats did so partly because of rapid population growth among Hispanics. Texas' population increased by nearly four million, or by 21%, between 2000 and 2010. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of that growth came from growth in the state's Hispanic population, which increased by almost 2.5 million.<sup>4</sup> In Florida, Hispanic population growth accounted for more than half (51%) of the state's population growth through this decade. Even in states with smaller Hispanic populations, Hispanics accounted for a large share of population growth. In Georgia, Hispanics accounted for 23.2% of the state's growth. In South Carolina, Hispanics accounted for 19.8% of the state's growth.

Even in states that lost congressional seats, Latinos contributed significantly to population gains, possibly limiting reapportionment losses. For instance, in New York, 72% of the population growth this decade came from the Latino population. In New Jersey, the state's population would likely have declined without Hispanic population growth. And in Michigan, Latino population growth kept the state's population from declining even more than it did.

# Table 2 – Share of the Population Eligible to Vote in States with Congressional Seat Changes, by Race and Ethnicity

|  |                            | Share Eligible to Vote % |        |        |  |  |  |  |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------|--------|--|--|--|--|
|  | Congressional<br>Gain/Loss | Latinos                  | Whites | Blacks |  |  |  |  |
| States That Gained Congressional Seats |                            |                          |        |        |  |  |  |  |
| Texas                                  | 4                          | 43.1                     | 77.3   | 70.0   |  |  |  |  |
| Florida                                | 2                          | 48.3                     | 79.8   | 63.5   |  |  |  |  |
| South Carolina                         | 1                          | 25.8                     | 78.4   | 72.7   |  |  |  |  |
| Georgia                                | 1                          | 22.9                     | 76.2   | 69.6   |  |  |  |  |
| Arizona                                | 1                          | 41.6                     | 79.0   | 64.7   |  |  |  |  |
| Utah                                   | 1                          | 34.3                     | 70.2   | 51.0   |  |  |  |  |
| Nevada                                 | 1                          | 33.9                     | 78.3   | 67.8   |  |  |  |  |
| Washington                             | 1                          | 36.0                     | 77.9   | 63.9   |  |  |  |  |

#### States That Lost Congressional Seats

| New York      | -2 | 47.6 | 77.4 | 64.0 |
|---------------|----|------|------|------|
| Ohio          | -2 | 47.4 | 77.6 | 70.1 |
| Massachusetts | -1 | 47.8 | 77.6 | 57.0 |
| New Jersey    | -1 | 44.5 | 76.8 | 68.5 |
| Pennsylvania  | -1 | 51.6 | 79.3 | 69.8 |
| Illinois      | -1 | 37.7 | 77.3 | 71.1 |
| Michigan      | -1 | 45.9 | 77.2 | 71.1 |
| Iowa          | -1 | 33.9 | 77.7 | 64.7 |
| Missouri      | -1 | 41.5 | 77.3 | 70.3 |
| Louisiana     | -1 | 46.4 | 77.5 | 70.5 |

Note: Eligible voters are U.S. citizens ages 18 and older.

Source: Pew Hispanic Centertabulations of the 2009 ACS (1% IPUMS sample)

#### PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Latino voting strength is limited by the fact that one-third of all Latinos are under the age of 18 and by the fact that many Latino adults are not U.S. citizens. Because of these factors, the <u>share of the Hispanic population that is</u> <u>eligible to vote</u> is lower than it is among either whites or blacks, even though the Hispanic population has grown rapidly in recent decades.

In Texas, for example, even though Hispanic population growth helped to fuel the expansion of the state's congressional delegation, fewer than half (43.1%) of all Hispanics are eligible to vote, compared with nearly eight-in-ten (77.3%) whites and seven-in-ten blacks (70%). In Florida, fewer than half (48.3%) of the state's Hispanics are eligible to vote, while eight-in-ten (79.8%) whites and 63.5% of blacks are eligible to vote.

In Georgia -- a state where the vast majority of Hispanic adults are foreign born who arrived within the last decade or two -- the gap is even wider. There, only 22.9% of the state's Latinos

are eligible to vote, compared with 76.2% of whites and 69.6% of blacks. Similar patterns are present in other "new settlement" states.

View the <u>full report (PDF)</u> for detailed tables with state-by-state data on population growth and congressiional reapportionment at <u>pewhispanic.org</u>.

1. Final 2010 Census population counts for the Hispanic population, and all other groups of Americans, will be released by the Census Bureau later this vear. 2. Among Hispanics who are U.S. citizens and 17 years of age or younger, some 15.3 million were born in the U.S. rounding. 3. Sum mav not total due to 4. The Census Bureau has not issued state population counts by race and ethnicity from the 2010 Census. However, the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) provides the most recent state population estimates by race and ethnicity. Latino population estimates from the 2009 ACS are used throughout this report.

## **Optimism About 2011**


Fri January 7, 2011

Americans are more optimistic than not about the year ahead --- both when it comes to themselves and their families and when it comes to the world. But they don't feel any more positive about 2011 in this Economist/YouGov Poll (conducted the first week of this year) than they felt one year ago about the prospects for 2010.<sup>24</sup>


42% of Americans are optimistic about the kind of year 2011 will be for the world. 28% are pessimistic. Last year, 42% were optimistic about 2010, and 32% were pessimistic. Americans feel better about what the year will bring to their families: more than twice as many (50%) are optimistic than pessimistic (21%). But that is not much different from what people thought in January 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> http://today.yougov.com/news/2011/01/07/optimism-about-2011/#

#### What's your feeling about the year ahead? Generally speaking. are you optimistic or pessimistic about what kind of year 2010/2011 will be for the world?



Are you optimistic or pessimistic about what kind of year 2010/2011 will be for you and your family?



Among the more optimistic are those under 30, African-Americans, women, and college graduates. Democrats continue to be more optimistic than Republicans about the year ahead.

One of the reasons Americans may not be more hopeful is that many of them don't expect to see a lot of improvement in critical areas, though there is some hope when it comes to the country's most important issue --- the economy. 41% expect that the economy in their area will be better in two years than it is today, although more see no change or a continued worsening. Similarly, while 31% see improvement in job security in the next two years, one in four say that will be worse, and 28% see no change.


|                                       | Much<br>better | Somewhat<br>better | No<br>change | Somewhat<br>worse | Much<br>worse | Not<br>sure |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|
| The<br>economy in<br>your area        | 7%             | 34%                | 24%          | 14%               | 10%           | 11%         |
| Job security                          | 5%             | 29%                | 28%          | 14%               | 11%           | 13%         |
| Social<br>Security<br>and<br>Medicare | 4%             | 17%                | 29%          | 18%               | 18%           | 14%         |
| Government spending                   | 4%             | 23%                | 28%          | 15%               | 18%           | 12%         |

Two years from now, do you think things will be better off or worse off than they are now when it comes to:

But when it comes to economic areas where the government has the most control, Americans are dubious about improvements. Perhaps worried by Washington discussions about cuts in entitlement programs, 36% believe Social Security and Medicare will be in worse shape in two years than they are today, and only 21% think they will be better off. Older adults (and Republicans) are especially worried about the future of Social Security and Medicare.


And even though many of the successful Republican --- and Tea Party --- campaigns last November were based on promises to reduce government spending, so far the public doesn't expect much in the way of results. 27% say government spending will improve in two years; 33% say it will be worse. Among Republicans, 46% expect government spending to get worse, and just 27% see an improvement.


There is more Republican optimism when it comes to what the newly-elected Congress, with its a Republican-controlled House of Representatives, will accomplish in the coming year. 42% of Republicans expect the new Congress to accomplish more than usual, and just 8% say it will do less than usual.




The country overall is not so optimistic. Among all Americans, 19% say the new Congress will accomplish more than usual, but 29% think it will produce even less than it usually does.

The new Congress's Republican leaders are beginning to evoke the same partian evaluations that Democrats Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid faced throughout their majority leadership terms. As Democrats learn about the Republican leaders, they learn not to like them. By a margin of 46% to 11%, Democrats hold an unfavorable view of the new House Speaker, John Boehner; by 46% to 9%, they are unfavorable towards the Republican Senate Leader, Mitch McConnell. Overall, Americans are somewhat negative about the Republican leaders.







Do you have a favorable or an unfavorable

Unfavorable views of Pelosi and Reid have declined slightly in the last week, as power has shifted away from them. 50% still have an unfavorable view of Pelosi, down from 55% last week. Unfavorable ratings of Reid have dropped from 46% to 42%.

## Very Religious Have Higher Wellbeing Across All Faiths

*Jews have highest wellbeing overall, despite being the least religious* 

January 6, 2011

Very religious Americans of all major faiths -- and even those who do not have a formal religious identity -- have higher overall wellbeing than do their respective counterparts who are moderately religious or nonreligious. This relationship, based on an analysis of more than 372,000 interviews, is statistically significant after major demographic and regional variables are controlled for.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> http://www.gallup.com/poll/145493/Religious-Higher-Wellbeing-Across-

Faiths.aspx?utm\_source=alert&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=syndication&utm\_content=morelink&utm\_t erm=Americas - Northern America - Religion and Social Trends - USA - Wellbeing

|   | Very<br>religious | Moderately<br>religious | Nonreligious |
|---|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| Jewish                                  | 71.2              | 70.0                    | 68.4         |
| Mormon/Latter-Day Saints                | 70.5              | 64.3                    | 65.4         |
| No religion/Atheist/Agnostic            | 70.2              | 65.7                    | 65.0         |
| Roman Catholic                          | 69.3              | 66.0                    | 65.5         |
| Other non-Christian                     | 69.0              | 64.6                    | 63.0         |
| Protestant/Other non-Catholic Christian | 68.3              | 63.1                    | 63.2         |
| Muslim/Islam                            | 67.9              | 64.5                    | 65.0         |

## Well-Being Index Composite Score by Religiosity Within Each Religious Identity

Controlling for age, income, education, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, and region

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index; data collected Jan. 2, 2009, through July 28, 2010

#### GALLUP'

<u>Gallup research</u> has previously documented that Americans who are the most religious have the highest wellbeing. The current results confirm that this same pattern persists within all major faith groups, including those who have no formal religious identity. Generally speaking, the major difference in wellbeing is found between the very religious and the other two groups, although not necessarily in strict progression. For some religious groups, those who are nonreligious have at least slightly higher wellbeing than those who are moderately religious.

Americans' degree of religiousness, as defined in this analysis, is based on responses to two questions asking about the importance of religion and church attendance, yielding the "very religious," "moderately religious," and "nonreligious" groups. (See page 2 for details of this classification procedure.)

Previous research has shown that religiosity, defined as either church attendance or self-reported importance of religion, is related to age, gender, race and ethnicity, region and state of the country, socioeconomic status, marital status, and child-bearing status. Because wellbeing is also related to these variables, this analysis statistically controls for all of these characteristics.

#### Jews Have Highest Wellbeing Overall, Followed by Those With No Religious Identity

Jews have the highest wellbeing of any of the faith groups examined in this analysis, while Protestants have the lowest overall wellbeing. Jews score particularly high on the Life Evaluation and Basic Access sub-indexes. Protestants, on the other hand, score lowest on the Life Evaluation Index and among the lowest on the Healthy Behaviors Index. (See page 3 for details regarding the sub-indexes.)

### Well-Being Index Composite Score by Religious Identity

Controlling for age, income, education, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, and region

----

|                              | Well-Being Index Composite |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Jewish                       | 69.8                       |
| No religion/Atheist/Agnostic | 67.0                       |
| Roman Catholic               | 66.9                       |
| Mormon/Latter-Day Saints     | 66.7                       |
| Muslim/Islam                 | 65.8                       |
| Other Non-Christian religion | 65.6                       |
| Protestant                   | 64.8                       |

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index; data collected Jan. 2, 2009, through July 28, 2010

#### GALLUP

#### **Religious Intensity Greatest for Mormons, Lowest for Jews**

Mormons are by far the most religious of these groups, with 74.6% categorized as very religious. Protestants, Muslims, and Roman Catholics are next in order of religiousness, although less than half of all three of these groups are classified as very religious. Americans who have no formal religious identity are the least religious of any of the faith groups, as would be expected, followed by Jews, with 15.9% classified as very religious, and those who identify with other non-Christian religions (20.9% very religious). The relative effect of religiousness on wellbeing persists despite these overall differences.

#### Religious Intensity by Faith

|   | % Who are<br>very religious | % Who are<br>moderately<br>religious | % Who are nonreligious |
|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Mormon/Latter-Day Saints                | 74.6%                       | 13.4%                                | 12.0%                  |
| Protestant/Other non-Catholic Christian | 49.5%                       | 31.1%                                | 19.4%                  |
| Muslim/Islam                            | 43.5%                       | 38.3%                                | 18.2%                  |
| Roman Catholic                          | 41.7%                       | 31.0%                                | 27.3%                  |
| Other non-Christian                     | 20.9%                       | 35.8%                                | 43.3%                  |
| Jewish                                  | 15.9%                       | 29.1%                                | 55.0%                  |
| No religion/Atheist/Agnostic            | 2.5%                        | 9.5%                                 | 88.1%                  |

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index; data collected Jan. 2, 2009, through July 28, 2010

GALLUP'

#### Implications

The findings confirm that the strong positive <u>relationship between religiosity and wellbeing</u> that Gallup previously demonstrated holds regardless of faith. Furthermore, the relationship appears to be largely independent of proportions of very religious, moderately religious, and nonreligious within each religious group, and it is more closely aligned with the faith itself. Muslims, for example, have a much lower level of wellbeing than do Jews. At the same time, the "wellbeing gap" that exists between their most religious and least religious constituencies is roughly the same, even though Jews have fewer very religious identifiers.

Interestingly, those without a religious identity, a group that includes atheists and agnostics, also appear to reap the positive wellbeing effect of religiosity. Although small in the overall percentage of its total population, the very religious within this group have considerably better wellbeing overall than the large majority who are nonreligious. This suggests a wellbeing benefit to the church-/synagogue-/mosque-going experience that is independent of religious faith, but instead may capitalize on the social aspects of attending religious institutions. It should also be emphasized that although those without religious identity rank second only behind Jews in overall wellbeing, this does not contradict that the most religious *within* any given identity group have superior wellbeing compared with those who are moderately religious or are nonreligious. Instead, it reinforces the evidence that religiosity matters to wellbeing regardless of religious identity.

Gallup will continue to explore the relationship between wellbeing and religion in future articles.

## About the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

The Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index tracks U.S. wellbeing and provides best-in-class solutions for a healthier world. To learn more, please visit <u>well-beingindex.com</u>.

## **Survey Methods**

Results are based on telephone interviews conducted as part of the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index survey Jan. 2, 2009-July 28, 2010, with a random sample of 372,927 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, selected using random-digit-dial sampling.

#### Sample Sizes (n=) of Reported Religious Groups

|   | Total   | Very<br>religious | Moderately<br>religious | Nonreligious |
|---|---------|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| Protestant/Other non-Catholic Christian | 208,961 | 103,500           | 64,994                  | 40,467       |
| Roman Catholic                          | 86,319  | 36,035            | 26,762                  | 23,522       |
| No religion/Atheist/Agnostic            | 53,722  | 1,333             | 5,078                   | 47,311       |
| Other non-Christian                     | 9,217   | 1,927             | 3,301                   | 3,989        |
| Mormon/Latter-Day Saints                | 7,290   | 5,439             | 977                     | 874          |
| Jewish                                  | 5,788   | 920               | 1,685                   | 3,183        |
| Muslim/Islam                            | 1,630   | 709               | 625                     | 296          |

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

#### GALLUP

The maximum margin of sampling error found for each reported group will vary according to the size, with the smallest expected error found for the largest reported group. For all three reported Protestant groups, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum expected error range is no greater than  $\pm 0.5\%$ . For smaller groups of fewer than 1,000 respondents such as some of those found for Mormons, Jews, or Muslims, error ranges can climb as high as  $\pm 6.0$  percentage points.

Generalized linear model analysis was used to estimate marginal scores for all five reported metrics after controlling for age (in years), gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, education (number of years), log of income, and region of the country.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones and cellular phones, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. Each daily sample includes a minimum quota of 150 cell phone respondents and 850 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas among landline respondents for gender within region. Landline respondents are chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member had the most recent birthday.

Samples are weighted by gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, adults in the household, cell phone-only status, cell phone-mostly status, and phone lines. Demographic weighting targets are based on the March 2009 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older non-institutionalized population living in U.S. telephone households. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting and sample design.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

## AUSTRALASIA

Heading into 2011 Economic Issues (32%, down 1%) still most Important Problem Facing the World & most Important Problem Facing Australia, (28%, up 4%)

Finding No. 4621 - In Australia, a cross-section of 1,269 men and women aged 14 or over were interviewed by telephone on December 8-12, 2010. Respondents were asked: "Firstly, what do you think is the most important problem facing the World today?" and "What do you think is the most important problem facing Australia today?" These findings come from a special Roy Morgan survey conducted in Australia on attitudes towards issues facing the World and Australia in the future.: January 06, 2011

Australians still consider Economic issues 32% (down 1% since September 2010) the most important problem facing the **World** today, ahead of Environmental issues (26%, down 3%) and Terrorism/ Wars/ Security/ Safety (15%, up 3%).<sup>26</sup>

In Australia, Economic Issues (28%, up 4%% since September 2010) outweigh Government/ Politics/ Immigration/ Human Rights (21%, down 5%) and Environmental Issues (20%, unchanged) according to a special telephone Roy Morgan survey conducted in mid December 2010.

#### Australian views on Problems facing the World

As a **World** problem Economic issues (32%, down 1%) have fallen slightly since September 2010, and remain well below the peak of 51% reached in May 2009. In particular many Australians regard Climate Change/ Global Warming (17%, down 2%), The Economy/ Economy problems/ Interest rates (13%, up 1%) and Poverty/ The gap between the rich and the poor (9%, down 4%) as the most important Economic Issues facing the **World**.

Environmental issues (mentioned by 26% of Australians) are the second biggest problem facing the **World**, down 3% since September 2010. Significantly 17% (down 2% since September 2010) of Australians regard Climate Change/ Global Warming as the most important problem.

Other major problems are Terrorism/ Wars/ Security/ Safety (15%, up 3%), Social Issues (7%, down 2%) and Government/ Politics/ Immigration/ Human Rights (6%, up 1%).

#### Australian views on Problems facing Australia

The most important problems facing **Australia** today are Economic Issues (28%, up 4% since September 2010). The Economy/ Economic problems/ Interest Rates 8%, (down 3%) is still the largest economic problem facing **Australia** today. Government/ Politics/ Immigration and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/2011/4621/

Human Rights are the next most important problem facing Australia (21%, down 5%) — led by Government, Political system, Political leadership (8%, down 3%).

Environment Issues (20%, unchanged) are also an important problem facing **Australia** according to many Australians — the most important Environmental Issues remain Climate change/ Global warming (9%, unchanged) and Water Conservation (5%, unchanged).

Other important problems facing **Australia** include Social Issues (8%, down 2%), Health Issues (6%, down 1%), Refugees and Asylum problems (5%, down 2%), Immigration/ Immigration policy (4%, unchanged) and Unemployment (3%, down 1%).

#### **Problems facing Australia - by State**

Looking at what Australians in different States regard as the most important problem facing **Australia** today reveals Queenslanders (35%) and Tasmanians (32%) are the most likely to say Economic Issues are the most important problem facing **Australia** — far higher than West Australians (18%) or Victorians (25%).

West Australians (28%) and Queenslanders (24%) are also most likely to mention Government/ Politics/ Immigration/ Human Rights as the most important problem facing **Australia** compared to only 15% of Tasmanians, 16% of Victorians and 16% of South Australians. Interestingly this split mirrors the result at the recent Federal election. The L-NP Opposition won 33/45 seats in Queensland and Western Australia while the ALP Government won 32/53 seats in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania.

Environmental Issues are also seen as a big problem facing **Australia** — particularly in Western Australia (25%) and South Australia (24%) — Water conservation is the most important environmental issue in both of these States. Environmental Issues are not seen as such a big problem in Victoria (19%) or Queensland (11%) — although it is important to note that this research was conducted prior to the devastating floods in large areas of Queensland.

Social Issues are seen as the most important problem facing **Australia** by 20% of Tasmanians and 13% of Victorians — far higher than any other States. Education is the leading Social issue in both States. Health Issues are most prominent in Victoria (8%) and New South Wales (7%). These results are after the recent election of the Baillieu Government in Victoria.

## Michele Levine says:

"This special Roy Morgan survey conducted in the final weeks of last year shows that as we head into 2011 Australians still regard Economic Issues as the most important problems facing both the **World** (32%, down 1% since September 2010) and **Australia** (28%, up 4%).

"Australians regard Government/ Politics/ Immigration/ Human Rights Issues (21%, down 5%) and Environmental Issues (20%, unchanged) as the other major areas of problems facing **Australia**. Within these categories Climate Change/ Global warming (9%, unchanged) and

Government, Political system, political leadership (8%, down 3%) are the most important problems facing **Australia**. The closely related issues of Refugees and Asylum problems (5%, down 2%) and Immigration/Immigration policy (4%, unchanged) are also important problems.

"In terms of the wider world, other important problems facing the **World** in 2011 are Environmental Issues (26%, down 3%) and Terrorism/ Wars/ Security/ Safety (15%, up 3% - and its highest since November 2009).

"Looking closely at the problems within these categories shows that Climate Change/ Global warming (17%, down 2%), The Economy/ Economic problems/ Interest rates (13%, up 1%), Poverty, the gap between rich and poor (9%, down 4%) and Wars and Conflicts (8%, up 1%) are the most important problems facing the **World** heading into 2011 according to Australians."

In Australia, a cross-section of 1,269 men and women aged 14 or over were interviewed by telephone on December 8-12, 2010. Respondents were asked: *"Firstly, what do you think is the most important problem facing the World today?"* and *"What do you think is the most important problem facing Australia today?"* 

These findings come from a special Roy Morgan survey conducted in Australia on attitudes towards issues facing the **World** and **Australia** in the future.

The research conducted was both **qualitative** (in that people were asked to use their own words) and **quantitative** (in that the 'open-ended' responses were analysed and 'coded' so that the results could be counted and reported as percentages).

Respondents were asked: "Firstly, what do you think is the most important problem facing the World today?" and "What do you think is the most important problem facing Australia today?"

|  | Most | timpo | ortant | : prob | lem  | facin | g the |
|--|------|-------|--------|--------|------|-------|-------|
|  |      | -     | May    |        | •    |       |       |
|  | 2005 | 2006  | 2008   | 2008   | 2009 | 2009  | 2010  |
|  | %    | %     | %      | %      | %    | %     | %     |
| The Economy/ Economic problems Interest rates      | 3    | 1     | 8      | 26     | 36   | 9     | 15    |
| Financial problems/ Money issues                   | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| Cost of living issues/ Rising prices/ Inflation    | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| Taxation - Mining Tax, Resource Tax etc.           | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| Banks/ Bank interest rates                         | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| Housing affordability                              | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| (Sub Total) Total Financial Issues/ Cost of living | 3    | 1     | 8      | 26     | 36   | 9     | 15    |
| Poverty, the gap between rich and poor             | 10   | 16    | 11     | 8      | 8    | 13    | 9     |
| Over-population                                    | 1    | 1     | 3      | 2      | 2    | 4     | 6     |
| Unemployment                                       | *    | *     | 1      | 1      | 4    | 2     | 2     |
| Foreign ownership & investment/ Selling our assets | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| Farming/ Cut food imports and support our farmers  | -    | -     | -      | -      | -    | -     | -     |
| Globalisation/Fairer world trade                   | 1    | 1     | 1      | 1      | 1    | *     | 1     |

| Hemelessness / Lask of housing   |                  |                         |                  |                  |                  |                  |                         |
|--|------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Homelessness/ Lack of housing  | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -<br>*           | -<br>*           | -                       |
| General Infrastructure/ Energy, Water, Internet etc.                             | -                | -                       | -                | -                | •                |                  | -                       |
| Transport/ Transport infrastructure/ Road & rail<br>Industrial relations reforms | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | -                       |
| Total Economic/ Financial Issues   | -<br>16          | -<br>19                 | - 24             | - 37             | -<br>51          | -<br>29          | - 32                    |
|  | 10<br>4          | 5                       | 24<br>18         | 57<br>14         | <b>51</b><br>12  | <b>29</b><br>19  | 52<br>24                |
| Climate Change / Global warming  | 4<br>7           | 5<br>6                  |                  |                  |                  | 19<br>4          | 24<br>7                 |
| Other Environmental issues   | /                |                         | 10               | 8                | 7                |                  | 3                       |
| Famine   | -                | 2                       | 4                | 4                | 2                | 4                | 3                       |
| Pollution/ Rubbish   | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | -                       |
| Water conservation   | 1                | 1                       | 3                | *                | *                | 2                | 2                       |
| Natural Disasters - Floods, Earthquakes etc.                                     | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | -                       |
| Drought  | -                | -                       | -                | *                | -                | -                | *                       |
| Oil Spill in Gulf of Mexico (World only)   | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | -                       |
| Total Environmental Issues   | 12               | 14                      | 35               | 26               | 21               | 29               | 36                      |
| Wars and conflicts   | 6                | 11                      | 10               | 6                | 5                | 12               | 6                       |
| Terrorism  | 46               | 20                      | 4                | 2                | 2                | 6                | 2                       |
| World Peace  | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | -                       |
| Security, Safety   | -                | 1                       | -                | 1                | *                | *                | 1                       |
| Relations with other countries   | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | *                       |
| Total Terrorism/Wars/Security/Safety   | 52               | 32                      | 14               | 9                | 7                | 18               | 9                       |
| Greed, Materialism   | 1                | 3                       | 1                | 3                | 3                | 2                | 3                       |
| Educational issues   | *                | 1                       | 1                | 1                | *                | 1                | *                       |
| Drugs and drug abuse   | *                | 2                       | 1                | 1                | *                | *                | 1                       |
| Social apathy/Family breakdowns/ Selfishness/Mora                                | ıl               | 2                       | 2                | 2                | 1                | 1                | 1                       |
| decline  | -                | Z                       | Z                | Z                | 1                | 1                | 1                       |
| Youth issues (Homelessness, Apathy etc.)   | -                | 1                       | 1                | 1                | 1                | 2                | 1                       |
| Anger/Violence/Aggression  | -                | 1                       | -                | 1                | 1                | 1                | *                       |
| Corruption   | *                | *                       | 1                | *                | *                | 1                | *                       |
| Crime/ Law & Order   | *                | 1                       | 1                | *                | -                | -                | 1                       |
| Total Social Issues  | 3                | 11                      | 10               | 9                | 6                | 7                | 7                       |
| Government/ Political system, Political leadership                               | 1                | 2                       | 1                | 1                | 3                | 2                | 1                       |
| Refugees and Asylum problems   | -                | -                       | -                | -                | *                | 3                | 1                       |
| Religion, Religious fundamentalism   | 2                | 5                       | 1                | 3                | 1                | 3                | 1                       |
| Human rights   | *                | *                       | 1                | *                | -                | 1                | *                       |
| Immigration / Immigration policy   | -                | 1                       | _                | *                | 1                | 1                | 1                       |
| Multiculturalism/ Integration/ Assimilation                                      | -                | *                       | _                | *                | 1                | *                | *                       |
| Racism/Racial tensions   | _                | 2                       | _                | *                | *                | -                | 1                       |
| Intolerance/ Discrimination  | 1                | 3                       | 1                | 1                | 1                | *                | 1                       |
| Aboriginal issues/ health/ Rights (Australia)                                    | -                | -                       | -                | -                | -                | -                | -                       |
| Total Government/ Political/Immigration/ Huma                                    | n                |                         |                  |                  |                  |                  |                         |
| Rights   | -4               | 13                      | 4                | 6                | 6                | 9                | 5                       |
|  |                  |                         |                  |                  |                  |                  |                         |
| 8  | 1                | 3                       | 2                | 1                | 2                | 2                | 3                       |
| Other health issues  | 1                | 3                       | 2                | 1                | 2                | 2                | 3                       |
| Other health issues<br>Hospitals   | -                | -                       | 2<br>-           | 1<br>-           | 2                | 2<br>-           | 3                       |
| Other health issues  | 1<br>-<br>*<br>2 | 3<br>-<br>1<br><b>4</b> | 2<br>-<br>-<br>2 | 1<br>-<br>-<br>1 | 2<br>-<br>-<br>2 | 2<br>-<br>-<br>2 | 3<br>-<br>-<br><b>3</b> |

| Energy crisis  | -   | 1   | 2   | *   | *   | *   | 1   |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Sustainable management of narural resources            | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| Depletion of fossil fuels                              | -   | *   | 1   | *   | *   | 1   | *   |
| Petrol prices  | -   | *   | 2   | 1   | *   | *   | _   |
| Total Energy crisis/ Petrol prices/Depletion of fossil | 1   | 1   | -   | 2   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| fuels  | -   | 1   | 5   | 2   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| Ties to the USA  | _   | -   | -   | -   | -   | -   | _   |
| Other  | 8   | 3   | 4   | 6   | 4   | 2   | 2   |
| Can't say  | 1   | 3   | 2   | 4   | 3   | 2   | 5   |
| TOTAL  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| * Less than 1%.  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |

## Most Important Problem facing the World

|   | AUSTRALIA |    |     |     |    |    |      |
|---|-----------|----|-----|-----|----|----|------|
|   | Dec       |    | VIC | QLD | WA | SA | TAS# |
|   | %         | %  | %   | %   | %  | %  | %    |
| The Economy/ Economic problems/<br>Interest rates       | 13        | 14 | 12  | 18  | 9  | 13 | 9    |
| Financial problems/ Money issues                        | 2         | 1  | 2   | 3   | 3  | 2  | 6    |
| Cost of living issues/ Rising prices/<br>Inflation      | 1         | *  | 2   | 2   | 1  | -  | -    |
| Taxation — Mining Tax, Resource Tax etc.                | *         | *  | *   | *   | -  | 1  | -    |
| Banks/ Bank interest rates                              | *         | -  | *   | 1   | -  | 1  | -    |
| Housing affordability                                   | *         | -  | -   | -   | -  | 1  | -    |
| (Sub Total) Total Financial Issues/                     | 17        | 15 | 16  | 23  | 13 | 16 | 14   |
| Cost of living  |           |    |     | -   |    | -  |      |
| Poverty, the gap between rich and poor                  |           | 9  | 11  | 7   | 8  | 9  | 12   |
| Over-population   | 3         | 3  | 3   | 4   | 4  | 4  | -    |
| Unemployment  | 2         | 1  | 2   | 2   | -  | 1  | 6    |
| Foreign ownership & investment/ Selling<br>our assets   | *         | -  | -   | 1   | -  | -  | -    |
| Farming/ Cut food imports and support our farmers       | *         | -  | -   | -   | 1  | 1  | -    |
| Globalisation/Fairer world trade                        | *         | 1  | 1   | -   | -  | 1  | -    |
| Homelessness/ Lack of housing                           | *         | *  | *   | -   | -  | 1  | -    |
| General Infrastructure/ Energy, Water,<br>Internet etc. | '*        | *  | -   | -   | -  | 1  | -    |
| Total Economic/ Financial issues                        | 32        | 29 | 33  | 37  | 26 | 33 | 32   |
| Climate Change / Global warming                         | 17        | 18 | 17  | 12  | 25 | 19 | 13   |
| Other Environmental issues                              | 5         | 5  | 4   | 4   | 6  | 7  | 4    |
| Famine  | 3         | 3  | 1   | 3   | 4  | 5  | 3    |

| Pollution/ Rubbish                      | 1              | 1               | 1  | *       | 1  | 1             | 3  |
|---|----------------|-----------------|----|---------|----|---------------|----|
| Water conservation                      | 1              | *               | 1  | _       | 1  | 2             | 5  |
| Natural Disasters — Floods, Earthquakes | 1<br>\<br>\    | 1               | 1  | _       | -  | -             | _  |
| Total Environmental Issues              | 26             | 28              | 25 | 18      | 37 | 32            | 23 |
| Wars and conflicts                      | 8              | 8               | 8  | 9       | 8  | 5             | 5  |
| Terrorism                               | 4              | 4               | 4  | 5       | 3  | $\frac{3}{2}$ | 3  |
| World Peace                             | 2              | 2               | 2  | *       | 5  | $\frac{2}{2}$ | 5  |
| Security, Safety                        | 1              | 1               | 1  | 1       | 1  | $\frac{2}{2}$ |    |
| Relations with other countries          | *              | 1               | 1  | 1       | 1  | 2             |    |
| Total Terrorism/Wars/Security/Safety    | 15             | 16 <sup>1</sup> | 15 | 1<br>16 | 17 | - 11          | 8  |
| Greed/ Materialism                      | 2              | 2               | 2  | 2       | 2  | 3             | -  |
| Educational issues                      | 1              | 1               | 1  | *       | _  | 1             | 3  |
| Crime/ Law & Order                      | 1              | 1               | 1  | 1       | 1  | 1             | 5  |
| Drugs and drug abuse                    | 1              | *               | 1  | *       | 1  | -             | _  |
| Social apathy/Family breakdowns         | /              |                 |    |         |    |               |    |
| Selfishness/Moral decline               | 1              | 2               | 1  | 3       | 1  | 2             | -  |
| Youth issues (Homelessness/ Apathy      | J              |                 |    |         |    |               |    |
| etc.)                                   | 1              | 1               | -  | 1       | 1  | 2             | -  |
| Anger/Violence/Aggression               | *              | *               | 1  | -       | 1  | -             | 2  |
| Corruption                              | *              | 1               | *  | *       | -  | _             | -  |
| Total Social Issues                     | 7              | 6               | 7  | 8       | 5  | 6             | 8  |
| Government, Political system, Politica  |                |                 |    |         | 5  |               |    |
| leadership                              | 3              | 4               | 2  | 3       | 1  | 2             | 3  |
| Refugees and Asylum problems            | 1              | 2               | *  | 2       | 1  | 1             | _  |
| Religion, Religious fundamentalism      | 1              | 1               | 1  | 1       | 3  | 2             | _  |
| Human rights                            | 1              | 1               | *  | -       | -  | -             | 3  |
| Immigration/ Immigration policy         | *              | *               | _  | *       | 1  | -             | -  |
| Multiculturalism/ Integration           | /              |                 |    |         | •  |               |    |
| Assimilation                            | ′ *            | -               | -  | *       | -  | -             | -  |
| Racism/Racial tensions                  | *              | -               | 1  | -       | -  | -             | -  |
| Intolerance/ Discrimination             | *              | *               | 1  | _       | 1  | _             | _  |
| Total Government/ Politics              | /              |                 |    |         | 1  |               |    |
| Immigration/ Human Rights               | 6              | 7               | 5  | 7       | 7  | 5             | 6  |
| Other health issues                     | 2              | 2               | 3  | 2       | 2  | -             | 3  |
| Hospitals                               | 1              | 1               | 1  | *       | 1  | -             | -  |
| Total Health Issues                     | 3              | 2               | 4  | 3       | 3  | -             | 3  |
| Energy crisis                           | 1              | 1               | 1  | 1       | 1  | 1             | -  |
| Sustainable management of natura        | 1              | -               |    |         | -  |               |    |
| resources                               | - *            | *               | -  | 1       | -  | 1             | -  |
| Depletion of fossil fuels               | *              | *               | 1  | *       | -  | -             | _  |
|   | f <sub>2</sub> | 4               |    | 2       | 1  | 2             |    |
| Fossil Fuels/Petrol Price               | 2              | 1               | 2  | 2       | 1  | 2             | -  |
| Ties to the USA                         | *              | 1               | -  | -       | _  | -             | -  |
| Other                                   | 4              | 5               | 5  | 3       | 3  | 3             | 14 |
| Can't say                               | 5              | 7               | 4  | 6       | 1  | 5             | 6  |
| · · · · J                               |                | -               |    | -       |    | -             |    |

TOTAL

100

100 100 100 100 100 100

\*Less than 1%. # Results for sample sizes less than 50 (Tasmania) should be treated with caution.

100

## Most Important Problem facing Australia

|  | AUSTRALIA          |                    |                    |                     |                                       |  |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
|  | Dec                | NSW                | VIC                | QLD                 | WA                                    |  |
|  | <b>2010</b><br>%   | %                  | %                  | %                   | %                                     |  |
| The Economy/ Economic problems/ Interest rates   | <sup>70</sup><br>8 | <sup>90</sup><br>7 | <sup>90</sup><br>7 | <sup>70</sup><br>12 | <sup>70</sup><br>4                    |  |
| Cost of living issues/ Rising prices/ Inflation  | 8                  | 3                  | 2                  | 5                   | 2                                     |  |
| Banks/ Bank interest rates   | J<br>1             | 3<br>1             | 1                  | 2                   | Δ                                     |  |
| Financial problems/ Money issues   | 1                  | 1                  | 2                  | 2<br>1              | 1                                     |  |
| Housing affordability  | 1                  | 1                  | 1                  | 1                   | 3                                     |  |
| Taxation — Mining Tax, Resource Tax etc.   | 1                  | 1                  | 1                  | 2                   | 1                                     |  |
| (Sub Total) Total Financial Issues/ Cost of living                                       | 1<br>14            | 1<br>13            | 1<br>14            | <sup>2</sup><br>21  | 1<br>10                               |  |
| l' l'  | 1 <b>4</b><br>2    | 13<br>2            | 3                  | <b>4</b>            | 10                                    |  |
| Unemployment<br>Foreign ownership & investment/ Selling our assets                       | 2                  | 23                 | 3<br>2             | 4                   | 2                                     |  |
| Poverty, the gap between rich and poor   | 2                  | 3<br>1             | $\frac{2}{2}$      | 2 3                 | 3                                     |  |
| Farming/ Cut food imports and support our farmers  | 1                  | 1                  | 2<br>1             | 5<br>1              | 5                                     |  |
| <b>e</b> 1 11  |                    |                    | 1<br>*             | 1<br>*              | 1                                     |  |
| General Infrastructure/ Energy, Water, Internet etc.<br>Globalisation/Fairer world trade | 1                  | 1                  | *                  |                     |                                       |  |
|  | 1                  | 2<br>1             | *                  | -<br>*              | $\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 1 \end{array}$ |  |
| Homelessness/ Lack of housing  | 1                  |                    | 2                  |                     | 1                                     |  |
| Over-population  | 1                  | 1<br>2             | ∠<br>*             | 1                   | <br>1                                 |  |
| Transport/ Transport infrastructure/ Road & rail   | 1<br>28            |                    |                    | 1                   | 1                                     |  |
| Total Economic/ Financial issues   | -                  | <b>28</b>          | 25                 | 35                  | <b>18</b>                             |  |
| Government, Political system, Political leadership                                       | 8<br>5             | 8                  | 6                  | 11                  | 9                                     |  |
| Refugees and Asylum problems   |                    | 5                  | 2                  | 7                   | 11                                    |  |
| Immigration/Immigration policy   | 4                  | 5                  | 6                  | 3<br>*              | 4                                     |  |
| Aboriginal Issues/ Health/ Rights (Australia only)                                       | 1                  | 2                  | 1<br>*             |                     | 2                                     |  |
| Human rights   |                    | 1<br>*             | *                  | *                   | -                                     |  |
| Multiculturalism/ Integration/ Assimilation  |                    | *                  |                    | 1                   | 1 1                                   |  |
| Racism/Racial tensions   |                    |                    | 1                  | 1<br>*              | 1                                     |  |
| Religion, Religious fundamentalism   | 1<br>*             | 1                  | 1                  | *                   | - ·                                   |  |
| Intolerance/ Discrimination  | •                  | *                  | -                  | -                   | -                                     |  |
| Total Government/ Politics/ Immigration/ Human   | <sup>1</sup> 21    | 23                 | 16                 | 24                  | 28                                    |  |
| Rights   |                    |                    |                    |                     |                                       |  |
| Climate Change / Global warming  | 9                  | 11                 | 10                 | 5                   | 9                                     |  |
| Water conservation   | 5                  | 6                  | 4                  | 1                   | 9                                     |  |
| Other Environmental issues   | 3                  | 3                  | 2                  | 3                   | 5                                     |  |
| Natural Disasters — Floods, Earthquakes  | 2                  | 2                  | 3                  | 1                   | -                                     |  |
| Drought  | 1                  | 1                  | *                  | -                   | 1                                     |  |

| Pollution/ Rubbish                                 | 1                   | *            | 1             | *    | 1       |
|--|---------------------|--------------|---------------|------|---------|
| Famine   | 1<br>*              | _            | 1<br>*        | _    | 1 .     |
| Total Environmental Issues                         | 20                  | 23           | 19            | - 11 | 1<br>25 |
| Educational issues                                 | 3                   | 3            | 4             | 3    | 1       |
| Anger/Violence/Aggression                          | 1                   | 1            | 2             | -    | 1 .     |
| Crime/ Law & Order                                 | 1                   | 1            | $\frac{1}{2}$ | *    | 2       |
| Greed/ Materialism                                 | 1                   | *            | 1             | 1    | 1 .     |
|  | downs/1             |              |               |      | _       |
| Selfishness/Moral decline                          | 10 1 1              | *            | 2             | 1    | 1       |
| Youth issues (Homelessness/ Apathy etc.)           | 1                   | -            | 2             | _    |         |
| Corruption   | *                   | *            | -             | _    |         |
| Drugs and drug abuse                               | *                   | *            | 1             | _    |         |
| Total Social Issues                                | 8                   | 6            | 13            | 6    | 6       |
| Other health issues                                | 5                   | 6            | 6             | 4    | 4 4     |
| Hospitals  | 1                   | 2            | 2             | _    | 1 .     |
| Total Health Issues                                | 6                   | 7            | 8             | 4    | 5       |
| Relations with other countries                     | 1                   | 1            | 1             | 1    | 1       |
| Security, Safety                                   | 1                   | 1            | 1             | 2    | 2       |
| Wars and conflicts                                 | 1                   | 1            | 1             | 2    | 1 2     |
| Terrorism  | *                   | _            | 1             | -    | *       |
| World Peace  | *                   | *            | *             | -    |         |
| Total Terrorism/Wars/Security/Safety               | 4                   | 3            | 3             | 4    | 4       |
| Energy crisis                                      | 1                   | 2            | 1             | 1    |         |
| Sustainable management of natural resources        | 1                   | 1            | *             | 1    | 1       |
| Depletion of fossil fuels                          | *                   | *            | -             | -    |         |
|  | Fossil <sub>2</sub> | 2            | •             | •    | 4       |
| Fuels/Petrol Price                                 | 2                   | 3            | 2             | 2    | 1 3     |
| Ties to the USA                                    | *                   | 1            | -             | -    |         |
| Other  | 3                   | 2            | 4             | 4    | 6       |
| Can't say  | 8                   | 4            | 10            | 10   | 7       |
| TOTAL  | 100                 | 100          | 100           | 100  | 100     |
| *Less than 1% # Results for sample sizes less than | n 50 (Tasmania) s   | should be tr | eated w       | vith |         |

\*Less than 1%.. # Results for sample sizes less than 50 (Tasmania) should be treated with caution.

## **MULTI-COUNTRY STUDIES**

## Hong Kong and China optimistic about the year ahead

Synovate global study on consumers' view on the economy

## 7 January 2011

HONG KONG — As the economy continues to stabilise, at least to some extent in much of the world, are consumers' feelings following suit? According to Synovate's first release of results on consumers' perception on the economy from the "Synovate Global Trends study," consumers in

China and Hong Kong are the top groups in Asia feeling the most optimistic about their market's economy and what's ahead.<sup>27</sup>

This first release of results on consumers' perception on the economy from the "Synovate Global Trends Study" surveyed over 23,000 respondents across 28 markets, including China and Hong Kong, revealing which markets are the most optimistic and pessimistic about their country's economic condition and job market, consumer's view on their personal financial situation, what they expect ahead on these factors in the coming months, and whether now is a good time to buy/ sell a car or a house.

## Consumers in China and Hong Kong optimistic about the economy ahead

China ranked near the top amongst the 28 countries surveyed in terms of the markets' Consumer Mood Index. The Synovate Consumer Mood Index asks respondents a series of questions about their own and their country's current and future economic prospects, including the economy in general, their personal economic situation and the job market in their country. China is the 4th highest market in feeling positive about their economy, while Hong Kong is not far behind in the 7th spot.

Ranking of countries base on their Consumer Mood Index:Ranking of countries base on their Consumer Mood Index:

- 1. Brazil (Consumer mood index of 137)
- 2. Sweden (129)
- 3. Columbia (125)
- 4. China (123)
- 5. United Arab Emirate (119)
- 6. South Africa (116)
- 7. Hong Kong (114)
- 8. Norway (114)
- 9. India (111)
- 10. Chile (108)

On the other hand, respondents in five of the G7 countries feel quite pessimistic regarding the economic situation in their countries, with Japan (75), France (75), Italy (76), UK (77) and the US (91) all showing a low Consumer Mood Index.

Please see Table 1, Global Consumer Mood Index, for further details and reference to rest of the markets surveyed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> http://www.synovate.com/news/article/2011/01/hong-kong-and-china-optimistic-about-the-year-ahead-showsnew-synovate-global-study-on-consumers-view-on-the-economy.html




Figure 1 – Global Consumer Mood Index

Commented Susanna Lam, Research Director at Synovate: "China and Hong Kong are the top markets in Asia showing such high optimism toward their own market's economy. Respondents in these markets think the economy is better than it was six months ago, and they believe the economic situation in the upcoming months will be better than it is today."

Fifty-six percent of consumers surveyed in China believe the overall economic situation in China will be better in the upcoming months (26% said remain the same as now, 14% worse than now). Close to half (49%) indicated their personal economy will become better (41% said remain the same as now, 7% worse than now), while 41% think the job market will improve in the coming months (35% said remain the same as now, 19% worse than now).

"In Hong Kong, respondents are more reserved about the market ahead," said Lam. "Over half (56%) believe the economy will remain about the same as the current situation (30% said the economy will become better than now, 12% worse than now), while seventy-two percent indicated so about their personal economic situation (17% anticipated it will become better, 10% worst). Toward the job market, close to 60% said it will maintain about the same (27% said it will improve, 11% worse)."

#### Hong Kong top market globally to indicate "Not a good time to buy a house"

"A bit contrary to what we are seeing globally, housing prices in Hong Kong and China continue to go up, up and up in 2010. The inflated housing market deters consumers from buying property," said Lam.

"In Hong Kong, four out of five respondents (84%) indicated it is a bad time to buy a house, the top market indicating this amongst the 28 markets surveyed. While 74% of those surveyed in mainland China, the second on the list, indicated so."

What about selling a house? The opinion is more diverse, said Lam.

Fifty-two percent of respondents in Hong Kong said it is a bad time to sell, while 41% believed it is good. In China, 56% said it is not ideal to sell versus 40% saying it is.

"The interpretation on this can be two fold: those indicating it is a bad time to sell are anticipating that the housing market will continue to up, hence they want to hold it off until a few months later to see how the market evolves. On the other hand the group of pro-sellers are encouraged by the already boosted market and want to gain some return on their property investment now," commented Lam.

Furthermore, a question on whether it is a good time to purchase a car in the next 12 months was asked. Sixty percent of those surveyed in Hong Kong indicated it is a bad time (20% said good time to purchase). For China, respondents are more balanced with 48% saying it is not opportune to buy versus 45% believing the purchase is good to go.

## Appendix

# Percentage ownership of different financial products by respondents in Hong Kong and China

The survey also asked what financial products respondents currently own. Figure 2 highlights the percentage ownership of different financial products by respondents in China and Hong Kong.



## Figure 2 - Ownership of financial products

### About the Survey

The Synovate Consumer Mood Index data was taken from the "Synovate Global Trends Study", an international research study that monitors and measures consumers' values and attitudes on a variety of topics and their impact on trends and other emerging insights.

In this first wave of study, over 23,000 respondents aged 16 to 65 were surveyed between the period of August to November 2010, across 28 markets of Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and USA.

The Synovate Consumer Mood Index asks respondents a series of questions about their own and their country's current and future economic prospects, including the economy in general, their personal economic situation and the job market in their country.

To calculate the situation indicators (current and future), the negative answers (current situation is bad/ the future situation will be worse) were subtracted from the positive ones (current situation is good / the future situation will be better), then adding 100 to leverage the results around this score and calculate the average of all topics to obtain a single score that represents current situation and future situation:

- Current situation perception = average (economy in general net + 100, personal economic situation net + 100 and job market net + 100)
- Future situation perception = average (economy in general net + 100, personal economic situation net + 100 and job market net + 100)

## CYBERWORLD


## Internet Gains on Television as Public's Main News Source

More Young People Cite Internet than TV

January 4, 2011

The internet is slowly closing in on television as Americans' main source of national and international news. Currently, 41% say they get most of their news about national and international news from the internet, which is little changed over the past two years but up 17 points since 2007. Television remains the most widely used source for national and international news -- 66% of Americans say it is their main source of news -- but that is down from 74% three years ago and 82% as recently as 2002.<sup>28</sup>

#### Where Do You Get Most of your News About National and International Issues?



PEW RESEARCH CENTER Dec 1-5, 2010. Figures add to more than 100% because respondents could volunteer up to two main sources. If asked more than once in a calendar year, trend shows final datapoint from each year.

The national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted Dec. 1-5, 2010, among 1,500 adults reached on cell phones and landlines, finds that more people continue to cite the internet than newspapers as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1844/poll-main-source-national-international-news-internet-television-newspapers

their main source of news, reflecting both the growth of the internet, and the gradual decline in newspaper readership (from 34% in 2007 to 31% now). The proportion citing radio as their main source of national and international news has remained relatively stable in recent years; currently, 16% say it is their main source.

An analysis of how different generations are getting their news suggests that these trends are likely to continue. In 2010, for the first time, the internet has surpassed television as the main source of national and international news for people younger than age 30. Since 2007, the number of 18 to 29 year olds citing the internet as their main source has nearly doubled, from 34% to 65%. Over this period, the number of young people citing television as their main news source has dropped from 68% to 52%.

#### Internet Now Rivals TV as Main News Source for College Grads

|                 | vision | net | -News-<br>paper | Radio |   |
|-----------------|--------|-----|-----------------|-------|---|
|                 | %      | %   | %               | %     | % |
| Total           | 66     | 41  | 31              | 16    | 3 |
| Men             | 61     | 43  | 29              | 17    | 3 |
| Women           | 70     | 39  | 33              | 15    | 3 |
| Men 18-49       | 55     | 56  | 21              | 19    | 3 |
| Women 18-49     | 62     | 53  | 23              | 16    | 3 |
| Men 50+         | 69     | 28  | 39              | 14    | 3 |
| Women 50+       | 78     | 24  | 45              | 14    | 3 |
| White           | 64     | 41  | 32              | 18    | 3 |
| Black           | 86     | 35  | 30              | 9     | 3 |
| Hispanic        | 66     | 45  | 28              | 12    | 3 |
| College grad+   | 54     | 51  | 35              | 20    | 5 |
| Some college    | 63     | 51  | 30              | 15    | 2 |
| HS or less      | 75     | 29  | 29              | 14    | 2 |
| \$75k or more   | 57     | 54  | 29              | 22    | 4 |
| \$30k-\$74,999  | 67     | 42  | 29              | 17    | 3 |
| Less than \$30k | 72     | 34  | 33              | 12    | 2 |
| Northeast       | 63     | 40  | 38              | 15    | 5 |
| Midwest         | 73     | 38  | 30              | 17    | 2 |
| South           | 68     | 41  | 29              | 13    | 3 |
| West            | 55     | 47  | 30              | 20    | 2 |
| Republican      | 67     | 38  | 29              | 18    | 3 |
| Democrat        | 69     | 43  | 32              | 12    | 5 |
| Independent     | 63     | 43  | 33              | 18    | 2 |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Dec 1-5, 2010. Figures read across and add to more than 100% because respondents could volunteer up to two main sources. Whites and blacks include only those who are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race. Among those ages 30 to 49, the internet is on track to equal, or perhaps surpass, television as the main source of national and international news within the next few years. Currently, 48% say the internet is their main source -- up 16 points from 2007 -- and 63% cite television -- down eight points.

The internet also has grown as a news source for people ages 50 to 64; currently 34% say the internet is their main source of national and international news, nearly equal to the number who cite newspapers (38%), though still far below television (71%). There has been relatively little change in the how people ages 65 and older get their news. The internet has risen to 14% from 5% in 2007, but is still far behind newspapers (47%) and television (79%) as a main source.

The decline in the share of Americans who cite television as their main source of national and international news crosses all age groups. Over the past three years, the number saying TV is their main source has fallen 16 points among 18-29 year-olds, eight points among those ages 30 to 49, and six points among those ages 50 and older.


## TV News Still Dominates Among Less Educated

College graduates are about as likely to get most of their national and international news from the internet (51%) as television (54%). Those with some college education are just as likely as college grads to cite the internet as their main source (51%), while 63% cite television. By contrast, just 29% of those with no more than a high school education cite the internet while more than twice as many (75%) cite television.

Similarly, those with household incomes of \$75,000 or more are about as likely to get most of their news on the internet (54%) as from television (57%). People with household incomes under \$30,000 are far more likely to cite television (72%) than the internet (34%).

There also are different patterns of news consumption across regions of the country. Notably, people living in the West are the most likely to cite the internet as their main source of national and international news (47% vs. 40% in other parts of the country), and the least likely to cite television (55% vs. 68% elsewhere).

#### On Television, Do You Get Most of Your News About National and International Issues From...?



#### Both Cable News and Broadcast News See Declines

Reflecting the slow decline in the proportion of people getting most of their national and international news from television, the numbers specifically citing cable news outlets or broadcast networks as their main news source has fallen. When asked where on television they get most of their news, 36% name a cable network such as CNN, the Fox News Channel or MSNBC; 22% name ABC News, CBS News or NBC News; and 16% say they get most of their national and international news from local news programming.

Compared with five years ago, the share citing a cable network as their main source is down seven points (from 43% to 36%), and the share citing a broadcast network is down eight points (from 30% to 22%). The local news figure has remained relatively constant over this period.

Mobile Phones Shaping New Social Lives

Neileson Mobile

From texting to video to social networking, mobile phones are taking an ever-expanding role in our daily lives. And young people around the world are more immersed in mobile technology than any previous generation.<sup>29</sup>

The Nielsen Company analyzes and tracks mobile usage in North America, Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. In this report, we'll highlight mobile youth data from Brazil, Russia, India, China, Vietnam, Germany, US, UK, Spain and Italy.

Usage patterns vary greatly among youth throughout the world, demonstrating how culture, economy and age can all play a large part in mobile behavior. These factors affect device selection, payment and usage.

Understanding whether behaviors are a function of age or other environmental factors can help marketers communicate more effectively with this key demographic through mobile services and devices.

What kind of phones do young people use?


#### Smartphone v. Feature Phone


Out of all the countries examined, Italy leads in smartphone penetration with 47 percent of young people ages 15-24 owning a smartphone, compared to 31 percent of adults over 25. Smartphone penetration among European youth averages 28 percent in the countries surveyed, while penetration among older adults in Europe is 27 percent.

As of Q2 2010, 28 percent of US mobile subscribers had smartphones. Youth in the United States exceed the population average smartphone penetration by 5 percent. All countries tend to skew male in smartphone adoption with one notable exception—the US, where 55 percent of smartphone users age 15-24 are female. In the overall US smartphone population, 55 percent were male.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> <u>http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-</u> downloads/2010%20Reports/Nielsen-Mobile-Youth-Around-The-World-Dec-2010.pdf

Italy has the highest smartphone penetration among youth 15-24; smartphone users skew male everywhere but US






Source: H1 2010


#### Multiple SIM Cards

One distinguishing factor of the US versus other countries' mobile behavior is multiple-SIM card usage. Outside the United States, it is not unusual for people to swap the SIM card in their phone in order to take advantage of different tariffs and lower cost in-network calling from mobile carriers. Multiple SIM usage is even more common in Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) among youth, where adults 25+ have a lower usage rate. In Europe, youths use multiple SIMs 9 percent less than the adult average. In terms of the motivation behind having more than one SIM, Italian youth claim their primary reason is to take advantage of different tariffs and free text messages. In China, young multiple SIM users are most likely to do so because of the ability to have different numbers for different people.

Some device manufacturers are taking advantage of this trend by creating devices that make it easy for consumers to insert multiple SIMs into the same phone at the same time.

How did they choose their device? Person responsible for device selection An overwhelming majority of young people throughout the world choose their own devices. Across the countries surveyed, only 16 percent of young people's parents chose their phone.






#### **Purchase Drivers**

Price was the most common consideration in selecting a mobile phone for young people, though that is true among other age groups, too. Adults in these countries rated price the most important consideration, too. Youth aged 15 to 24 put price as the first purchase driver, with the exception

of Russian youth, 21 percent of whom placed design/style first. Around 14 percent of Brazilian adults say design/style is the most important consideration, compared to 7 percent of US adults.



## How do they pay for their phones?


Prepaid v. postpaid

Prepaid, also commonly referred to as "pay as you go," is a method of payment where mobile credit is bought before the service is activated. Unlike postpaid services, which are often contract based, the minutes people can talk are paid for prior to use and require minimal credit history. Outside the United States, prepaying for service is a common method, often due to a lack of the required infrastructure and ecosphere to track credit history. At 24 percent, young people in the US are much less likely to prepay than the emerging markets, which all have prepaid rates over 85 percent.

This data is consistent with the global adult population, except postpaid as a majority tends to slightly increase in the 25+ bracket, which may be a more suitable age for a contractual agreement.

## Person responsible for mobile charges

Personal payment for mobile charges increases as teens move into young adulthood. Across the countries surveyed, personal payment increases on average thirty percent once mobile users exit their teen years. Germany and Brazil are tied for the highest percentage of teens who say they pay their own bill, while Italy has the lowest. The US has the lowest rate of personal payment among ages 20-24, with only 45 percent of youth in that age bracket paying for their own service.



## Types of Advanced Data Usage

At 70 percent, young Chinese advanced data users have a significantly higher mobile internet usage rate than the rest of the world. In the UK and US, females have at least a 10 percent higher rate of messaging use than males.

Among European youth, those in the UK are more likely to use mobile internet, with over 20 percent more usage than other European countries.

Text and Picture Messaging

Messaging tends to skew female in the majority of markets, except for a few outliers. Indian males are twice as likely as Indian females to use mobile messaging.

China also skews slightly male in both types of messaging, but only by a 4 percent margin. In the UK and US, females have at least a 10 percent higher rate than males who use messaging services.

#### Mobile Insights Coverage

In 2010, The Nielsen Company surveyed mobile consumers in 19 countries, including the countries listed below. The sample sizes indicated in the chart reflect all respondents, not just youth.

| Global Coverage | Methodology  | Sample (per wave) | Cadence   | Regional Coverage       |
|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------------|
| US              | Online       | 75,000            | Quarterly | National                |
| Germany         | Online       | 5,000             | Q1        | National                |
| Spain           | Online       | 8,500             | Quarterly | National                |
| Italy           | Online       | 5,000             | Quarterly | National                |
| UK              | Online       | 5,000             | Q1        | National                |
| Brazil          | Face to Face | 5,000             | Q2        | 10 urban cities         |
| Russia          | Face to Face | 5,000             | Q1        | 9 urban cities          |
| China           | Face to Face | 5,000             | Q1        | Tier 1, 2, and 3 cities |
| India           | Face to Face | 5,000             | Q2        | 22 telecom circles      |